



*Printed for S. Briscoe in Russel
Street Covent Garden.*



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THE ~~24~~ 40
Compleat Captain :
 OR, AN
 ABRIDGEMENT
 OF
Julius Cæsar's Commentaries.
 WITH
 Political Remarks

On his WARS with the
Gauls, } Affricans,
Brittains, } Alexandrians,
Spaniards, } And the Civil Wars
 By HENRY Duke of ROHAN.

WITH
 The Military Discipline of the *Greeks* and
Romans, shewing the means by which they
 obtain'd so many *Glorious Victories*, and ex-
 plaining the manner of their *Encampments*.

To which is added,
 The *Maxims of War now in use*. Together with a
 Comparison betwixt the *Ancient* and *Modern* way
 of making *WAR*. With Observations on both.

LONDON, Printed for S. Briscoe in Ruffel-Street,
 Covent-Garden, 1694.



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TO THE
KING.

SIR,

I Make bold to present
You with the fruits of my
present Vacation from bu-
siness, wherein You will find an
Abridgement of the Wars of
Cæsar the Greatest Captain
that ever was in the World,
whose prudent Conduct you may
A 3 observe

The Epistle Dedicatory.

observe in all his Designs, a Marvellous Diligence in his Executions, and an admirable Constancy in his greatest Difficulties. If at any time he discovered somewhat of Temerity, it was very seldom, and serves only to demonstrate that his Courage was nothing Inferiour to that of Alexander the Great. You are, SIR, the Monarch of that Warlike Nation which cost him so much labour to Subdue, and like him You are so Inur'd to the Fatigues of War, that they are become Habitual to You, and You have been therein

The Epistle Dedicatory.

therein so Fortunate, that
Your Actions are at present
the Greatest Ornaments of
History, You are a Prince
upon whom all Europe have
their Eyes fix'd as the
Great Restorer of their Liber-
ty. If You continue Your Ge-
nerous Designs you shall thence
reap Immortal Glory, and Your
Renown will equal that of the
Greatest Captains of Antiquity.
But the perfection of this high
Courage consists in perseverance.
Consider, SIR, that many
Princes who begun well have
lost all their Reputation by be-
A 4 taking

The Epistle Dedicatory.

taking themselves to their Ease too soon, because the Glory of Great Personages does evanish if they love to be out of Action, they being in this like those who Swim against the Stream, they are certainly carried backward, if they don't push themselves on to advance forward. Here You have also a Collection of the Order in which the Ancient Greeks and Romans did manage their War, which is the true foundation of all Military Art, for though the late Invention of Gunpowder hath occasion'd a great Change in the way of making

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The Epistle Dedicatory.

king War, yet even at this time all the good Maxims of War are drawn hence. Which I endeavour to make evident by a small Treatise of War herewith annexed, wherein my design is to demonstrate, that the difference which is betwixt the Arms us'd now, and those us'd by the Ancients, is no sufficient ground for us to despise their Order of War.

SIR, If I please Your Majesty, I obtain my Desire, and for Reward shall only beg with the greatest of Humility, that You would not disdain to make use of me in such occasions as
offer

The Epistle Dedicatory.

offer themselves for the Advancement of Your Glory, so that my Obedience may be made manifest in the Execution of Your Commands, my Fidelity by the Faithful Discharge of my Trust, and how little I value my Life, so it may be serviceable to You in the War. In the mean time I shall Pray to God,

S I R,

That he would Bless Your Reign,
make it of long continuance and
render your Sacred Person happy
beyond all President.

Your most Humble, most Obedient,
and most Faithful Subject and Servant,

H. D. R.

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A N
ABRIDGMENT
OF THE
W A R S
I N

CAESAR'S Commentaries.

With Political Remarks upon them.

An Abridgment of the Gallick Wars.

B O O K I.

CÆsar having had the Government of Gallia for the space of Five years, the first War he made there, was against the Switzers: The ambition of Orgintorix

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occasion'd it, he was a Man Nobly born, Rich and Powerful in his Country ; and therefore easily perswaded those People who were naturally bold, and inclin'd to Arms, by the continual Wars the ywag'd against their Neighbours, to Invade *Gallia*, which Country was larger and better than their own. Their deliberations being fixed in order thereunto, they took three years time to make their preparations, during which they provide Carriages and Sumpter-Horses, order all their Country to be sown with Corn, for the subsistence of their Army, and nominate *Orgentorix* for their Chief and Leader, who on his side employs that time, in making Alliances with his Neighbours, perswades *Casticus* a *Bourguignon*, to make himself Lord of his Country as his Father had been before him ; Prevails with *Dumnorix* of *Autun* (Brother to *Divitiac*) the most powerful Man of his City, to do the same, and marry his Daughter to him. But the *Switzers* who were always jealous of their liberty,

erty, perceiving that *Orgentorix* aspir'd to enslave them, seize on his Person. Several contestations arising about his Tryal, occasion'd by his Relations and Friends, he dyes in Prison. Yet for all this they persist in their former design, and take the Field on the appointed day, having taken Provisions for three Months along with them, burnt the remainder of their Corn, and all their Cities to the number of twelve, and 400 Villages: and having prevailed with those of *Basle*, *Distalengen* and *Clackii* to do the like, they march towards *Geneva*, in order to pass the *Rhosne* there. *Cesar* being inform'd thereof, repairs immediately to *Geneva*, assembles as many men as he can, causes a Bridge that was over the *Rhosne* to be cut down, and undertakes to make a Ditch and a Wall, eighteen Miles in length, extending from the Lake of *Geneva* to Mount *Jura*, to hinder the passage of the *Rhosne*. Whereupon the *Switzers* send Deputies to him, to demand the pas-

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sage: he amuses them, promising to give them an answer another time. In the mean while he puts himself in a condition to oppose them, and they having attempted the said Passage in vain upon his refusal, take the Way of *Burgundy* which *Dumnorix* procur'd for them. Upon this *Cesar* leaves *Labienus* at *Geneva*, and goes himself to raise new Legions, follows them, and having overtaken them at the Passage of the *Saone*, beats the fourth part of their Army, which was not yet past, and casts a Bridge over the said River, in order to pursue them; but his Provisions beginning to fail him, and perceiving that *Dumnorix* hindred those of *Autun* to send him supplies according to their promise, he acquaints *Divitiac* his intimate Friend and Brother to *Dumnorix* therewith, who confesses it to him, interceeds in his behalf, and obtains his Pardon. After which being inform'd that the *Switzers* were Incamp't at the foot of a Mountain, he sends to view it, and finding that
the

the access of it was easie, he sends *Labiennus* thither in the Night, to gain the top thereof, and having put his Army in Battalia in the morning, he dispatches *Considius* to view the Enemy, who being allarm'd at the sight of *Labiennus*, brings word to *Cæsar* that the Enemy had possess'd themselves of the Mountain; which stopt him, and hindr'd him from defeating the *Switzers* that Day. The following day he marches towards *Beaume* to distribute Corn to his Army, which the *Switzers* observing follow'd him. *Cæsar* seeing them coming towards him, makes himself Master of a Hill, puts his Army in Battalia upon the rising, and places two new Legions at the very top of it, with all the Baggage, alights from of his Horse, sends him away and makes all his men do the like, to shew them that they had no way, but to Vanquish or to Dye. The *Switzers* attack him; he beats them, pursues them briskly, and forbids those of *Langres* to assist them with Provisions, and finally constrains them to sur-

render upon Discretion. He disarms them, takes Hostages, and obliges them to return into their Country, and to rebuild their Houses, and of three hundred sixty eight thousand Persons among which fourscore and twelve thousand bore Arms, they went back in all but one hundred thousand.

R E-

REMARKS.

THE resolution of this People, which seems Barbarous, and is universally condemn'd by reason of its ill success, has nevertheless the same principles by which all Conquerors act, viz. a desire of Commanding, and of extending their Territories. Their prudence is Remarkable in taking three Years time to make Preparations, and their constancy in persisting in their design notwithstanding the Death of their Leader, and in the Execution thereof by burning their Goods and Houses, to remove all hopes of a return, depending only upon the good success of their Swords. From thence we may gather that great Designs ought never to be undertaken timorously; That we ought not to think on the means to escape, but rather on those that conduce to Victory: For if at the beginning of a dangerous underta-

B 4 king

king, you discover how you may save your self, the natural impatency or timorousness of mankind will put them upon seeking the way to do it, on the least accident that happens: and had not the Switzers encounter'd with the incomparable Virtue of Cæsar, who by his Valour, Industry, Diligence and good Fortune stop their Fury, they might have succeeded in their undertaking.

In the management of this War Cæsar has shewn (as in all the others) that the happy success of all his Exploits, is to be imputed to his invariable order in Incamping securely, always retrenching himself, to avoid being constrain'd to fight against his will, and to be in a condition to improve all advantages to beat his Enemies: To his care that Provision might not fail him, and to his keeping his Souldiers constantly in Exercise and upon their Guard, to be the better able to execute his designs with speed and in good Order.

The pardoning of Dumnorix is remarkable. His natural Clemency inclin'd him to it, suffering himself to be vanquish'd

quishted at the intreaty of his Brother Divitiac whom he lov'd; nevertheless he had a constant eye upon him, lest new inconveniencies might thereby arise for the future.

The fault of Confidius shows how necessary it is to imploy Persons of experience to view an Army.

And his ordering the Switzers to go back to inhabit their own Country again, was a great piece of Prudence to hinder the Germans (a very powerful Nation) from taking possession of it, and coming too near Provence.

T H E
S E C O N D W A R .

THe Subject of the second War was this, the Divisions of the *Anvergnats* and *Antunois*, two potent Nations in *Gallia*, brought in the *Germans*, by the assistance of which the first overcame the other : Nevertheless, they found themselves both oppressed, particularly the Victors, the vanquish'd making their Peace by paying some Tribute, and by giving Hostages ; whereas the *Germans* seiz'd on the best part of the others Lands : Whereupon being unable to brook slavery, they summon the Estates of the Country, by *Cesar's* leave, to implore his assistance, which he promises

mises them. In order thereunto he sends Deputies to *Ariovistus* General of the *Germans*, and receives such haughty answers, that finally they come to blows; *Cesar* beats him, drives him out of *Gallia*, together with all the *Germans*, forcing him to repass the *Rhine*. These two Wars were ended in one Summer.

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REMARKS.

“ **W** Hereupon we may observe
“ how dangerous such Auxilia-
“ ry Assistances prove, especially when
“ we require ’em of such as are more Po-
“ tent than our selves. *Cæsar* indeed
“ drove out *Ariovistus*, but the *Gauls*,
“ only chang’d their Master, he In-
“ gag’d in that War for two Reasons ;
“ First because he was affraid that if that
“ Potent Nation should once get a
“ Footing into *Gallia*, they might Invade
“ *Provence* and approach too near *Italy* :
“ Secondly because that War was a
“ Step towards the Conquest of the
“ said *Gauls*, which he manag’d with
“ so much Art, keeping up their Di-
“ visions, that he made use of some
“ to overcome others, and finally sub-
“ dued them all.

“ We

“ We must also observe his diligence
“ (so much commended in all his Acti-
“ ons) in preventing his Enemies by
“ making himself Master of *Bezancon*,
“ whereby he provided for the
“ Subsistence of his Army. It was
“ in this expedition a Panick fear
“ seiz’d his Soldiers , which began
“ by the Volunteers, who being desi-
“ rous to retire, discourag’d the others,
“ in order to cover their own Shame,
“ by the general disgrace of the whole
“ Army ; which is a thing a General
“ ought carefully to look to, never
“ hazarding a Battle without having
“ first Incourag’d his Men, which *Cæ-*
“ *sar* did at that time by a Speech ; a
“ Talent in which he excell’d all o-
“ thers. He also took the advantage
“ (as several other Generals have done,
“ particularly *Marins*) of a very
“ strong Camp, before so formidable
“ an Army, to show his Soldiers by
“ divers Skirmishes, that their Enemys
“ were neither Invincible, nor braver
“ than they : making them sensible
“ that adding order and Military dis-
“ cipline

“cipline to the Prudence of their General, they were superior to them :
“for the *Romans* did never subdue other Nations by Number, or Valour,
“but by their Skill in War, which
“daily improv’d by the observation
“of their Order, and by Retrenching of their Camp. Whereupon
“it is observable that *Ariovistus* having Incampt his Army between
“*Cesar* and the place from whence he receiv’d his Provisions, and *Cæ.*
“*jar* not having beenable in five days
“time to draw him to a Battle, having well fortifid his Camp, he
“marches with his whole Army in
“order of Battle to fortifie another
“that was not so large, in a more advantageous place, two miles distance from the first, which open’d
“a way for his Provisions, causing
“one third part of his Army to work, while the other two remain’d in
“Battalia, which repulsed the Forces
“*Ariovistus* sent, to hinder the said
“Fortifications, which being finish’d
“*Cesar* leaves two Legions in it, and
marches

“ marches back with the remainder
“ of his Army into his former Camp.
“ The next day *Cæsar* places his men in
“ Battle array between the two Camps:
“ he being gone back again *Ariovistus*
“ attacks the little Camp and is re-
“ puls'd. *Cæsar* having thus reviv'd
“ the courage of his Souldiers, causes
“ his whole Army to march out in
“ Battalia, and goes up to the very
“ Retrenchments of *Ariovistus*, pro-
“ vokes him to fight, he comes out
“ and is beaten.

THE

THE
THIRD WAR.

BOOK II.

THe third War of *Cæsar* was against the *Belges*, the third part of the *Gauls*, and those that were most inclin'd to War at that time. The chief reasons of it were that seeing the rest of the *Gauls* in Peace with the *Romans*; they were affraid of being attack'd by them; besides they were sollicit'd to it by the discontents or ambition of some *Gauls*, some of which were as much displeas'd to see the *Romans* in their Country as the *Germans*; and others fearing that they would have no opportunity of making themselves Masters of some Principality, or dominion, while they remain'd there. Their Army consisted of

281000

281000 fighting Men. *Cæsar* being inform'd of those mighty preparations, Commands *Divitiac* to attack those of *Autum* and those of *Beauvais*, and having made an agreement with those of *Reims*, who declar'd themselves for him, he pitches his Camp on the River *Aisne* near *Soissons*, after which he reliev'd *Brenne*, and the Enemy endeavouring to pass the River, he opposes it, and kill's a considerable number of them. In the next place so great an Army beginning to want Provisions, and those of *Beauvais* hearing that *Divitiac* destroy'd their Country; they resolv'd to retire to their respective houses, with a resolution to joyn together again, to relieve the first that should chance to be attack'd. But they made such a disorderly retreat, that *Cæsar* had time enough to overtake them, and charging them in the Rear, routed and made a great slaughter of them, after which he lays Siege before *Nejon*, and takes it. All those people submitted, except those of *Tournay*, who were esteem'd

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steem'd the bravest of them all, and who having secured their old Men, Women and Children, resolv'd to make a good defence. *Cæsar* marches towards them, they attack him with so much fury, that they were like to have routed him, and he confesses himself, that his good fortune, had as great a share in this Combat, as his Valour and Industry: Nevertheless, he Defeated them, after which he found no more resistance, and the renown of his Victories made him formidable even in *Germany*, and acquired him all *Normandy* and *Brittany*, which *P. Crassus* one of his Lieutenants submitted to the *Roman* Empire, with one Legion only.

THE

REMARKS.

‘ *C*æsar’s Judgment is observable
‘ in this Place, who by his
‘ diligence secur’d those of *Reims*, kept
‘ them from Revoulting by his Indu-
‘ stry and Mildness, and by his pru-
‘ dence prepar’d a division against
‘ those of *Beauvais*, a most potent Peo-
‘ ple, which prov’d of great use to
‘ him.

‘ In the next place we must observe
‘ that an Army of 30 or 40 thousand
‘ Warlike well disciplin’d men, may
‘ with patience retrenching and lodg-
‘ ing themselves carefully, dissipate the
‘ most numerous Armys, which for
‘ want of Provision destroy themselves;
‘ and when they ingage (provided
‘ care be taken to avoid being sur-
‘ rounded by them) are ruin’d by
‘ disorder and confusion. This is suf-
‘ ficiently justifi’d by the Wars of the

' Romans, who never routed their
 ' Enemies, but with an inferior num-
 ' ber, nor were ever forc'd to come
 ' out of their Retrenchments to fight a-
 ' gainst their wills: and particularly
 ' in the present War, in which *Cæsar*
 ' found more work against one Pro-
 ' vince of the *Belges*, than against all
 ' the *Belges* together, he having
 ' given us a very particular descrip-
 ' tion of the Battle he fought against
 ' those of *Tournay*, as of one of the
 ' most dangerous that ever he was
 ' engag'd in, in which there are ma-
 ' ny things worthy of our considera-
 ' on.

' The First, that those of *Tournay*
 ' being inform'd that *Cæsar* caus'd his
 ' Bagage to march after every Legion,
 ' they resolv'd to put themselves in
 ' Ambush to fight him, considering
 ' very prudently that the Baggage se-
 ' perating the Legions, in a very close
 ' Country, it would be impossible for
 ' them to succour one another, and
 ' that consequently they might with all
 ' their Forces destroy every Legion a
 ' part.

' The

‘ The Second, that they were mista-
 ‘ ken in their presupposition, by reason
 ‘ that tho *Cæsar* made his Army March
 ‘ thus for his own convenience in Coun-
 ‘ try’s where he had no Enemy’s to
 ‘ Encounter, yet when he came among
 ‘ his Enemy’s he caus’d Six Legions to
 ‘ march together, all the Baggage
 ‘ after them, and two new Legions in
 ‘ the Rear, in which Order they Attackt
 ‘ him in his Quarters.

‘ The Third, *Cæsar*’s own Confession
 ‘ who acknowledges freely that he
 ‘ was Attack’d so unexpectedly and
 ‘ with so much Vigor, and in so close
 ‘ a Country, that it was neither his
 ‘ usual Order that sav’d him, (for they
 ‘ did not allow him time to put his Ar-
 ‘ my in Battalia) nor his Exhortations,
 ‘ nor yet his presence in every place,
 ‘ (because he was forc’d to Fight
 ‘ where he chanc’d to be :) but he who-
 ‘ ly imputes his deliverance to the long
 ‘ Discipline of his Soldiers, who
 ‘ knew of their own accord how to
 ‘ place themselves, and to his exactness
 ‘ in causing all the Officers to remain

‘ in their Posts, while the Retrenchments of the Camp were making, so that no place wanted Men to Command, and others to Obey: which caus’d the Resistance, and hinder’d the surprize.

‘ The Fourth, that a Rash Resolution proves often dangerous, and that to avoid it a General, ought never to omit any thing relating to Military Discipline. And the fifth, that considering the Conspiracy of the People of *Bois le duc* (whom he Besieged in] one of their strongest holds) against him after their Capitulation we must learn to be always diffident of an Enemy, and to keep most upon our Guard, when we are upon the point of subduing him.

THE

THE
FOURTH WAR.

BOOK III.

THE first Exploit of Arms was against *Servius Galba* one of *Cæsars* Lieutenants, whom he had sent with a Legion and some Horse in the Country of *Helvæ*, *Valais* and *Sion*, (which extends from *Savoy* to the Lake of *Geneva*) in order to secure Trade, who after some successful Combats made a Peace with those People, receiv'd their Hostages, and having left two Companies in the Country of *Helvæ*, goes to take up his Quarters with the remainder of the Legion, in the Town of *Martanach*, situated in a Vale, and divided into two by a small River call'd *la Branse*, he Retrenche his

C 4 Camp

Camp on one side of the River, and Lodges the *Gauls* he had with him on the other. The small Number of Soldiers he had in his Camp, (which was not as yet in a good Posture of Defence) Emboldned those People to Revolt, in hopes of Routing him at the first onset, they not being able to indure that he should keep their Children for Holtages, as also being affraid that the *Romans* would Annex their Country to the Neighbouring Province. Thus he was Attack'd on all sides before he had leisure to collect himself, and being reduc'd to a great extremity, having neither Provisions to subsist, nor Men to Resist long, despair forc'd him to receive the Council of *P. Satius Baculus* and of *G. Volusenus* Colonel of a Thousand Men, which was to Salley out on all sides on their Enemies, which they did so Briskly, that tho' they could not defend themselves against them within their Trenches, they beat them in the open Field. After which taking the advantage of their Astonishment

ment, he removed his Legion in a place of Safety.

But the occasion of the fourth War was this; *P. Crassus* one of *Cæsars* Leivtenants, having sent several Tribuns to make Provisions of Corn, for the maintenance of his Army in the Countrys of *Perche, Cornoaille and Van-nes*: They detain'd them contrary to the Law of Nations, and their own engagements, in hopes thereby to recover their Hostages. Their Neighbours following their Example did the same, and all of them sent word to *Crassus* that they would not deliver them, unless he return'd their Hostages. *Cæsar* hearing this Conspiracy, prepares for War with all speed; concluding that if he left unpunish'd it might occasion a general Revolt: for he was acquainted with the Humor of the *French* who were apt to take Arms, loving their Liberty and abhorring Slavery. In the first place he takes care to stop the progress of the League. To that end he sends *Labienus* in the Country of *Trier* with the Horse, command-
ing

ing him to Visit those of *Reims* and the other *Belges*: *P. Crassus* into *Gascconny* with Twelve Legionary Ensigns, and a considerable Number of Horse: *Q. Titurinus Sabinus* with Three Legions towards *Perche*, *Allencon*, and *Lizieux*: gives the Naval Army to *D. Brutus*, and he himself with the Land Army resolves to Attack the People of *Vannes*, who were the Promoters of that War. Their Conuntry borders upon the Sea, is of a difficult access, and abounds in Shipping; in so much that as soon as he had reduc'd one Place with great labour, the Inhabitants remov'd on Board their Ships with all their Goods, and went to another, and thus he could make no Progress untill his Fleet Arrived, after which he gave them Battle, & defeated them. Whereupon they submitted to *Cæsar*, who put all the Senat to Death, and sold the People. In the Interm *Cæsars* Lieutenants in *Gallia* were not Idle. *Q. Titurinus Sabinus* was Attackt by *Viridonix* Chief of many People with a potent Army. But by his patience

ence and Policy he Ingag'd him to Attack him within his Trenches and so Vanquished him, which restord all that Country to its former Obediēce. On the side of *Guinne P. Crassus* overcomes the *Sontiates*, besieges their City and takes it. After the Capitulation on *Adcantuan* their General makes a Sally with such a number of his Men as he most confided in, in hopes to force the *Roman* Camp, but being repuls'd *Crassus* notwithstanding allowed him the former Capitulation he had granted him. During that Siege the People of *Spain* and *Gasconny* that lye about the *Pyrenean-Hills*: make a League together, and chuse some Captains, who had formerly serv'd under *Sertorius*, to Command them. *Crassus* Marches against them, They Retrench themselves, and cut off his Provisions, whereby he is forc'd to Fight them within their Trenches, in which he fortunately found out some defect, through which he forc'd them. *Cæsar* finding no more Enemy's but those of *Terovenne* and *Guelthers*, altho' the

the Summer was far spent marches against them, where he finds a new way of making War, those People keeping within large Forests: however he resolves to find them out, and as he was fortifying his Camp at the Entrance of the Wood, they Attack him and are Beaten back: after which *Cæsar* advances into the Forest, causes the Trees to be fell'd, and makes use of them as of a Bulwark, and with incredible pains and diligence advances to the place where they kept their Cattle and Baggage: But the Weather grew so Sormey and their fell such abundance of Rain, that he was oblig'd to carry his Army into Winter-Quarters.

REMARKS.

Thus ended this War, in which,
in the first place we will observe the advantage of retrenching of Camps, which serve to bridle whole Countries, as Citadels do Cities : The *Romans* having thereby only maintain'd so many conquer'd Nations under their obedience ; for the Armies that are quarter'd in divers Towns, may easily, thus separated, be defeated in the whole, or in part by a Conspiracy : besides, the delights of Cities corrupt Military Discipline, and dastardizes the most generous Courages : And when there are more Fortresses than can well be kept, they must be dismantled, to the end that nothing may be able to resist the Army, which being always kept intire opposes the renewing of Conspiracies ;
it

‘ it being most certain that the best
‘ way, not only to prevent the Re-
‘ volt of Conquer’d Provinces, but
‘ also to preserve ones own Country,
‘ against a Potent Enemy (‘provided
‘ care be taken not to want Provisions)
‘ is to make strong retrenchments :
‘ For those who put themselves abso-
‘ lutely upon the Defensive, shutting
‘ themselves up in Garrisons, must of ne-
‘ cessity (unless they are reliev’d) perish
‘ at last : by reason that the Coun-
‘ try being destroy’d for the space of
‘ two or three years, the Cities
‘ must be famish’d of course, and
‘ consequently will surrender, finding
‘ that you are no longer in a condi-
‘ tion to defend them : Chusing to
‘ submit to the Enemy rather than to
‘ perish with you.

‘ *Secondly*, We will consider how
‘ much *Craffus* was put to it, when he
‘ had to do with Captains that had
‘ serv’d under *Sertorius*, and who ac-
‘ cording to the custom of the *Romans*
‘ made use of the advantage of places,
‘ to fortifie their Camps, and to cut
‘ off

‘ off Provisions from their Enemies,
 ‘ for by this manner of making War,
 ‘ they reduc’d the said *Craſſus* to such
 ‘ straights, that he was forc’d to attack
 ‘ them within their Camp, and altho’
 ‘ he forc’d them, either because his
 ‘ Souldiers were better, or because he
 ‘ found out some defect in their Camp,
 ‘ it is most certain that he under-
 ‘ took it more out of despair than
 ‘ reason, and only when he was reduc’d
 ‘ to the necessity of starving.

‘ We will also observe that nothing
 ‘ surpriz’d *Cæsar* during all this War,
 ‘ whether he was attack’d in the open
 ‘ Field or in his Camp, or Surpriz’d,
 ‘ or whether his Enemies retir’d in-
 ‘ to inaccessible places; he having all
 ‘ along pursu’d his Enemies every
 ‘ where, without omitting the least
 ‘ point of Military Discipline. For
 ‘ tho’ our Enemies behave themselves
 ‘ sometimes as if they were afraid,
 ‘ the better to surprize us, we must
 ‘ never despise them, since our Trade
 ‘ is such, that faults are irreparable,
 ‘ and that in one hours time we may
 ‘ lose

‘ lose the Reputation we have acquir’d
‘ in Forty Years.

‘ To end this Discourse, I will add
‘ that the Cruelty *Cæsar* practis’d on
‘ those of *Vannes*, ought not in the
‘ least to reflect on the Clemency he
‘ has shewn during the whole course
‘ of his Life, but that we ought to be-
‘ lieve that he forc’d his natural in-
‘ clination in that severe Action, to
‘ chastise the violation of the Law of
‘ Nations, which they were guilty of,
‘ in detaining those as Prisoners who
‘ went to Trade with them as Friends:
‘ as also to strike a Terror into those
‘ People who were so much inclin’d
‘ to Revolt, by using them with
‘ great mildness when they kept with-
‘ in the bounds of their Alliance, and
‘ with great rigor when they broke it.

THE

THE
FIFTH WAR.

BOOK IV.

THE *Germans* of *Frankfort* and
of *Hesse*, to the number of 400000
Souls, being persecuted by the *Suevi*
(the most Potent and boldest people
of *Germany*), quitted their Country,
and having march'd up and down
through divers Countries, came at
last upon the *Rhine*, into the Provin-
ces of *Guelderland* and *Juliers*, drove
out the Inhabitants, and took Posses-
sion of their Land, on both sides of
the River. *Cæsar* being acquainted
with the humour of the *French* which
is uneasy, and ready to cast off the
yoke of Slavery, resolv'd not to suf-
fer the *Germans* to settle on this side

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of

of the *Rhine*. And tho he perceiv'd that they had begun to treat with them, he dissembles it, and anticipating his usual time of taking the Field, he marches straight to fight the said *Germans*, who being astonish'd at his diligence, send Ambassadors to him to Treat about a Peace. He gives them a Patient hearing, and favourable Answers ; but still Marches towards them. Finally they agree about the Conditions, provided *Cesar* will stop three days, he allows them one during which his Cavalry going out to Forage, meets with a Party of 800 *German* Horse who fall briskly upon them, and put them to Flight, pursuing them to their very Camp. But sending their Principal Officers the next day to *Cesar* to excuse the said Action, and to acquaint him that it was done accidentally, he detains them Prisoners, Marches with his Army towards the *Germans*, surprizes them and cuts them all into Pieces after which he casts a Bridge over the *Rhine*, marches into *Germany* relieve

relieves *Cologne*; grants a Peace to such as are willing to give Hostages, burns, and destroys the rest, and at the end of Eighteen dayes returns into *France* and breaks his Bridge.

REMARKS.

WE must observe *Cesar's* conduct in this Place, who by his quick and unexpected March dissipated the Negotiations that were on foot between the *Germans* and the *Gauls*: by his dissimulation towards the *Gauls*, feigning himself Ignorant of their Practices, and expressing a great deal of Confidence in them, retains and hinders them from precipitating themselves into a League with the *Germans*: by his Industry amuses them to Treat, while he still advanc'd towards them, and when a favourable occasion offers it self he improves it to take them

in disorder, destituted of their Cheifs,
making them believe that they had
first broken the Treaty.

In the next place we must consider
that taking the advantage, of the
Renown of so great a defeat, he
resolv'd to show the *Roman Eagles*
on the other side of the *Rhine*, to
frighten the *Germans*, in order to keep
them in awe for the future. That
he did not venture to pass the *Rhine*
upon Boats looking upon it to be too
dangerous; and therefore made a
Bridge which he caus'd to be fortify'd
and guarded at both ends: That
he remain'd no longer in that Coun-
try than it was necessary to Establish
the Reputation of his Arms, and
that upon his return he broke his
Bridge, to hinder the *Germans* from
making use of it. I add moreover
that the defeat of 5000 *Roman* Horse
by 800 *German* Horse, and the fol-
lowing day the defeat of 40000
Germans by 30 or 40000 *Romans*,
is a clear demonstration that it is
not the Natural bravery of a Nation

over

over another, nor yet the greater Number over a smaller which occasions the gain of Battles ; but the exact observation of Military Discipline , and the continual exercise of Arms, which not only teaches how to fight well, but also how to improve advantages, and to know when it is fit to fight or not.

THE SIXTH WAR.

CÆsar's Sixth War was against *England*, because the Inhabitants of that Island often assisted the *French* against him. In order to go about it he Inquires of the Merchants who Traded there, what sort of People they were, how they made War, under what Laws they liv'd and which were there best Ports. After which he sent *C. Volusenus* to View the Coast, then sent for the Ships he had Employd

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against

against those of *Vannes*, and order'd all things that were necessary for his design. Upon the news of these preparations several *English* Towns sent Embassadors to him, offering to obey and send him Hostages, whom he sent back with good words, and with them *Cornio* (whom he had made King of *Arras*) the better to discover the Country under that pretence. Nevertheless *Cornio* not daring to trust the *English* remain'd but five dayes upon the Coast, and then came back again to report what he had discover'd. In the meantime *Cæsar* makes a Peace with those of *Terouenne*, in order to leave no Enemies behind him: takes two Legions and part of his Cavalry: sends the remainder of his Army into *Guelderland* under the Command of *Q. Titurins Sabinus* and *Arunculeius Cotta*: leaves *P. Sulpicius Ruffus* to Guard the Port where he Imbark'd, and sets Sail. He arrives safely on the Coast of *England* (with his Infantry only) which he finds all in Arms: he indeavours to Land his Men, but
find-

finding that it was impossible in that place, he removes Eight Miles farther, and there Lands with great peril. Nevertheless the *Englisb* were so astonish'd at it, that they sent to desire a Peace of him. But a great Storm arising at that time which disabled many of his Ships, and forc'd back those that Transported his Cavalry on the Continent; Incourag'd them to that degree that insted of sending Hostages to him, they Arm'd the whole Country against him, fell upon one of his Legions which was gone out for Forrage, which he succours and brings out of danger. In these Extremitys *Cesar* looses no time to refit his Ships, to get Provisions and to secure his Camp, and being a new Attack'd by the Inhabitants of the Island, he Fights and beats them, which oblig'd them again to desire a Peace. He grants it, and takes Hostages from such as offer'd them speedily, and brings back his Army in a good condition into *Gallia*. Only Two Ships that had on Board 300 men landing a little lower, were set upon

by those of *Terouenne*, which *Cæsar* being acquainted with *Marches* with his *Cavalry* to their *Relief*, delivers them, and Beats his *Enemies*.

R E M A R K S.

TO begin a War in Autumn, without any visible advantage, in an unknown Country, in which he holds no Intelligence, being oblig'd to Cross the Ocean; is an Enterprize, in my opinion, worthy of the Invinſible Courage of *Cæsar*, but not of his usual Prudence. Nevertheless, that Sally must be excus'd, upon the account of his good Fortune, which he had subjected to his Will; for in this undertaking in which Men and the Elements seem'd to have conspir'd against him. The Earth refusing him Provisions, The Sea disabling his Ships, The Air producing Storms, and the Country on which he Landed endeavouring his Ruin: Yet his Constancy overcame it all, opposing to hunger his Prudence in Providing

viding Victuals for his Army; To the Ruins of the Sea; his diligence in resisting of his Ships: to the Assaults of his Enemies, his Arms to overcome them: insomuch that he constrain'd them to desire a Peace, and thus he Gloriously atchived an Enterprize in which another would have met his Ruin.

Let us observe, how, before his departure from France, he took care of all things that were necessary to keep them within the Bounds of their Duty, and to secure his Return.

Let us moreover observe that Cæsar abounded in Inventions, to take his time advantageously in all present Exigencies: for observing that his Soldiers not being us'd to Sea Ingagements were at a loss how to Land; he chang'd his first Order, even during the Action, and drawing closer to the Coast with his Gally's he landed in spite of his Enemy's, who not being accusom'd to see such kind of Ships, being astonished thereat betook themselves to flight. And indeed we must admire two Excellencies in Cæsar which he possess'd in perfection, which

which are very Essential in a great Captain; viz. That he consider'd and took care of all things that might forward, or prejudice his design, before he undertook it: and that in the Execution he never fail'd to take his Time, when ever occasion offer'd it self, and to apply an immediate remedy to whatever unexpected accidents might befall him. In which he has been Inimitable,

THE
SEVENTH WAR.

BOOK V.

C*Æsar* not being satisfy'd with his first Voyage into *England*, imployes the Winter in making all necessary preparations to go over thither the second time, and according to his usual custom goes into *Lumbardy*,
and

and before his return from thence steps into *Sclavonia*, there to appease some seditions: After which he comes back to his Army, finds all things in a good condition, and praises every body's diligence in making all things ready. But before his departure he goes to *Tryers*, a very powerful City, to accomodate the Division happen'd between *Inditiomar* and *Cingentorix* the two most considerable Persons there. The last comes out to meet him, and promises all obedience to him: the other prepares for War. Nevertheless being affraid that his Men would forsake him, he surrenders himself. *Cesar* receives him; but lessens his Authority and augments the Power of *Cingentorix*, whom he had a better opinion of. That being done, he continues his design, takes the greatest Men of *Gallia* along With him in that War. *Dumnorix* of *Autun* makes a difficulty of going, *Cesar* presses him to do it, he Excuses himself: after which he endeavours to debauch the *Gauls*: finally he flies;
Cesar

Cæsar sends after him ; he being unwilling to return , Kills himself. *Cæsar* imbarcs his Army at *Calis*, and leaves *Labiennus* there with three Legions and two thousand Horse. He goes over into *England*, and Lands without opposition ; he fortify's a Camp for the Guard of his Ships, and leaves *Q. Atrius* there, goes on himself, and forces the *English* Camp, not far distant from thence. The following day *Atrius* sends him word that most of his Ships are disabled by a Storm. He goes back to them, imploy's ten days in refitting them, draws them a Shore, causes that Camp to be well fortify'd, Writes to *Labiennus* to cause new Ships to be built, Marches towards *Cassivellanus*, General of the *English* who dares not Attack him unless it be when he goes out of his Camp to Forrage : which obliges him to do it in good Order, and after having try'd his way of Fighting in some Skirmishes he beats him by *C. Tribonius* one of his Lieutenants who was gone out to Forrage with three
Legions

Legions and all the Cavalry. After that defeat, none of his Enemy's appear'd in a Body against him, and *Cæsar* being come up to the *Thames*, at the only place where it is fordable, Crosses it in spite of the *English*, who endeavour'd to hinder it. This astonish'd *Cassivellanus* to that degree that he kept altogether within Woods and Forests: and seeing that divers Towns did Surrender to *Cæsar*, he also sent to him, who receiv'd his, submission, took Hostages, and impos'd a certain Tribute upon the Country; then finding that the Season was advanc'd, and dreading some Tumult in *France* he cross'd the Sea again, bringing back his Army with a great deal of Glory: the which contrary to his wonted Custom, he was constrain'd by reason of the scarcity of the Year to divide into divers Garrisons to make it Subsist. But before he could pass into *Italy*, *Ambiorix* and *Catamulcus* excited by *Indutiomarus* take up Arms, Attack *Sabienus* and *Cotta* two of his Lieutenants, beat them and Kill them as they

as they were endeavouring to Retire out of their Quarters. From thence they March against *Cicero* another of his Lieutenants who defends himself with great difficulty. *Cæsar* relieves him and beats the *Gauls*. The Rumor of the Defeat of two *Roman* Legions had induc'd the other *Gauls* to Revolt; so that *Labiennus* is Attack'd in his Camp by *Indutiomar*. He sustains his Effort, then defeats and Kills him. As the first Defeat of Two *Roman* Legions had induc'd all the *Gauls* to revolt, so these two last Defeats of the *Gauls*, made, them lay down their Arms.

R E M A R K S.

Altho *Cæsar*, in his second Expedition for England, went over stronger, and better prepar'd than before, having remedy'd all those things that had been wanting in the former; nevertheless being oblig'd to cross the Sea to go over into a Country in which he held no manner

manner of correspondence, going out of another that was newly Conquer'd, Subject to Revolts and very unwilling to brook Subjection; he indulg'd his Ambition more than he profited the Romans. In which we will observe first his dexterity and Prudence, in prevailing with those that were most stirring among the Gauls to go along with him, to stand him instead of Hostages. But his Natural Clemency seems to have made him commit an Error, by only lessening the Authority of Indutiomar, instead of destroying it absolutely, which he was like to have dearly paid for.

Secondly, that he is never daunted by unexpected Accidents, which he remedies as if he had foreseen them. He shew'd it sufficiently in the Violent Storm that disabled all his Ships, which would have stung any other Man into absolute despair.

Thirdly, that tho' the World agrees that no General ever knew how to improve a Victory better than he did, or ever prosecuted it with more Vigour; yet he forbore to do it on this occasion,

sion by reason, that he was in a strange Country, and that his Camp was not as yet well fortify'd.

Let us also observe, that tho' Scarcity of Corn oblig'd him contrary to his Custom to make his Army Winter into different Quarters, and not in one Body, to make it subsist the more easily: he did it so judiciously, that the Places into which he Quarter'd his Men, were neither so distant from each other, as to hinder them from being able to Succor one another, nor yet so near but that they kept divers People in Awe. Nevertheless the success of that way of Quartering shews evidently, that there is nothing like remaining in one Body, because a small Body is more liable to be attempted upon than a greater, which imbolden'd the Gauls to Revolt, and to Attack the Camp of Sabinus and Cotta, upon whom the subtle Speech of Ambiorix, who while he was Capitulating with them, told them that the Revolt was so general, that the other Two Camps were Attack'd at the very same time, in such a manner that they could not suc-
cor

cor each other; made such an impression and caus'd such a confusion of advices, that out of fear they chose the worst, which was to abandon their Camp, and to retire. From whence we may gather that it is always unsafe to follow the advice of an Enemy, and that nothing is more dangerous than to Retreat within sight of the Enemy.

Ciceros resistance in his Camp, who refus'd to receive the Council of his Enemy, and resolv'd to defend himself within his Retrenchments prov'd very successful and Glorious to him, and afforded Cæsar time to come to his Relief. In which there are two remarkable Circumstances: the first relating to Cæsar who being inform'd that the Gauls were coming up to him to Fight him, finding himself Weak, chose an advantageous Place, Fortify's it, takes a small Circumference for his Camp, to be the better able to defend it, and to make his Enemies believe that he was very Weak: who, after having challeng'd him divers times to Fight, began to despise him, which created a great Carelessness in their Order, in so much that they no longer Attack'd him without confusion: having thus lulld them, he fell upon them so Vigorously that he beat them without Resistance: and Labienus one of his Lieutenants also defeated Indutiomarus by the same Stratagem. The second relating to the Gaul, who not
E being

being able to force Cicero's Camp which contain'd Ten Miles Circumference and yet was made in three Hours time, by Persons who had nothing but their Swords to Digg the Ground with, and nothing but their Cloaths to carry the Earth : which shows us what vast Number of Men they were, and what may be done in Armies well Regulated and well provided with all things necessary.

THE
EIGHTH WAR.

BOOK VI.

CÆsar perceiving that the affairs of Gallia were disposing towards a War, reinforces his Army with three Roman Legions, and as many other Souldiers as he can get ; which prov'd of great use to him : For after the Death of Indutiomar, the People of Tryers put their Government into the hands of his Relations, who made a League with all those that were

were willing to revolt ; and particularly with *Ambiorix*. Which *Cæsar* being acquainted with, assembles four Legions, tho' in the Winter time, surprises those of *Tournay*, and forces them to surrender and to give him Hostages : The Spring being come, he summon'd an Assembly of the *Gauls* at *Paris*, from whence on the very day it ended he marches against those of *Sens* and next against *Chartres*, who being surpriz'd surrender themselves. From thence he prepares to attack *Ambiorix* and those of *Triers* ; but first he resolves to deprive them of their Allies. To that end he sends away all his Baggage to *Labienus* (who was in the Country of *Triers*) with two Legions to reinforce him, and goes himself with five to attack the *Gauls*. In order to this Execution he divided his Army into three Bodys ; knowing that they were not strong enough to dispute the Field against him : and burnt and destroy'd their Country to that degree that he forc'd them to surrender, to give Ho-

stages, and to abandon *Ambiorix*. At the same time those of *Tryers* attack *Labienus*, who feigning to be afraid, and retiring as if he had fled, drew them in disorder into disadvantageous Places, where he routed them, and took the City of *Tryers* itself. This Expedition being ended, *Cæsar* built a Bridge over the *Rhine*, and crosses it. The inhabitants of *Cologne* favour him, he fortifys his Camp, makes all sorts of Provisions, and indeavours to draw the *Suevis* to a Battle. But they retiring into great and profound Forests, he ceases to pursue them, repasses the *Rhine*, only cuts six Score foot of his Bridge on the *German* side, builds a strong Tower at the end of it, and a Fort at the other end on the side of *Gallia*, leaving twelve Cohorts to the Guard of the said Fort and Bridge (*Cæsar* makes a discription of the manners and customs of the *Gauls* and *German*s in this place) that being done, he goes to continue the War against *Ambiorix*, and the better to surprize him

him, he sends *L. Minutius Basilus* before him with all his Cavalry, forbidding him to make any Fires in his Camp, to the end he might be ignorant of his coming. And thus he had like to have taken *Ambiorix*, who made his escape miraculously, and after that did nothing but fly from one place to another. *Cesar* in order to pursue him the better, sends all his Baggage again into a Castle of *Liege* call'd *Vatucca*, and left *Q. Tullius Cicero* to guard it with one Legion, commanding him to keep a good Guard during seven days, which was the time to which he limited his Expedition, and not to move out of his Retrenchments. Then he divided his Army into three Bodys to destroy the Country, there being no set Army to oppose him, so that his greatest care was, to hinder his Soldiers who were greedy of Booty, from stragling too much, lest they should be kill'd by the enemys who lay lurking in Woods and Marshes. Whereupon it was generally reported on the other

side of the *Rhine* that *Cæsar* was exposing the Country of *Guelderland* to Plunder : which induc'd the *Westphalians* to participate of that Booty. They assemble two thousand Horse in haste, cross the *Rhine*, Plunder without resistance, and relish it so well, that they resolve to attack the Camp of the *Romans*, where unfortunately that day being the seventh since *Cæsar's* departure, *Cicero* who had observ'd his command punctually, having no tydings of him nor of any *Enemies*, suffer'd himself to be prevail'd upon by the importunity of his Souldiers to permit them to go out to Forrage ; at which time he was unexpectedly set upon by the *Westphalians*, against whom he had much ado to defend himself ; until his Souldiers coming back from Forrage, part of them pass'd through the *Enemies* and so got into the Camp again, but the rest were cut in pieces. Nevertheless this Relief made the *Enemies* despair of forcing the Camp, and therefore they retir'd with their Booty

ty into their own Country. *Cæsar* arriv'd soon after, and chid *Cicero* for having exceeded his orders; after which he began a new to expose the Country of *Gaelderland* to Fire and Sword, and to pursue *Ambiorix*, who made his escape again. This being done, he puts his Army into Garrison, makes provisions of Corn, and then passes into *Italy*.

R E M A R K S.

C*Æsar met with no great opposition in this War, every Body flying before him, while he burnt and destroy'd the Country. Nevertheless there are fine Remarks to be made upon it. For tho' it does not teach us how to fight, and to take places; yet it instructs us how to deal with those that defend themselves by flight, and retire into inaccessible places: In which several Captains have been disicent, for want of having*
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observ'd three principal things like Cæsar, viz. So to prevent them by great diligence, as to surprize them before their being able to retire and to remove their Goods into Forrests; by which means some are constrain'd to surrender, and others perish with hunger. Secondly, to divide an Army into as many Bodys as may be consistent with safety, to the end that attacking a Country in divers places, at one and the same time the Inhabitants may be at a loss which way to fly; and lastly to hinder the Souldiers from stragling without order, to run after Booty, lest they should be set upon by the Enemies. Such omissions have often created great inconveniencies in Victorious Armys. Which ought to teach us never to swerve from the strictness and severity of Military Discipline; tho we suppose our selves at a great distance from our Enemys, and very safe. We have a very good example of it in this Book, in the case of Cicero, who receiv'd a considerable loss, and had like to have been intirely defeated, by having suffer'd himself to be
pre-

prevailed upon by the importunity of his Souldiers, who contrary to Cæsar's Command, would go out of their Retrenchments to Forrage.

We also learn the difference between old and new Souldiers, who for want of experience, not knowing how to choose the safest and most honourable way, retiring upon a Hill were cut to pieces: whereas the others being sensible that there was no safety but by forcing their way to the Camp with their Swords, saved themselves and their Camp. We may also see how ingenious fear is to seek out subjects to increase it, for because that place was the same in which Titirius and Cotta were defeated the preceeding year, they lookt upon it as an ill Omen.

Let us likewise observe that when ever Cæsar design'd to go about an expedition of seven or eight days, in which diligence was requir'd, he sent away his Baggage, which commonly is a great hinderance in the Field. Therefore 'tis impossible to conduct an Army well, unless a General retrenches his Camp according to occasion

casion, or marches without Baggage.

Let us moreover admire how careful Cæsar was to be well inform'd of all that pass'd by his Spy's. And indeed it is a thing of such use that a Prince or General ought never to spare any thing for it, since it is the only way to attempt great Actions, and to avoid great Ruins.

Neither must we forget his skill in dividing those that were making a League against him, and in attacking them separately: nor his usual diligence in surprising them, whereby he did atchieve the best part of his great designs.

We will conclude the Remarks of this Book by the Stratagem of Labienus; who being desirous to fight those of Trierers before the arrival of the Germans, declar'd Publickly that he was afraid of them, and that he design'd to retire; being very senceible that there were Gauls in his Army who would give them notice of it; And in the mean time gave secret orders to retire with great noise, and as it were with fear; which those of Trierers being acquainted with; unwilling

to loose the Occasion that offer'd it self, cross'd a River, and came up to them in disorder, as to a certain Victory, without staying for the Germans. But Labienus turn'd against them in good Order and beat them. However I would never advise any one to attempt such a Stratagem with Raw Men, who are commonly frightened when an Enemy comes running upon them without order; tho on the contrary it incourages those that are experienced in Combats.

THE
NINTH WAR.

BOOK VII.

THe affairs of Gallia being quieted, Caesar goes into Italy, according to his Custom, where he learnt the Death of Piso, and the Broils of Rome, which induc'd the Gauls to revolt a new. Chartres led the
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the way : the *Auvergnats* followed, and several others did the same. *Vercingentorix* and *Auvergnat* is elected their Generalissimo. *Cesar* hearing this News, comes away in the midst of Winter : crosses the Mountains of *Gevaudan* which were covered with Snow, and arrives in *Auvergne*, before his departure from *Italy* was known ; which retain'd many within the bounds of their Duty, and astonish'd those that were revolted : He passes with the same diligence into *Burgundy* and *Champagne*, assembles his Army, Marches into the Country of *Berry*, and besieges and takes *Villandunnum* (out of which he takes 600 Hostages) then forc'd *Giens* (or *Orleans*) where a great slaughter was made. *Vercingentorix* seeing the success of his Enemy, and not thinking his Army strong enough to fight him in the Field ; endeavours to starve him, To that end he burns above twenty Towns, preserving only *Bourges*, (and even that against his Will.) *Cesar* besieg'd it, and found him-

himself reduc'd to great streights and difficulties: Finally having surmounted them, he took it, kill'd forty thousand Men, and refresh'd his Army there. During this Siege he endeavours to surprize the Camp of *Vercingentorix*, by whom he is repuls'd, and who not being daunted at so much ill success, continues the War with great Courage and Prudence; and to hinder his Enemy from crossing the River of *Alliers*, he breaks down all the Bridges thereof. Nevertheless *Cesar* amusing him at one Place, crosses it at another, and besieges *Clermont*. *Vercingentorix* fixes his Camp on the other side; and several attacks and fine Combats pass between them. However *Cesar* is forc'd to raise the Siege; either because he thought he could not take it, or to remedy the Revolt of the *Autunois*, occasion'd craftily by *Litavicus*, who having obtain'd the Command of a Reinforcement they were sending to *Cesar*, being got within Ten Miles of him; pretended that he had receiv'd News from

from the Army, that all those of *Autun* that were in it, had been Massacred by his Command, which News he immediately sent to *Autun*; and caus'd all the *Romans* that were there and in his Camp to be put to Death, Plunder'd all the Goods, and particularly the Corn they were transporting to the Army; but *Cæsar* receiving notice thereof by *Eporedorix*, takes four Legions without consulting, and all his Cavalry, marches Day and Night, overtakes *Litavicus*, with his Forces, discovers his Cheat to his Souldiers, and reduces them to surrender upon discretion, without striking one blow. Then dispatches away to those of *Autun*, to acquaint them therewith, and with the same diligence goes back very seasonably to his Camp, which he relieves, finding it attackt and press'd close by *Vercingentorix*. This being done he marches again towards the River of *Alliers*, and crosses it. In the mean time *Litavicus* who had made his escape to *Vercingentorix*, procures a League between him and those of

Autun, and *Eporedorix* and *Virdumar* possess themselves of *Nevers*, where *Cesar* had left his Hostages, his Corn, and Treasure, which they Plunder'd and Burnt. This reduces him to great streights, by reason that *Vercingetorix* follow'd him still, and cut of his Provisions. Finally he resolv'd by great marches, to reach the *Loire*, which he cross'd, in order to joyn *Labienus* to whom he had given four Legions at the begining of this War to go towards *Paris*. During these Transactions, *Labienus* found himself at a great loss in all these Revolts. Nevertheless having taken *Melun*, he created some jealousies among his Enemies in divers Places; which enabled him to cross the *Seine*. And before all those revolted People could joyn into one Body, he beat the first that came in his way, march'd to *Provins*, and from thence joyn'd with *Cesar*. In the mean time the Factions and Conspiracies increas'd daily among the *Gauls*: They hold an Assembly in which almost all the Provinces of
Gallia

Gallia send Deputys, and elect *Vercingetorix* anew for their Generalissimo, who raises abundance of Horse, in order to destroy the *Romans* by cutting of their Provisions. On the other side *Cæsar* lays in stores of all things, and receives the *German* Cavalry into pay; But *Vercingetorix* being puffed up with the good opinion he had of his Horse, engages with *Cæsar* and is beaten; after which he returns to *Alexia*, where *Cæsar* pursues and resolves to besiege him. *Vercingetorix* perceiving his design, gathers all the Provisions of the City, causes them to be distributed by measure, and judging that with good management they might last two months; he discharg'd his Cavalry, sending them all to their respective homes, in orders to procure him a relief in time; and he shuts himself up with 80 Thousand Fighting Men, in *Alexia*, which *Cæsar* incloses, with double and treble Trenches. Then makes a second Circumvalation to oppose the releif from abroad, with all the dili-

diligence and labour imaginable, and makes a sufficient Provision of Victuals, to consummate those of the besieg'd, who labour under great want. Finally the Relief comes commanded by *Cornio* to the Number of 250000 Men, makes three great Efforts, at several times, two by Day and one by Night, is repuls'd and retires: Which constrains those within to surrender at *Cæsars* mercy, who detain'd the *Autunois* and *Auvergnats*, in order to get those Citys again which were of use to him, and distributes all the others among his Souldiers. All the rest submits after this Exploit. Thus ended this War which prov'd the greatest and most dangerous of all those *Cæsar* had in *Gallia*.

REMARKS.

ALL the other Wars of *Cæsar* against the Gauls were different from this, by reason that in the former he made use of their Divisions to Ruin them. This was made al-

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most by a general consent of them all, electing a Supreme Chief of great Prudence, and Courage, who being sensible that the good Discipline of the Romans, and their Skill in the Trade of War, render'd them invincible in Battle; chang'd the manner of making it, by Protracting of time without hazzarding a general Combat, being superiour in Horse, in a Country which favour'd him; and by cutting off the Provisions of their Army, and but little of ruining them: which affords us a Scope for very fine Remarks.

First upon Vercingetorix, who being Voluntarily chosen head of divers People, who Emulated each other, knew so well how to govern them? that, notwithstanding all his adversities he still preserv'd a great Authority among them, and kept them in great Awe: never sparing Severity where it was requisite: (for fear is the most powerful motive to keep Men within Bounds) his ill success having never daunted him, nor alter'd his Mind: even when he was accus'd of holding Intelligence with the Enemy: he harangu'd them with so much boldness, that it increased his Authority instead of Lessning it. And indeed the most Effectual way to satisfy People is to speak often to them about present transgressions. He was allow'd to burn about Twenty Towns to inconvenience their Enemies: which argues his ability; since the
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only way to Vanquish the Romans (who were too hard for them in Fight) was to combat them by Hunger. In such affairs all mild Counsels, or such as are only Executed by halves are Ruinous; of which the taking of Bourges may serve for a Memorable Example by reason that in saving it from a necessary Conflagration, it was preserv'd for the use of the Romans, who supply'd their Wants by the taking of it. His great Credit is Remarkable by his being able to perswade Free People, at the very beginning of a War. before their having try'd the Ill success of it, when they were full of hopes of Vanquishing without applying such Violent Remedys, to set Fire to their Houses and Goods, for the preservation of which, Wars are commonly made. It was without doubt a very difficult Enterprize; by reason that the loss of things that are certain and present, that are seen and felt, is prefer'd by Ignorant People, to those things of which the Event is uncertain, and the usefulness distant: and none can perfectly apprehend that difficulty, unless such as have Experienc'd it in governing of People. He also express'd his Confidence to the very Last, not fearing (tho' at the Head of so many different Nations) to lock himself up in a Place, in which he perform'd what ever could be done by a pru-

dent brave Commander, despising Hunger and all the Inconveniencies of a Siege, and holding out untill the Relief he expected was repuls'd and Defeated, but wherea. Histories are only compil'd by the Victorious, we seldom hear the praises of any but the Children of Fortune.

Let us now Examine Cæsar's conduct in this War, which surprises him in the midst of Winter, he being in Italy at that time, his Army divided into divers Countrys, distant from each other, and the revolted laying so much in his way, that it was almost impossible for him to joyn his Legions. Those great difficultys requir'd an incomparable Labour, in order to overcome them, which he did by making himself a Passage through Mountains which were cover'd with Six Foot deep of Snow, and Terrify'd his Enemies more by appearing in the midst of them (at a time when they imagin'd him to be in Italy, without apossibility of coming towards them) than by the number of his Forces. He likewise improv'd their Terror, by making several Incursions with his Horse, to perswade them that he was very Strong.

Let us also consider that Cæsar finding the Method of the War alter'd and that his Enemies avoided to come to Battle; adiests himself to the Siege of Towns, in which he shew'd himself as Excellent as in other Feats

of War. For whatever is practis'd by the best Modern Commanders is Copy'd after him; and all that we admire in the Siege of Ostend, Breda, Bois le Duc and several other Sieges of the late Prince Maurice, who surpass'd all others in those Matters, falls infinitely short of the two Circumvalations of Alexia: the Industry and Labour of which together with the shortness of time in which they were perform'd, Surpasses whatever has been done elsewhere by much. I am sensible that the Invention of Powder and Artillery, has alter'd the manner of Fortifications, Attacks and Defence of Places; but not so much but that the principal Grounds on which they are Establish'd are particularly Copy'd from Cæsar, who Excell'd all the Roman Generals in that Point.

He is equally to be admir'd for his Inventions, and Stratagems and for the boldness of his undertakings. When he resolv'd to Storm the Retrenchments about Clermont he created a Jealousy in them by a Body he form'd of the Servants and Baggage of the Camp, which he caus'd to march in sight of them, on that side which he did not design to Attack, but not so near as to permit them to discern what they were, and having put a Legion in Ambush in the Night. and slipt the Flower of his Army into the little Camp which was nearest to the Place, he falls upon

them so unexpectedly that he forces all their Retrenchments.

When he resolv'd to pass the River of Aliers which was oppos'd by Vercingentorix, he Posted some Legions near a Bridge that had been broken down, and with the Remainder of the Army which he had order'd in such a manner, that it seem'd to be intire, he marches along the River-side, as if he had sought for another Passage: amusing the Army so well that the Bridge was mended before any body took notice of it, and thus he pass'd without any henderance.

When Vercingentorix during the Siege of Bourges march'd out with his Cavalry, he departed in the Night and Attack'd his Infantry in his Camp which he was very near taking.

When at the Siege of Cleimont, being inform'd of the Revolt of 10000 Autunois who were come to his Assistance, he takes four Legions, marches Day and Night to surprize them; takes them all and returns time enough to defend his Camp which was Attack'd by Vercingentorix. Whereupon we will observe by the by the advantage of keeping a Camp always well Fortified, in order to be ever in a condition to Assault ones Enemy, according as occasions offer themselves.

I can not pass by his great Modesty; in
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the Case of Cornio whom he had ever favour'd, Increas'd in Wealth and Honour, and in whom he greatly Confided: he Excuses his Revolt instead of blaming him for it; alledging that he suffer'd himself to be Involv'd in the general design that was form'd for the recovery of the Liberty and the Glory of all the Gauls

Let us speak a Word of Labienus one of his Lieutenants, who finding himself non-plus'd with four of Cæsar's Legions in that general Revolt; being Surrounded on all Parts with Enemies and necessitated to Cross the Seine upon Boats in order to joyn Cæsar, being oppos'd by great Forces in three Bodys, makes a great Show of passing in two Places, where he did not design it. And having thus divided their Forces in divers Bodys, not knowing whether to go to oppose him, pass'd in the Night with three Legions in the Place where he was least expected, Fought and routed the next that came in his Way; Insomuch that having pass'd the remainder of his Forces with ease, he joyn'd Cæsar without the least opposition. Upon which I will make his Remark that whoever is not very careful, Diligent and Watchfull in keeping the Passage of a River or Mountain; is commonly surpris'd, by reason that he who keeps it relies upon the advantage of the Place, whereas those that design to pass, seek out all means

meanes (and finally find them) to overcome all those Obſtacles.

T H E
T E N T H W A R.

B O O K V I I I.

THe *Gauls* being deſirous to make another attempt to ſhake of the Yoke of their Servitude, divers Citys conſpir'd together to make another Revolt. But *Cæſar* having timely notice of it, ſurprizes them ſo unawares that he maintain'd thoſe in their Allegiance which were not as yet Revolted, and reduc'd the others. Eighteen days after his return into his Winter Quarters, the People of *Bourges* acquainted him that they were ſet upon by thoſe of *Chartres*. He marches to their Relief, and notwithstanding the great Rains that fell, reduc'd them to Reaſon. Afterwards thoſe of *Reims* de-

desir'd his assistance against the People of *Beanvais*, the most puissant and Warlike Nation of all the *Gauls*, who were commanded by *Corbens* and *Comius* two brave Warriors, he marches thither, takes care to have good Intelligence about them, Incamps before them, where his Men receiv'd some check going to Forrage. But *Corbens* having remov'd his Camp to a stronger Place; *Cæsar* was Inform'd that he had plac'd Men in *Imbuscado*, to surprise his going out to Forrage, whereupon he repairs thither so strong that he Beats and Kills him. This Victory oblig'd those of *Beanvais* to Surrender themselves; but *Comius* fled, being unwilling to trust the *Romans*, by reason that *Labienus* not long before had Imploy'd *Val-lusenus* to Kill him contrary to the Law of Nations. This War being ended, *Cæsar* marches to destroy the Country of *Ambiorix*, in order to make him Odious to the People: he Succors *Limoges*, which was Besieg'd by *Dumnacus*, by *Fabius* one of his
Liev-

Lieutenants who pursues him, and beats him as he was hastning to reach the River *Loire*. Then subdu'd those of *Chartres*, and *Britany* with great Scelerity and Felicity. He Besieges *Drapez* and *Lutery* in the City of *Cadenec* by *Caninius* : who being come out to provide the Town with Corn, *Lutery* is Beaten endeavouring to get it in, and afterwards *Drapez* Attack'd and taken in his Camp. After which he laid a formal Siege before it, to which *Cæsar* repair'd in Person. who contriv'd to deprive them of Water ; so that this Poor People was oblig'd to Surrender upon discretion, whom he us'd Roughly, causing the Hands of such as had borne Arms to be cut off ; which griev'd *Drapez* who was a Prisoner, to that degree that he starvd himself : and within few dayes after it *Lutery* was taken and brought to *Cæsar*. About the same time *Labienus* Beat the People of *Tryers* and the *Germans*, and took all their Chiefs. After so many happy Victories obtain'd by *Cæsar* and his Lieutenants, he

he employs the rest of the Summer in Visiting all the *Gauls*, the better to secure his Conquests, especially in *Gascony*, where he had not been often, and divides his Army compos'd of Ten Legions, in such places where he thought it most necessary, which prov'd of great use to him in the Disorders of the Civil War into which he is a going to Enter.

REMARKS.

Some People impute the frequent Revolts of the Gauls to the sickleness of their Temper and their Impatience, which can abide no Foreign Yoke; and others to Cæsars extraordinary Clemency. I confess that Clemency which gives hopes of Pardon, sometimes Imboldens to a Revolt; by reason that Men easily forget kindnesses which do not fully restore Liberty. But if Cruelty renders them less frequent, it makes them more dangerous, because that when Men Act
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by Despair, and have no hopes *undess* of Victory, the most Timorous become Valliant Obstinate, Constant, and faithful to the Last, which never happens when People rely on the Clemency of their Enemies. These Wars afford us frequent Examples of it. Cæsar in most of the Revolts of the Gauls, has often found it Easie to bring them back to their Allegiance, by his Clemency, which prov'd a puissant Motive to create divisions among them, and to hinder them from being obstinate in their Revolts. And when ever he chanced to exert any Severity it was groundd on some base unworthy Action; as when those of Vannes contrary to the Law of Nations Stopt the Roman Knights, who came to buy Corn of them for the Maintenance of the Army, (but I cannot excuse that of Cadenat;) On the Contrary the King of Spains Crueltys, Executed by the Duke of Alva reduc'd miserable Fishermen to despair, who thereupon, shook of his Insupportable Yoke, and by an admirable Constancy have maintain'd themselves, Increas'd their Dominion

minion, and are become so formidable that they are able to Resist him in these Parts, and to snatch his Treasures in the Indies.

Cæsar Teaches us also by his Care and Industry, to inform our selves with what passes among our Enemies, either by taking Prisoners in the Field, or by keeping Spyes among them, and shows us the advantage of it. Several of his happy Successes were grounded upon it, it being always advantageous to Attempt them, by reason that he who Attacks has more Courage than he who is Attack'd, whoever supposes the assailant stronger than himself, do's not know which way he will Attack him, and dreads Treachery. Finally, all that can be done in such a Case by a brave well Disciplin'd Army, is to defend themselves. But it occasions great disorders among raw Soldiers. And therefore he took so much care to Fortify his Camp, in order to Guard it, and all his Baggage, with a small Number of Men, and to be able to perform great Executions without danger, being always certain of a Retreat.

Let us also consider the Siege of Cadenac. Cæsar judging it Impregnable by open force, knowing that it was very well provided with Corn, undertakes a great and dangerous Labour to deprive them of the Water of a Fountain, which lay without the Town, and the only one that supply'd them. But the Besieged perceiving it, put the Works on Fire, and indeavour'd by a Sally to prevent the Extinguishing of it, which Cæsar observing, and finding that he could not repulse them, by reason of the advantage of the Place, he bethought himself to Storm the City, whereby he oblig'd them to Retire.

THE

A N
ABRIDGMENT
OF THE
Civil W A R S.
I N
CAESAR'S Commentaries.

B O O K I.

THe real cause of the Civil War between *Pompey* and *Cæsar*, is that the one would have no Companion, and that the other could not endure a Master. But the pretended Cause, was that the Senat refus'd, to allow *Cæsar* to stand Candidate for the Consulship being absent (tho' it

it had been promis'd to him :) or else that they would oblige him to disarm alone, allowing his open Enemies to remain in Arms against the inclination of the Commons. Which was resolv'd with Violence ; insomuch that the Tribuns of the People were constrain'd to quit the City, and to go to *Cesar*, who, Improving the occasion, makes his particular Case that of the Publick, declaring to his Soldiers that he is only Arm'd to restore the Liberty of the People, which is oppress'd by the Senat, and having Animated them upon it, he marches away from *Rimini* (which was still part of his Government) and makes himself Master of the March of *Ancona*, which occasion'd a great dread at *Rome*. *Pompey* and the Consuls forsake it, and dare not assemble their Forces nearer than *Capua*. In the meantime *Cesar* continuing his march, Besieges *Domitius Enobarbus* in *Consennium*, who, (together with all the Senators that accompany'd him) is delivered up into his hands by his own Souldiers,

Souldiers, who ingageing in his Party, he set *Domitius* and the Senators at Liberty; and restor'd what ever belong'd to them. Proceeding on, he brings *Pompey* in *Brundisium*, who being unwilling to sustain the Siege, crosses the Sea with his Army, which he was forc'd to do at two sundry times, for want of Ships. Moreover he was oblig'd to make use of a great artifice to conceal his retreat from *Cæsar*, and to hinder those of *Brundisium* from giving his Enemy means to pursue him. *Cæsar* not being able to follow him for want of Ships, sends *Vaterius* into the Isle of *Sardinea*, and *Curion* into *Sicilly*. *Cotta* abandon'd the one, and *Cato* the other, complaining of *Pompey* who had ingag'd them Inconsiderately into that War, and cross'd over into *Affrica*. In the meantime *Cæsar* repair'd to *Rome*, justify'd his Actions, and offer'd to agree to a reasonable Peace. But seeing that his Enemys spun out the Negotiation by delays, he goes into *Gallia*, and

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there Reinforces his Army with *Gauls*. *Marseille* refuses to receive him, he besieges it, and sends *C. Fabius* to make himself Master of the passages of the *Pyrenean Hills*, which he performs bravely. Then draws near to *Petrejus* and *Affranius* who were Incamp'd below *Herde*, and pitches his Camp along the River *Segre*, on which he casts two Bridges. There only past some flight Skirmishes between them at first, untill two of *Fabius's* Legions being gone out to Forrage over that Bridge which was most distant from his Camp, it chanc'd to break; which his Enemies being inform'd of, march'd out with four Legions and all their Horse to fight them. But they retiring upon an advantageous Hill, and *Fabius* who suspected it, being come to their assistance, he delivered them out of that Peril. During these Transactions *Cesar* having left *C. Trebonius*, his Lieutenant General at the Siege of *Marseille* and *D. Brutus* to Command his Naval Army, repair'd to his

his Camp. Being got thither, *Caesar* endeavoured to Lodge his Army between *Herde* and the Enemys Camp. But after a long Combat, in which both Partys pretended to have had the advantage, they both retir'd into their former Camps. Soon after that the continual Rains carry'd away the two Bridges, and hinder'd the River from being Fordable any where. Which reduc'd him to great Streights, not being able to get provisions, nor to joyn a supply of Forces that came to him from *Gallia*, nor to rebuild his Bridges, by reason of the Rapidity of the Water, and the opposition he receiv'd from the Enemys, who were on the other side of the River. Finally, he causes Boats to be made, and while his Enemys amuse themselves to intercept some *Gauls* who were coming to joyn him, he carrys his Boats in Waggon, twenty miles distant from his Camp, puts them upon the River, makes some Souldiers pass on the other side, and without loosing time, Slips two Le-

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gions

gions more over, by means of which he makes his Bridge. And thus re-establish'd his Passage, got Provisions, and joyn'd the Forces that came up to his assistance, astonish'd his Enemys, and gain'd so much reputation, (with the news he receiv'd at the same time that *Brutus* had beaten the *Marseillians* at Sea) that five considerable Towns surrender'd up to him, and several others capitulated. But being unwilling to stop in so fair a way, he digs divers Trenches in order to cut off the Water from his Enemys Camp, and to make the *Segre* Fordable. *Affranius* and *Petrejus* dreading the success of his enterprize, resolv'd to reach *Octogesa* situate on the *Eber*, where they had sent men before hand to make a Bridge. In order thereunto they decamp at midnight. *Cesar* sends his Cavalry after them, making them Ford the River, (by reason that his Bridge was too distant) then leaving his Baggage in his Camp, he crosses with his Infantry, and pur-
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sues them so close, that he breaks their design, hindering them from going to the place intended, and from returning to their former Camp. In-
somuch that he reduces them to such extreams of hunger and drought, that they are oblig'd to yield to his Mercy without striking one blow. He dismisses them all, and satisfies them with incredible Courtesies; such as were never practic'd elsewhere towards Enemys. Thus he remains Master of *Spain*, sending them back loaden with shame and obligations, to publish his Clemency and Valour.

R E M A R K S.

T H E worst thing that can befall a Nation, a General, and an Army, is to suffer themselves to be surpris'd by fear; by reason that fear

is always attended with Fatal Consequences. Therefore the Leaders of People, and Commanders of Armies ought to foresee it, and to provide most carefully against it. We have three notable Examples upon that Subject in this Book. The first when Cæsar cross'd the Rubicon, for he was declar'd an Enemy to the Publick before that. Pompey promises that by stamping with his foot upon the Ground he will raise Armies to Combat him: that at his approach his very Souldiers will deliver him up to him: He does not judge him worthy of the least consideration: Those that dare name him are banished from Rome; and finally, he is treated like a Criminal of low esteem. Nevertheless, upon his first Motion in order to declare a War, and notwithstanding he behav'd himself at Pizaro as he had done at Rimini, not having the fourth part of his Army with him; every body is surpris'd, Pompey and the Consuls fly, the care of raising Men is laid aside, and they abandon Rome. The cause of this great alteration proceeds from that
Pompey

Pompey had never imagin'd that Cæsar should have dar'd to undertake so great a design, relying upon the presumption which his Vertue and his good Fortune had given him; which made him apply himself more to maintain his Party in the City, than to provide for his defence: So that when he found that things went otherwise than he had publish'd them, he was astonish'd. Therefore it was no great wonder that ignorant People who fix all their assurance, or fear on the good or ill countenance of the Person in whose hands they have plac'd their Fortunes, should do the like. Whereupon I say, that in affairs of such consequence, it is necessary, in imitation of Cæsar to consider maturely before hand, all the worst events that can happen, in order never to be surpris'd. But being once engag'd, we must arm against them all, and have constancy enough to persist to the end.

The second example is, when Domitius Enobarbus finding himself out of hopes of being succour'd by Pompey, resolv'd to fly from Corfinium where
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he was besieg'd; but by the alteration of his Countenance; by the faintness of his Words not suiting his present condition, and by the omission of those cares that were necessary for the common defence, discover'd to his Souldiers what he design'd to conceal from them; so that preventing his flight they deliver'd him up to Cæsar. This is a fine Lesson to inform a General that he ought to appear most chearful in the greatest perils; by reason that his Souldiers are encouraged or daunted by his looks. The third is, when Cæsar discover'd the Terrors of Afranius and Petrejus's Souldiers; because, says he, they did not succour and assist each other: insomuch that they hardly sustain'd the Shock of the Cavalry, before they laid all their Colours down in a heap; that they neither kept their Ranks nor distances, and that they did not remove from a Camp, in which they could not subsist for want of Water. And the Armies do not draw so near one another in these days by reason of their Cannon; Nevertheless experienced Captains

tains improve those considerations very usefully. I have seen Henry the Great pursuing eight hundred Horse with less than two, judging that they would not fight, because they confounded themselves, and did not observe their distances, which happen'd exactly according to his prediction.

Altho retiring by Sea, out of a besieg'd City, does not seem very difficult, yet the Precautions Pompey us'd in retiring from Brundisium, sav'd him. For considering that he had to deal with People he abandon'd, and with a vigilant Enemy, he had been ruin'd unless he had wall'd the Gates, and stopt all the Avenues of Brundisium, excepting only two conceal'd ones, which led his Men to the Port; by reason that as the last were retiring from of the Walls, the Inhabitants receiv'd Cæsar's into their room. Therefore in all sorts of retreats, it beboves a Captain to use his utmost cares, to do it with safety, and to avoid confusion: and when he does it by choice, he ought to do it so soon and so speedily, that he may not be oblig'd to fight.

fight. In this Place I will mention a dispute between Affranius and Petrejus, the one being desirous to retire by Night, the other by Day. Those who were for removing in the Night, alledg'd that they should reach the Mountains, and the places of safety, before it could be perceived by their Enemy's. The other were of opinion that having to do with Cæsar, who was strong in Horse, they could never steal away from him without fighting; and in that case it was better to do it in the Day time than in the Night, which always occasion'd disorders in retreats. For my part I hold the first opinion to be the best; For besides that, it is very dangerous to retire before an Enemy in the day time: A prudent Captain seldom engages to pursue an Army in the Night, because it is very difficult to avoid falling into some ambush or other.

B O O K II.

DURING these transactions in *Spain*, *Caius Trebonius* continues the Siege of *Marseilles*, to the relief of which *Pompey* sends anew *L. Nassidius*, who joyning his Naval Forces with those of the *Marseilleans*; engag'd against *Brutus* and was beaten. The greatest loss fell upon the *Marseilleans*, who fought with more obstinacy than the others, as being more concern'd in the preservation of their Estates and Liberties; and the thing that griev'd them most was, that they had conceiv'd too great hopes of their deliverance. However they still continued to make a vigorous defence. But *Trebonius* rais'd such Works against it and made use of such Machines that he approach'd a Tower which he undermin'd, and made part of it tumble down.
Where.

Whereat the besieg'd were so astonish'd, that they promis'd to surrender at *Cæsar's* coming, and desir'd a Truce till then. *Trebonius* grants it, and his Souldiers not keeping a good Guard, relying upon the confidence of the Truce; the Garrison makes a sudden Sally on a windy Day, and burns all the *Roman* Machines. Notwithstanding all this *Trebonius* was not daunted; he repair'd them with great diligence, which oblig'd *Domitius* to save himself by Sea, before the arrival of *Cæsar*; who tho call'd away by the affairs of *Italy*, would not leave *Spain* untill it was wholly reduc'd to his Devotion. There was *Varro* who at first spoke of him with great respect. But as soon as he thought that his affairs were not in a good posture, he exclaim'd against him and those of his Party; so that after the defeat of *Affranius* and of *Petrejus* he found himself oblig'd to sustain the War. But *Cæsar* having made an Assembly at *Cordona*; every body came

came to him there, and acknowledg'd his cause, and divers Towns drove out *Varro's* Garrisons, who was deserted by his men to that degree that one Legion, out of two which he had, abandon'd him : So that he was oblig'd to submit to *Cesar's* Mercy, as well as the rest. This being done, he left *L. Cassius Longinus* in *Spain*, goes to *Marseille* which surrenders to him, and then repairs to *Rome*. At the same time *Curio* passes out of *Sicilly* into *Affrick* with two Legions only and 500 Horse, and takes up his Quarters in the *Cornelian* Camp near *Uticca*, where *Peterejus Accius Varus* was incamp'd, against whom he had an advantageous Combat of Cavalry. Nevertheless upon some discourse of one *S. Quintilius Varus* to *Curio's* Souldiers, they fell into a panick fear, which being appeas'd by a Speech he made to them, he march'd in order of Battle against *Varrus* and beat him again, forcing him to retire into *Uticca*, where (with the Ill will
the

the Inhabitants bore him) he press'd him very close, when he was inform'd that King *Juba* was coming to his assistance ; whereupon *Curio* retir'd into his Camp, resolving there to expect the remainder of his Army which was in *Sicily*. But receiving a false advice that King *Juba* did not come in Person, and that he only sent a weak reinforcement commanded by *Saburria*, he alter'd that good Resolution. So that being swell'd by his first Victory, and more fit to harrangue the People of *Rome* than to command Armies, he march'd Night and Day to intercept the said Reinforcement : his Cavalry meets part of the *Nu-median* Horse in the Night and routs them. This Success makes him more eager, so that he marches as if he had prosecuted a Victory. But being tyer'd and in disorder, he meets a compleat fresh Army which beats him ; whereupon the best thing he could do was to expiate his Temerity by his Death. And thus he dyed a better Souldier than he had been a good Captain.

R E-

REMARKS.

IT is a Maxim held by all, and neglected by many, that it is necessary to keep a better Guard during a Truce than at all other times. We have a notable Instance of it in this Book: Trebonius had reduc'd those of Marseilla to the utmost extremity by a wonderful Labour, when during a Truce he had granted them out of mercy, his Souldiers neglecting their Guards, invied them to break it; and he saw all those Works burnt in one hour which had been divers months a raising. Which ought to teach us, never to deviate from the severity of Military Discipline in War. Altho the Souldiers grumble at it, it is better to give them any other sort of satisfaction, and when they see their Captains sharing with them in all the perils and fatigues of War, they go through them chearfully. For we read that several Captains by an exact observation of Military Discipline have surmounted the greatest difficulties, and have obtain'd glorious Victories: and that several others have been shamefully beaten for having dispis'd it: But there are no examples that the obser-
vatin

vation of the said Discipline ever caus'd the loss of a Battle, or the ruin of an Enterprize.

A great Courage without Experience is more capable of committing a great fault in War, than an indifferent one. For the first is commonly attended with presumption, and not so capable to hearken to advice as the other; especially when it has met with success in the beginning of a War. Curion is a famous example of it. From being a Tribune of the People, he became General of an Army: and indeed he committed several remarkable faults. For after having had the good Fortune to beat his Enemies and to shut them up in Uticca, and upon the news of King Juba's coming, of taking a good resolution to retire into his Camp, which was on the Sea side, and well fortify'd, and provided with all things, there to expect the remainder of his Army; upon the very first advice he receives that the Reinforcement is inconsiderable, and that it is not Commanded by Juba in Person, without staying for a confirmation, without considering, and without believing any body, he quits his first Resolution, goes out to fight him: after his Cavalry had met with some Partys of Juba's of which they brought some Prisoners to him; he inquires who Commands them, and they answering that it was Saburra, he concludes that Juba is not there. Thus he

con-

confirms himself in his first error and marches so fast and so far that he finds himself 23 miles distant from his Camp, in a Country he did not know, with part of his Men (the rest not having been able to follow him) very much ty'd and in disorder, which inabl'd Juba to beat him with ease. Which proves, that neither Courage alone makes a good Captain (tho it contributes very much towards it) nor yet the reading of Books, nor Eloquence; but that it requires a long experience, and to have seen defeats as well as Victories. For he that has never been engag'd in them can never imagine what it is, the bravest Souldiers sometimes committing the basest Actions on these occasions; as it happen'd in this, in which tho the residue of that Army was retir'd in a well fortify'd Camp and not attack'd: they imbark'd themselves with so much confusion and disorder, that a considerable part of them were drowned. Therefore I conclude that it is better not to go so fast, and to know whether one is going; than to be oblig'd to flye shamefully, or to Perish.

BOOK

H

BOOK III.

C*æsar* being chosen Dictator, provides for the safety of the City of *Rome*; causes himself to be declar'd Consul with *P. Servilius*: lays down the Dictatorship at the end of Eleven Days, after which he goes to Imbark at *Brundisium*, where he had sent Seven Legions before him. But he did not meet Ships enough for half his Army, so that he was constrained to go over with 15000 Foot, and 500 Horse; leaving *M. Anthony* with the rest, promising to send him back the Ships. *Pompey* who had had the whole year before him to make his preparations, had gather'd together a vast number of Men, of Provisions and of Ships; so that *Cæsar* pass'd with difficulty and peril, and sent back his Ships immediately to *Anthony*. But *Bibulus* General

equal of all *Pompeys* Naval Armies took about thirty of them which he burnt, and put all the Marriners to death, in order to deter others from attempting that Passage, which he did so effectually, notwithstanding the Winter Season, that he hinder'd *Anthony* from passing. At the same time *M. Octavius* Lieutenant to *Pompey*, besieges *Salonis* in *Dalmatia*, which makes so vigorous a defence, that without being reliev'd by any body, they oblige him to raise the Siege, and force him by a Sally to remove shamefully, from whence he repair'd to *Pompey* at *Durazzo*. On the other hand *Cæsar* having taken several Towns on the Strand side, hinder'd him from getting any refreshments. Finally *Bibulus* dyes, and the Sea not being so carefully kept, *Anthony* crosses it: and the Wind favour'd *Cæsar's* good fortune so much that they chang'd exactly to put his Army in safety, and to destroy that which follow'd it. The news being come up to him and

to *Pompey* at one and the same time, by reason that they were Incamp overagainst one another, the one marches away to joyn *Anthony*, which he effected, and the other to fight him; which not having been able to do, he goes back to Incamp at *Asparagne* of the appurtenances of *Durazzo*, and orders *Scipio* to come to joyn him with his Army. *Cesar* finding that the War was like to last long, sends part of his into *Macedon* and in *Theffaly* to make provision of Corn; by reason that the Sea being commanded by *Pompey* he could get none from *Italy*. But *Scipio* accidentally meeting with them had like to have destroy'd *L. C. Longinus* with one of *Cesar's* Legions; which he had certainly done had not *M. Favonius* whom he had left with eight Cohorts to guard his Baggage, sent him word that unless he came speedily to his Relief, *Dometius* was coming to Seize it. Whereupon he desisted from his Enterprises, and came very seasonably for *Favonius*. About
the

the same time young *Pompey* being inform'd that *Cæsar* sending his Ships back for the third time to *Brundisium*, had left some at *Oricum* under the Guard of *Cavinus*, with three Cohorts; he came to attack them, and took or burnt them all. This being done *Cæsar* pitch'd his Camp between *Durazzo* and *Pompey*, in order to cut off his communication with *Durazzo*. But *Pompey* remov'd his Camp to a place call'd *la Pierre* upon the Sea side, which had a small Port; so that by means of his Ships he got the same conveniences from thence. Whereupon *Cæsar* endeavours to enclose him with Trenches, and *Pompey* extends his Lines by other Trenches as much as he can, and finding himself stronger than he, attacks his Retrenchments, and had the advantage of him in two Combats, in which he had like to have routed him. *Cæsar* being no longer able to remain there, returns towards *Apollonia* and *Oricum*, where having made a review of his Army, and provided

for those two Places he passes into *Theffaly* to joyn the Army of *Domitius*. *Pompey* pursues him, who also joyns the Army commanded by *Scipio*. The two Armys (on which the Decision of the whole *Roman* Empire depended,) Incamp'd themselves before each other. *Cesar* endeavoured to come to a Battle, and *Pompey* avoided it. Finally, he suffer'd himself to be vanquish'd first by the reproaches of his own Men, and next by *Cesar's* Valour ; who pursu'd him so closely and with so much vigour after the Victory of the Battle of *Pharsalia*, that he never gave him time to Rally, coming into *Egypt* almost as soon he ; where King *Ptolemy* violating the Laws of Hospitality, and forgetting the kindnesses his Father had receiv'd from *Pompey*, caus'd him to be murdered : hoping to Ingratiate himself with the Conqueror by that base Action, who reveng'd it, as will be seen in the following Book. During these Transactions *Cassius* who commanded the
Armies

Armies of *Suria* of *Phœnicia* and of *Scicily*, burns the Ships *Pomponius* guarded in the Port of *Messina*; and *Lelio* took a small Isle before the Port of *Brundisium*, as *Libro* had done before. But the news of *Pompeys* defeat broke all the measures of his Lieutenants.

R E M A R K S.

‘ **I** F *Cæsar*’s Clemency and Liberality
‘ are so commendable during the
‘ whole course of his Life; he seems
‘ to have outdone himself in this Ci-
‘ vil War. To be unwilling to de-
‘ stroy whole Armies in *Spain* by o-
‘ pen force, and having reduc’d them
‘ to his Mercy, to dismiss them with
‘ their Commanders without obliging
‘ them to engage no longer to make
‘ War against him: To pay the arrears
‘ due to his Enemies, while he bor-
‘ rows

rows Money from his own Captains
to pay his own Men, to restore at
once to *Domitius Enobarbus* 150000
Crowns, which *Pompey* had given him
out of the publick Treasure, to make
War against him: To release the Pri-
soners he took without Ransom, nay,
even to restore them what ever was
theirs, while *Bibulus*, *Labiennus* and
others masacred as many of his Soul-
diers as fell into their Hands; are
actions to be admir'd but never to
be imitated: Especially in an Age
in which the practice is very diffe-
rent from this Generosity: and even
from what he had practis'd in *Gallia*,
where he sometimes us'd great Se-
verity. Let us therefore inquire
into the Reasons which inclin'd
him to this blind Clemency, which
seem'd to be fatal to his Men: In
order to which, I am of opinion that
we must distinguish the Designs. He
was a Conqueror in *Gallia*, so that
whenever they abus'd his first and
natural Clemency, he practis'd se-
verity to awe those by fear, which
he

‘ he had not been able to subdue by
‘ his mildness. But here he is engag’d
‘ in a Civil War, in which under pre-
‘ tence of maintaining the Liberty of
‘ the People, he designs to enslave
‘ the People and Senate. To that end
‘ he lays aside all his Passions the
‘ better to effect his design, and the
‘ more his Enemies are Cruel against
‘ him, the milder he appears against
‘ them : So that his Enemies only
‘ dreading him in Battle, and not dis-
‘ pairing of a Pardon, submit with
‘ ease at the first frowns of Fortune.
‘ But the Case is very different in
‘ such Civil Wars, as are only made
‘ for the defence of ones Person or
‘ Religion : For having no design in
‘ such to subvert the State, you are o-
‘ blig’d to repel Cruelty by Cruelty,
‘ or else you would find no Adherents:
‘ But when you fight for Dominion,
‘ you must obtain it, by behaving
‘ your self in such a manner that nei-
‘ ther Vengeance nor Cruelty may be
‘ fear’d from you, and by showing a
‘ great Liberality and all sorts of Ver-
‘ tues :

' tues : for people never desire a change
 ' of condition, unless it be to make
 ' themselves easier. Thus with this
 ' liberal Resolution, and Clemency,
 ' retaining his Dictatorship but a
 ' Fortnight ; doing nothing contrary
 ' to the common practice, as Pro-
 ' tector of the Common Wealth, justifi-
 ' fying all his Actions, showing him-
 ' self as desirous of a Peace, as *Pompey*
 ' seem'd averse to it, in order to
 ' animate his Citizens and Souldiers
 ' against him; and prosecuting the War
 ' much better than he, he achiev'd
 ' the greatest and most Glorious de-
 ' sign that ever was undertaken.

' *Cæsar* having joyn'd all his Forces,
 ' endeavours to fight *Pompey*, and not
 ' being able to draw him to a Battle,
 ' he undertakes a high design, viz.
 ' To besiege him in his Camp, tho he
 ' was weaker than he. It was near
 ' *Dunrazzo*, where he began to in-
 ' close him with Trenches, taking
 ' the advantage of small Hills, of
 ' difficult access, .(which in my
 ' opinion induc'd him to that de-
 ' sign :)

‘sign:) the Reasons alledg’d by
‘him, are, that being weak in Caval-
‘ry, and having a scarcity of Corn,
‘he could not possibly get any, *Pom-*
‘*pey’s* Army being free, which he
‘thereby also depriv’d of Forrage,
‘and made it useless to all the Facti-
‘ons of the War ; since it would les-
‘sen *Pompey’s* Reputation throughout
‘the Empire, and increase his own,
‘when it should be reported that *Cæ-*
‘*sar* kept him besieg’d, and that he
‘durst not fight him ; which was of
‘great use to him, since People com-
‘monly side with the strongest. On
‘the other hand, *Pompey* being un-
‘willing to quit the Sea side, or to
‘remove from *Durazzo*, where he had
‘put his Stores and Provisions, re-
‘solv’d to subsist there ; and finding
‘that his Cavalry would suffer too
‘much unless they return’d to For-
‘rage, he made an inclosure of Trench-
‘es on his side, of fifteen Miles cir-
‘cumference. Thus the two Captains
‘omitted nothing in order to the
‘success of their Designs. Finally, *Pom-*
‘*pey*

‘*pey* finding himself very much streight-
‘ned by this inclosure, attacks one of
‘the ends of *Cæsars* Retrenchments,
‘in which he had so much dvantage
‘in two Combats that were fought
‘in one day, that *Cæsar* confess’d, that
‘his Army would have been routed
‘if he had pursu’d his Victory. This
‘shows us still the usefulness of Re-
‘trenchments, and how easy it is there-
‘by to avoid a Combat against an
‘Army we stand in dread of; to re-
‘incourage one that is disheartened;
‘and to starve another stronger than
‘our own: For the skill of War con-
‘sists chiefly, in never being forc’d to
‘Fight against ones Will, to which
‘end ’tis necessary to take care not to
‘want provisions, to exercise the Soul-
‘diers to handle their Arms well,
‘and to observe their Orders, and to
‘know how to make Retrenchments;
‘for had *Cæsar* been to deal with a
‘less skilfull Captain than *Pompey* who
‘had suffer’d himself to be inclos’d
‘at first, he would either have ruin’d
‘his Army or have forc’d him to fight.

Cæsar

Cæsar being sensible that he could
no longer block up *Pompey*, nor yet
remain near him without being re-
duc'd to great inconveniencies for
want of Provisions; undertakes a
long retreat of several days march.
To that end he dispatches away his
Baggage in the evening with one Le-
gion, and the remainder of his Ar-
my about Mid-night excepting two
Legions, and with his Cavalry which
he himself follow'd at break of
day. *Pompey* pursues him with
speed, and finding him lodg'd
where he had formerly been In-
camp'd, he also takes possession of
his old Camp near him: But where-
as *Cæsar* seemingly sends out his
Cavalry to Forrage, (making it
return secretly into his Camp a-
gain) *Pompey* sends out his in ear-
nest, and most of his Souldiers be-
ing gone back to fetch some Bag-
gage they had left in their former
Camp; he marches away suddenly
in the same order as the day before.
So that *Pompey* not being able to fol-
low

low him at that time, and the other making great Marches still in the same order; he could not possibly overtake him; and in three days time desisted his pursuit. This is a fine Lesson to show how dangerous it is to make a retreat within sight of an Enemy; and how to avoid a Combat, and what order is necessary to be observ'd not to be incumber'd with the Baggage, and how a Retreat is made better with part of the Army, than with the whole. For since *Cesar* was afraid of retreating within sight of *Pompey* with an Army so accusom'd to Vanquish, and dreaded by *Pompey* himself, what must Generals do in these our times, who command Armies newly rais'd, without order, without obedience, full of Baggage, where Souldiers do not understand their Arms, nor the Captains how to teach them; and yet they would think it a reflection upon their Honour, to retire by stealth. Presumption and Ignorance are two ill Councillors in War.

At

‘ At the Battle of *Pharsalia*, *Pompey* was as strong again as *Cæsar*, especially in Cavalry, on which he rely’d particularly for Victory: but his Army was neither so well experienced nor so accustom’d to fight as *Cæsars*, so that dreading they would break their order in going to Charge, he commanded them to tarry and sustain the shock of the Enemys Army without moving from their Place. *Cæsar* not approving this Advice, commanded his Army to begin the Onset, alledging that it would excite the courage of his Men, which it is fitter to encrease than to lessen, not disapproving the Ancient way, beginning the Combat with a general shout. And experience informs us that in all Warlike Actions, he that attacks redoubles his Courage, and that he that is attack’d has some fear.

‘ As for the Order of *Pompeys* Battle, having a Brook on his Right, he plac’d all his Horse on the Lett, flatterer himself that after having over-
‘ thrown

‘ thrown *Cæsar’s*, it would enclose his
‘ Army, *Cæsar* being sensible that his
‘ Cavalry was not strong enough to
‘ resist *Pompeys*, reinforce’d it with
‘ sprightly Souldiers whom he mixes
‘ among it; moreover he makes a de-
‘ tachment out of every Battaillon,
‘ with which he compos’d another to
‘ sustain it, which he puts out of the
‘ Rank of the three orders of the In-
‘ fantry, and Commands them not to
‘ Charge, untill they receive orders
‘ from him; so that when *Pompeys*
‘ Cavalry had beaten back *Cæsars*,
‘ which they could not do without
‘ putting themselves in disorder, they
‘ met this Battaillon which stopt them
‘ short: and then oblig’d them to turn
‘ their backs, and wholly to abandon
‘ the Left Wing of *Pompeys* Army,
‘ through which *Cæsar* pursuing his
‘ Point, easily put the rest in disorder.
‘ Whereupon we will observe two
‘ things, the one that a General must
‘ never hazard all his Forces at once,
‘ but by degrees: and the other to ob-
‘ serve distances so well, both on the
fides

'sides and in the Rear; that the first
'being overthrown, may not over-
'throw them that are to sustain them,
'leaving them a convenient space to
'pass and to rally behind.

'As *Cæsar* knew how to Vanquish,
'so he knew better yet how to pur-
'sue his Victory, and to improve it.
'But never comparably to that of
'*Pharsalia*, in which he did not alone
'content himself with forcing the Camp,
'nor with besieging the remainder of
'the Army upon a Hill, on which they
'retir'd, nor yet with pursuing *Pom-*
'*pey* for some days: But with 3 or
'4000 Men only, he follow'd him both
'by Sea and Land, until he trac'd him
'to his Grave in *Egypt*, where he ar-
'riv'd almost as soon as he, never al-
'lowing him time to recolect himself,
'or any wise to Rally. This teaches us
'to improve occasions when they offer
'themselves, and never to delay what
'may be executed on the Instant.
'For worldly things are subject to
'great Revolutions: And the affairs
'and difficulties *Cæsar* still met with
'after *Pompey's* death, testifie suffici-
I 'ently

'ently that had he in imitation of fe-
 'veral great men; endeavour'd to
 'gather the Fruits of his Victory be-
 'fore their being Ripe, and to relish
 'Peace before it were secur'd, he
 'might have repented it.

O F T H E
 Alexandrian W A R,

Written By
Anlus Hircius, or Opins.

B O O K I V.

CÆSAR being arriv'd at *Alexandria* with 3200 Foot, 800 Horse, 10 *Rhodian* Gallys, and some Ships of *Asia*, learnt the Death of *Pompey*, and observing that there was no good understanding between his Souldiers and the Inhabitants, he sent for some fresh Legions out of *Africa*. In the mean time being desirous

rous to examine the Last Will and Testament of the late King *Ptolomy*, who had made the People of *Rome* his Executors, he order'd *Ptolomy* his eldest Son, and *Cleopatra* his eldest Daughter to disband their Army, and to repair to him to acquaint him with their Rights. But *Ptolomy's* Council disapproving that way of accomodation, sent for his Forces under hand, which were at *Pelusium*, under the Command of *Achilas*. Which *Cesar* being acquainted with, and that the King himself held Intilligence with the said *Achilas*, he detain'd him, and prepar'd for his defence. He repulses them at first, then quarters his Men in one part of the City, and his Enemys do the same in the other. *Arsinoe* causes *Achilas* to be put to Death, puts *Ganimedes* in his room, who assuming the said Authority, continues the first design, reduces *Cesar* to great Extreame, and spoils his fresh Water, which he soon remedy'd digging abundance of Wells. He also sends for Souldiers, Ships, and Arms from all Parts; and

I 2 being

being inform'd that the 37th Legion was arriv'd on the confines of *Africk*, but that it could not come up to him, by reason that the Wind was contrary; he Imbarks alone, takes all his Ships along with him, with his Marriners only, and sets out to meet it. The Enemies knowing that he was without Souldiers, attack him. He beats them, and without any other Succors joyns his Legion, and returns to *Alexandria*. This first Combat astonishes the *Alexandrians*; nevertheless they refit and make their Naval Army better than ever, which *Cesar* beats a second time, in which Combat *Euphranins* Captain of the *Rhodian* Gallies signaliz'd himself extremely. There is a small inhabited Island before the Port of *Alexandria*, which covers it, and joyns that City by the Mole, which is 900 Paces long, and 60 in breadth, on which there were two Forts. *Cesar* judges it necessary to take the said Island, in order to have the freedom of the Sea. He forces it, then takes one of the Forts of the Mole. There was a
great

great Combat in the Second, and he was repuls'd with so much disorder, that not being able to hinder his Soldiers from throwing themselves on board his Ship, he sav'd himself by swimming, before it perished. The *Alexandrians* being astonish'd at those Combats, have recourse to cunning, they demand their King from *Cæsar*, he delivers him, hoping that it would facilitate an accomodation. During these Transactions, *Mithridates Pergamenian*, a Man very nobly born, a great Warrior, Brave, and very faithful to *Cæsar*, comes to his assistance: takes *Pellusium* by the way, and comes to pass the *Nile* at a place call'd *Delta*. Which *Ptolomy* being inform'd of, goes in Person to oppose him, and *Cæsar* to assist *Mithridates*, who before the arrival of either, had already beaten *Ptolomy's* Men in one occasion. *Cæsar* also beat others before he could join *Mithridates*; after which he attacks a small Fort between his Camp and that of *Ptolomy*, which he takes, and the next day attacks their Camp, which he forces, and the King

endeavouring to save himself by Water, is drown'd : then returning Victorious to *Alexandria* every body submits to him. In the mean time the Provinces of the Empire did not remain in quiet. *Domitius Calvinus* one of *Cesar's* Lieutenants was defeated by *Pharnaces* , who made himself Master of the Kingdom of *Pontus*. In *Illyria* *Gabinus* *Cesar's* Lieutenant, was also defeated, and dy'd at *Salona*. And *Octavius* of *Pompey's* Party, thinking to seize on that Province, met with *Cornificius* who oppos'd it : as also *Vatinius* who hearing this news at *Brunsum*, puts out to Sea, meets *Octavius*, Engages with him and routs him. In *Spain* *Cassius Longinus* , who was left there by *Cesar*, exposes himself to the hatred of the Inhabitants and of his Army, by his Covetousness : they conspire against him, and wound him, and thinking he was dead, discover their Joy. But he being cur'd punishes the Conspirators rigorously : however he could not prevent a revolt in his Army. And as he was endeavouring to remedy it on one side,

side, they also revolt on the other, and altogether elect *Marcellus* for their Commander, who came to Incamp below *Cordona*, which favour'd him. *Longinus* sends to King *Boguda* to demand Succors, who sends him a considerable reinforcement; nevertheless *Marcellus* maintains himself without fighting; and *Lepidus* coming with new Forces to endeavour to accomodate them, *Longinus* suspecting it, removes farther from them; but upon the approach of *Trebonius* his successor in that Government, he Imbarks for *Africk*, where *Cesar* had design'd him, and is drown'd at the mouth of the River *Iberna*. Let us return to *Cesar*, Altho his affairs required his presence in *Rome*, he first resolves to revenge the defeat of *Domitius*. He leaves *Egypt* with the sixth Legion only, leaving the remainder of his Army to guard the Kingdom, and with such Forces as he could gather in *Asia* he fights *Pharnaces*, beats him, takes what he had from him, and gives the Kingdom of *Bosphorus* to *Mithridates-Per-gamienian*, as a recompence for the
good

good Service he had done him in the *Alexandrian War* : Then returns Triumphant with so many Victories to Rome.

REMARKS.

OF all *Cæſar's War*, I look upon this to be the least necessary, and the most dangerous and that he never expos'd himself so much in any other. For having heard the Death of Pompey at Alexandria, to tarry there with 3 or 4000 Men, and in that condition endeavour to oblige a young King to restore part of his Kingdom in favour of his Sister Cleopatra ; shows that he either confided strangely in his good Fortune, or that he was very much in love with it. But as that beginning is not suitable to his usual Prudence, so the progress and the end surpasses all his other actions, and his faults seem only to be committed, the better to illustrate his Vertue. This prov'd a War without Rule ; he was oblig'd to defend avenues and streets, and to make Barricado's ; to dispute one half of the City against the other ; To remedy unexpected Accidents, To encourage his Men, To combat at Sea without Soldiers, and yet vanquish'd : And, as if he was fallen or dropt out of a New World,

World, to make a War after a new method. Which shows that he excell'd particularly in three things; viz. That he never lost his hopes, that he had a great experience, and that he never was confounded in his Command. This War being ended, he marched against Pharnaces; whereupon we will only observe two things: The first, that tho he only endeavoured to put a speedy period to this War, because he had business elsewhere; yet he did not venture to attack him inconsiderately, but always begins by incamping himself with advantage: then having left his Baggage in a place of safety, he marches with his whole Army to make another Camp near him, leaving a considerable Valley between them, to the end that if he should attempt to hinder him from satisfying himself there, and to attack him, he might not be able to come up to him without a great disadvantage. The other is, to show the advantage of those that attack: for Cæsar observes himself, that tho Pharnaces attack'd him rashly; yet his Soldiers were daunted at it, and it put them at first in disorder. This Confirms that whoever attacks has a great advantage, and that there is nothing more necessary in War than Retrenchments.

OF THE
War of *AFFRICK*;

Written By

Anlus Hircius, or Opus.

BOOK V.

THE Remains of *Pompey's* Party being rally'd, in *Affrick* under *Scipio*, under *Cato*, and under King *Juba*, *Cæsar* repairs thither in the Month of *December*, having at first but 3000 Foot and a few Horse with him; he appears before *Andrabetta*. But *Considius* seeing him so weak holds out, and *Cæsar* is attack'd in his retreat by a Sally from the Town, and by Cavalry come to their assistance, which he repulses: in which

which it was observ'd that 30 French Horse made above 2000 *Meters* give ground. The News of his arrival being spread, several Towns and Castles open'd their Gates to him, and furnish'd him with Provisions. He pitch'd his Camp at *Russina* there to tarry for the remainder of his Army; but growing impatient, he goes to that Port and imbarke himself to go in search of it. And as he was just setting Sail, a considerable part of it arrives. After which he goes with 30 Cohorts to seek for Corn: he meets *Labiennus* in his way, against whom he had a sharp Combat, in which he had the advantage, and thus he retir'd into his Camp, which he fortifi'd more than ever, because he found himself weak: he drew two Trenches from the Town to the Port, the better to secure it; and then dispatch'd into *Cicily*, into *Sardinia*, and into *Italy*, for a reinforcement of Men and Corn. On the other side *Scipio* and *Cato* who were desirous to fight him before he could be reinforced, press'd *Juba* to make hast to them with his Army. But being on his way thither, he was forc'd to turn back again, being inform'd that *P. Sirtus Caesar's* Lieutenant and King *Boguda* attackt his Kingdom. In the mean time *Labiennus* joyns *Scipio*; and they Incamp near *Caesar*, both sides
endea-

endeavours to take advantages, divers Combats and Skirmishes pass'd between them, without daring to venture a Battle. *Casars* necessity increas'd daily: he bears them with great Constancy, and only buoies up the hopes of his Men by his assurance. He sends new orders to hasten his Forces and Provisions, some of his Ships are cast away, and being inform'd that others are pursued into the very Port of *Lepis*, he repairs thither with all the speed imaginable, throws himself into a Ship, and with such Men as he could assemble sets forward to their relief; drives away his Enemys takes some of their Ships, and retakes some of his that had been taken. Finally, his Forces repair to him from sundry parts. He begins by punishing some seditious Libertines of his Army; then resolves upon a decisive Combat. To that end he goes to incamp before *Tapsa*, which he surrounds with Trenches, supposing that *Scipio* would attempt to relieve it: who having prevail'd with King *Jaba* to come back again, they Encamp near *Casar* into three Camps. There they Ingage, and *Casar* beats them, not losing above 50 Soldiers, besides some few wounded. Ten thousand were kill'd on the other side, and the three Camps taken. *Tapsa* surrenders upon the re:
port

part of that Victory to *C. Rebilus*. *Cato* seeing that they would make no defence, kills himself. *Utricca* opens its Gates to the Victorious: *Admet* does the like: Those of *Zama* shut theirs against their vanquish'd King, and call in *Caesar*. All the rest of *Juba's* Kingdom revolts, he and *Petrejus* kill each other out of despair. *Sitius* having beaten and kill'd *Juba's* Lieutenant, and coming up to *Caesar*, Incounters *Africanus* and *Faustus Silla* by the way, who were going towards *Spain*, beats their Army and takes them Prisoners, after which they were both kill'd in a mutiny. *Scipio* and several Senators being Imbark'd to go into *Spain*: are driven into the Fleet of *Sitius*, in which all perished, or kill'd themselves. This was the sequel of that Battle, in which all things conspir'd to contribute towards *Caesar's* Victory, who pardon'd all those that implor'd his Clemency, and then return'd to Rome.

REMARKS.

CÆsar did three things in this War, which savour very much of Temerity. The first was to Cross over into Africk in the middle of the Winter with a small Number of
of

of Men, having no Port at his Command, and consequently not being able to give a Rendezvous to his Ships; which was alledge'd against him as a defect in point of forecast. Nevertheless after his Passage his behaviour is altogether admirable. He Incamp before the Town of Ruspine which was within half a League of the Port and Joyns it with the Town and his Camp, which he Fortifys very well: for thereby he had a Foot on the Sea and another on the Land, in order to act either by Sea or Land according as occasions should order and to prevent being Surrounded. This is a fine Lesson for those who form undertakings upon any Country being but Weak at the beginning: for in such a Posture they are able to sustain great Efforts, or at worst to retire. The second was to leave his Army near Ruspine, and to Embark himself without giving any notice of it to any Body in order to go in search of his Ships. The third was, being acquainted with the misfortune of his Fleet, to quit his Camp: and to fly to Lepus: To throw himself into a Ship, to rally others, and to Attack his Enemy's. And tho he did not perish in it, all that can be said of it is that he rely'd absolutely upon his good Fortune, and that he never was tyred or discouraged by hazardous or penible undertaking. Observe that Cæsar in all his Wars has ever been Inferior in Number to his Enemies. And for that Reason he ever made use

use beyond all others, of Fortifications, which he still made the stronger when he found himself not in a condition to Fight, as he was for a long while in Affrick. In so much that even Scipio himself wonder'd at his coldness. Nevertheless he still train'd up his Soldiers in Exercise, and taught the new ones himself, and endeavour'd to Exercise them by small Combats, in which he commonly had the advantage by his Industry. And ever attempt-
ed upon his Enemy, which is an excellent Maxim to Encourage our Men and to avoid a Surprise.

OF THE
War of SPAIN,
Against
POMPEY's Children.

BOOK VI.

THE remainder of the Forces of Affrick, rally'd again in Spain, under Cneus and Sextus Pompey's Children. Caesar repairs thither, and finds the one be-

128 *An Abridgment of the War of Spain.*

besieging *Ulla*, the other in *Cordona*; throws in a reinforcement into the first, and Incamps before the other. This obliges *Cneus* to raise the Siege in order to relieve his Brother. Some Skirmishes pass between the two Armies. But *Cesar* not being able to draw his Enemy to a Battle, besieges *Attequa*, and after a considerable resistance takes it in sight of *Cneus*. After which both Armies observ'd each other, and made divers Combats of little use, Finally, they Incamp in a Plain near *Munde*, with a resolution on both sides not to refuse a Combat. Nevertheless, *Cneus* Posts himself advantagiously, whereupon *Cesar* being unwilling to attack him, the fury of his Souldiers prevail'd with him. The Combat was great and dangerous, according to his own Confession; and he got the day, which prov'd very bloody, with great difficulty. There fell 30000 Men on *Pompeys* side, and not above 1000 on *Casars*. Those that made their escape into *Munde* were constrain'd to surrender. *Sextus Pompey* abandon'd *Cordona*, *Cneus*, is speedily pursued, overtaken and kill'd. All the Towns yield to the Victor. This was the last Battle fought by *Cesar*, and a mortal blow to *Pompey's* Party.

T H E
Military Discipline
O F T H E
GRECIANS.
A N D
Particularly of their Phalanx.

TH E Discipline of the *Greeks* is but obscurely hinted at in their Authors, because most part of the Books on that subject are lost, and we have only some small Remains. So that its difficult to make an exact Collection on this Head. Their *Phalanx* was formed thus.

The Grecian Phalanx.

Giogo signifies two Men in Front, and several of those joyn'd together Compose a *Rank*, and oftentimes the word *Giogo* is taken for a *Rank*; *Verfo* signifies two Men, the one behind the other, and many of them so placed make up a *File*, *Locho* signifies a *File*, which amongst the *Greeks* consisted of several *depths*, but they never exceeded 16, as judging that number sufficient to sustain the greatest Efforts, to make the *Phalanx* deeper they thought was to no purpose, and judg'd it better to stretch out the Battle in length, either to prevent their being attackt on the *Flanks* themselves, or to attack the *Flanks* of the Enemy then to make their *Phalanx* so deep.

The *Phalanx* was altogether compos'd of *Oplites*, that is to say, Men in heavy Armour, with long Pikes and Bucklers for the Archers, those who us'd Slings and Darts were drawn up apart in a *Locho* or *File* of
of

of 16 Soldiers; there were 5 who had command, viz. The 1st, 5th, 9th, 13th, and 16, which as also their Names is explain'd in the following Figure.

The First Figure.

- Locago.....O..... Leader of the File.*
 1 *Eno Marche...O...*
 2 *Eno Marche..O... Leader of the half File.*
 3 *Eno Marche...O...*
Vrago.....O..... he who brings up the File.

The most Valiant was appointed to be Leader of the File, and the most prudent to bring it up.

When they began to Marshal the Army, they joyn'd 2 Files the one against the other, who made up 32 Soldiers, and then together they were called *Dilochie*, and the Captain of the 2 Files *Dilockite*.

Then they doubled 2 Files which made up, 4 consisting of 64 Soldiers, and this Troop was called a

132 *The Military Discipline*

Tetrarchie, and their Commander *Tetrarch*.

Next they doubled the four Files which made up 8, consisting of 128 Soldiers, and their body was called a *Taxiarchie*, and their Commander *Taxiarch*.

In the last place they doubled those 8 Files which made 16, and this body was called *Sintagme*, or *Senagie*; and their Commander *Sintagmarch*, or *Senago*.

This body had 5 general Officers, a *Standard-bearer*, one to order the *Rere*, whose duty was much the same with that of our *Sergent*, a *Trumpet*, (for they had no *Drum*,) one to give *Orders*, and a *Minister*.

The *Standard-bearer* took his Post in the middle of the first Rank, as appears by this Figure.

The


The Second Figure.

Syntagmarch.

Taxiarcb

Tetrarch

Diloquite



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
The *Phalanx* was compos'd of 16 such bodys as that in the preceeding Figure.

Then they doubled the 16 Files which they called a *Pentacosiarchie*, and the Commander *Pentacosiarch*.


Then they doubled the 32 which they called a *Chiliarchie* and the Commander *Chiliarch*.

Then they doubled the 64 Files, which they called a *Merarchie*, and the Commander *Merarch* or *Telarch*.

Then they doubled the 128 Files, which they called a *Phalanx Phalangarchie*, or *Strategie* and the Commander *Phalangarch Stratega* or General. So that the *Phalanx* consisted of 4096 Soldiers; one *Phalangarch* who commanded all, two *Melarchs*, four *Chitiarchs*, eight *Pentacosiarchs*, 64 *Tetrachs*, and 228 *Dilochites* as may be seen by the following Figure.



The

*The Fourth Figure.*Feet 96 


1536. 1536. 1536. 1536.

This was the Order of the *Grecian Phalanx* composed of Men in heavy Arms, named *Oplites*, who carried Pikes and Buklers, which took up (reckoning 6 foot to each Soldier) 6144 foot in Front, and 96 in depth, besides the three Intervals.

To this Army they join'd half as many more, lightly Arm'd, called *Files*, who fought at a distance with Darts and Slings, and stood in Battle array behind the *Phalanx*, to whom they were equal in *Front*; but the *Files* were only 8 Men deep in the same order, and with the same Officers, and when the Battle was to begin, they marched through the Intervails to charge the Enemy, and then when the Armies were ready to joyn, they retired that same way

way to their old Post behind the Armed Men, and sent showers of Arrows, Darts and Stones over their heads upon the Enemy; adding mean-while to the depth of the *Phalanx*, which that it might sustain the great Shock, was at that time 24 Men deep.

The Fifth Figure.



And as for the Cavalry, they were always posted upon the Wings, and both Horse and Foot chang'd their form according to their ground, the number of the Enemy, or their order of Battle; deminishing the Front, and doubling the Files, or doubling the Front and deminishing the Files, by cutting off one half as did *Cyrus* in the Battle against *Cresus*, when afraid of being surrounded; his Files consisting of 24 Men, he reduced them

to

to 12, and enlarg'd his Front as much again.

They did also observe other orders according to occasion, as drawing up in a Circle with the light Arms in the middle to sustain a great Shock on all sides, in a Triangle that they might the better enter a Battalion, or in a Half-Moon to enclose, and other postures which are not now much in use.

And that they might not be confounded in observing such Orders when they had occasion, there were publick Schools called *Gymnasia*, for training the youth in those exercises, and Masters to teach them their Orders, and how to handle their Arms. Every Souldier had 6 Foot Square allowed him to exercise all his Postures and change of Orders; 3 Foot in time of Battle, and sometimes to sustain a vigorous effort, they would close so as to allow but a Foot to each. By this means it was that so many of the Petty Republicks of Greece maintain'd their Liberty so long, perform'd such great Actions, repuls'd great Armies with small Force, and carried their

their Victories into *Asia* and elsewhere, until such time as their divisions destroy'd them, and gave *Philip* the opportunity of subduing them: After which his Son *Alexander* by them and their Discipline conquer'd a great part of the World.

Its true indeed, that the constitution of those Republicks was more proper to maintain their Liberty than enlarge their Dominions; for tho all without exception did apply themselves to Arms, yet the small number of Soldiers in each Republick apart, together with their poverty and divisions, prevented their making any progress that way. It being difficult for so many Sovereign Republicks to agree any otherwise then in their common defence, as they did several times against the *Persians*, but never for a Conquest; in which it is hard for them either to agree in the Command of the Forces or share of the Conquest.

As for their intrenched Camps which they call'd *Apleto*, they rather chose such as were strong by situation than
to

to fortifie them by Labour, and they had no certain form like the *Romans*, but according to the advantage of the Ground they fortified one side more then another ; but hereof we find very little certainty in ancient Authors.

T H E
Military Discipline
O F T H E
R O M A N S.

C H A P. I.

R*omulus* having built the City of *Rome*, he divided it into Centuries and Military Orders, each Body contained 3000 Foot and 300 Horse, and because they made choice of the most Valiant Men, those Bodies were called *Legions*, which is as much as to say *Chosen*.

The

The City being afterwards enlarged by the *Sabins*, the Legions were increas'd to 6000 Foot and 600 Horse; but since that time they have been compos'd of much lesser numbers.

Tullius Hostilius the 3d King of the *Romans*, establish'd Military Exercises, and distinguish'd the People into five Classes: The Richer sort were oblig'd to mount themselves with Horse and Arms for the Cavalry. The three other Classes were imploy'd in the Infantry; and according to their ability were made *Spear-men* (*Hastarii*) *Leaders of Bands*, (*Principes*) or *bringers up of the Rear*. (*Triarii*) who were always the strongest Men, and all these sorts were oblig'd to Arm themselves according to their Rank. The fifth and last Class being too poor, were exempted from the War.

Yet when the *Romans* put Fleets to Sea, which happen'd in the 499 year of the City, they took the richest of the last *Class* to be Souldiers at Sea, and moreover, obliged them in case of necessity to serve twenty years by Land.

No

No Man could arrive to the dignity of a Civil Magistrate at *Rome*, without serving Ten years in the War, nor by that means neither, except he were 27 years of Age, because they began to serve in the Wars at 17, and left off at 45. They were also oblig'd of these 28 to serve 15, and when that was accomplished, they were under no further obligation to bear Arms, except in the Guard, and defence of the City.

After that the Kings were banished from *Rome*, two Consuls were annually chosen in their place. Then the Consuls chose 24 Military Tribunes, but afterwards the People would chuse them themselves. It was necessary that 14 of them should be of those who had served 26 years in the War, and the other Ten of those which had served longer. *viz.* 11 years on Foot, and 15 on Horseback, which shows that they put a greater value upon the Infantry then upon the Cavalry.

The Consuls did annually assemble out of the Tribes all who were from 17 to 45 years of Age, either in the
Capit

Capitol or in the Field of Mars; and those who did not appear were chastised with Rigour, the delinquents being easily found out, for by the Ordinance of *Tullius Hostilius* a Register was kept of all Births and Burials, and those who dwelt within the Territories of the City, as well as the Citizens themselves, were reckoned within the number.

There were always four Legions chosen, *viz.* Two for each Consul. Sometimes they rais'd more, but very rarely, and that according to the urgency of the Occasion, as in *Hanibal's* time there were 23 Legions on Foot altogether: But the Consuls had never any more then two a piece, the rest being commanded by *Pretors*, *Proconsuls*, and other Captains: But the Republick growing stronger afterwards and those Laws having fallen into disuse, *Cesar* alone Commanded Ten Legions against the *Gauls*,

Before they proceeded to the Election of the Soldiers, they divided the 24 Tribunes among the 4 Legions. *viz.* Of the 14 younger Tribunes they

they gave four to the 1st Legion, 3 to the 2^d, 4 to the 3^d, and 3 to the 4th, and of the 10 Elder Tribunes they gave 2 to the 1st, 3 to the 2^d, 2 to the 3^d, and 3 to the 4th. So that there were 6 Military Tribunes to each Legion, and every one of them had some of the Elder and some of the Younger.

The Tribunes being thus disposed and divided in four Bands, the Tribes were drawn by Lot, and of the first there were four Men chosen as equal as possible they could be ; Of those four the six Tribunes of the 1st Legion chose one, the six of the 2^d chose another, the six of the 3^d chose the 3^d, and the six of the 4th had the 4th. After this four more were brought, of which the Tribunes of the 2^d began to chuse the 1st, those of the 3^d the 2^d, those of the 4th the 3^d, and those of the 1st had the 4th, and thus every one began to chuse successively, and the like was done throughout all the Tribes, so that in the Choice of the Souldiers, the first Legion had no advantage of the last, but they were all formed alike. The

The Infantry being thus chosen, then the *Censor* chose the Cavalry.

As to the number of the Souldiers in each Legion it was different, according to the difference of time. Those of the Infantry have sometimes consisted of 3000, 3200, 4000, 4200, 5000, 5200, 6000, 6200, always observing that proportion as to number, which they found most commodious to divide; and from their *Manipuli*, or *Small Parties*, their *Centuriæ*, or Companies of 100, and their *Cohortes*, or Bands, the least of which contained 500 men. And the same method was taken with the Cavalry, which consisted sometimes of 200, 220, 250, 300, 320, 330, 350, or 400.

The Election being thus finished, the Tribunes of every Legion made them to swear one by one with their Left hand elevated, and the Thumb of their Right lifted up on high, to obey all that their Superiour should command,

L

At

At the same time the Consuls commanded the Magistrates of *Italy* to make Elections, of the same nature, amongst the Allies of the *Romans*, by which they raised an equal number of Foot, but double the number of Horse; so that in a Consular Army there were to be of right four Legions, two of *Romans*, and two of their Allies.

This being done they were dismissed, after having a day prefixt to rendezvous again in a certain place, without Arms, where the Tribunes chose the youngest and poorest for *Velites*, i. e. *Skirmishers*, or *Light Harness-men*; the next to them for *Spearmen*, the most active to be *Principes*, i. e. *Leaders of Bands*, and the eldest to be *Triarij*, to bring up the *File*.

After this they were armed, in which there was also a diversity; but the more usual Arms of the *Velites* were a *Morion*, or Head-piece; a small *Targe*, or Buckler, Darts and a
Sword

Sword. The Archers and those who used Slings were called extraordinary and Auxiliaries.

The Spearmen had Targets, or Bucklers, four foot high, a Helmet, and a sort of Breast-plate ; and the richer sort had Armour both for back and breast, a two-edged Sword with a good point on their right side, and two Dartsto throw.

The *Principes* and *Triarij* were armed in the same manner, only the latter had Javelins instead of Darts.

Their Cavalry was at first very ill armed, but they learned from the *Greeks*, to make use of Back and Breast, Shield and Javelin.

The Allies, both Horse and Foot, were arm'd and disciplin'd like the *Romans*.

Besides the four bodies of *Velites*, *Hastarij*, *Principes* and *Triarij*, already mentioned, ancient Authors speak of *Tirones*, *Rorarij* and *Accenses*, who were all young Souldiers, either *Romans* or Auxiliaries; and as

I suppose, fought only with such Weapons as they could hurl or sling; and in effect there was no other body of Infantry among the *Romans* but these three orders, the *Hastarij*, *Principes*, or *Triarij*; for the *Velites* did not make up a distinct body, but were mixt with the other both in the Battle and Camp, and were never made use of by the *Romans*, till the Siege of *Capua*.

The Election being over, the Soldiers arm'd, and the Orders form'd, the Tribunes did separate each order, by Centuries or Bands, and afterwards made an Election of ten men each. Those of the first, which was the most honourable, assisted at the Councils of War, and resembled our modern Captains; and those of the second were like our Lieutenants, but all of them were named Centurions; those of the first Election were called the first Centurions, and the other second Centurions. After this the Centurions chose the *Vexillarij*,
who

who answer to our modern Ensigns, and each *Cohort*, or *Band*, had two of them. Then they chose twenty *Tergiductores*, or *Hindermen*, who guided the Rere of the Troops. So that every Band had two Commanders at the Front, and two on the Rere.

CHAP. II.

*The Order and Divisions of a Legion
of 4200 Foot, and 300 Horse.*

A Legion is always divided into five bodies, *viz.* the Infantry into 4 called *Velites*, *Hastarij*, *Principes* and *Triarij*, and the Cavalry in one. Each Body is divided into ten Troops, those of Foot being called *Cohortes*, or *Manipuli*, i.e. Bands and Companies; and those of the Cavalry were called *Turmæ*, or Troops.

In each of the three first orders of Infantry there are 1200 Souldiers, which are divided into ten Troops of every sort, containing 120 men in a Troop. But of the fourth order, *viz.* the *Triarij*, there are only 600
men,

men, who make up ten Troops of 60 in a Troop.

The Body of Cavalry consists of 300, which make up ten Troops of thirty in a Troop.

Amongst Authors there is a difference betwixt the names of *Cohors*, *Centuria* and *Manipulus*, but here they signify the same thing. Yet in some places of *Titus Livius* we find distinctions of Legions, thus *Legio Cohortis*, *Legio Cohorti*, *Legio Centuriæ*, *Legio Manipuli*; which I suppose to proceed from the Legions, having been augmented to 6 or 7000 men, and those were subdivisions.

C H A P. III.

WHen they were to march, they pull'd down their Tents, and packt up their Baggage on the first sound of the Trumpet, at the second they loaded, and at the third they march'd out of the Camp, but none were to touch their Tents till such time as those belonging to the Consul and Tribunes were pull'd down.

The Archers and Slingers march'd first, then the right Wing of the Allies, and their Baggage on the Rere, then the first Legion with their Baggage, and so the second in like manner; then followed the Left Wing of the Allies with their Baggage, the Cavalry being on the Front and the Rere, and sometimes on the Wings; accord-

according as they were apprehensive of the Enemies motion.

The *Roman* Legions and Wings of the Allies, marcht foremost by turns, that they might equally participate of the conveniency of arriving first in the Camp.

If in their march they had any greater suspicion of the Rere or Wings, than of the Front, they strengthened them accordingly. And this was their ordinary way of marching: But in *Cæsar* I find, that when he marcht in an Enemies Country, but especially if it abounded with hedges and woods, he ordered all the Legions to march in a body, and then all the Baggage together, leaving only some few Troops on the Rere to guard it.

When the Army march'd in three bodies at an equal distance, viz. all the Spearmen, as well *Romans* as Allies together, having their Baggage before them. Then the *Principes* and *Triarij* marcht in that same order,
the

the Archers and Slingers, and the Cavalry were on the Flanks and the Front to secure the Baggage, or else in those parts where they apprehended most danger — and being thus ordered, if there happened any occasion to fight, be on what hand it would, the Troops were immediately free from the incumbrance of their Baggage, to make head against the Enemy.

When the Army drew near to the place of Incampment, the Tribunes and Centurions appointed for that end, advanced to consider where they should pitch, and that being agreed on, they markt the place for the Consul, or Captain Generals Quarter, with a white Pennon; then they distinguisht his Pavillon from others by a red Pennon; with a second sort of red Pennon they markt those of the Tribunes; and with a third sort they distinguisht the Quarter of the Legions from the rest: after this they assign'd each
their

their portion of ground by Pennons of another colour, and then with a Line adjusted all the other Lodgings in a little time; because they never chang'd measures, nor the form of their Camp, and were well vers'd in it as never doing otherwise.

And when the Army arriv'd each Troop knew their Quarters by the Marks and Pennons; so that they all marcht into them without any confusion or mistake

C H A P. IV .

*The Quartering of the Souldiers in their
Camp.*

THE four bodies of the *Velites*, *Hastarij*, *Principes*, and *Triarij*, were lodged or quartered under the name of the three last bodies only ; the *Velites* being mixt amongst them, as you may see here below.

<i>Hastarij</i> —————	1200
<i>Velites</i> join'd with the <i>Hastarij</i> —	480
	1680

<i>Principes</i> —————	1200
<i>Velites</i> join'd to them ———	480
	1680

Triarij

<i>Triarij</i> —————	600
<i>Velites</i> join'd to them————	240
	<hr/>
	840

The *Romans* allowed 10 foot square for the Lodging of two Souldiers; so that in a piece of Ground 100 foot broad, and 1000 long, there was room to lodge 2000 Souldiers; and so ten Bands of Spearmen, or *Hastarij*, who made up no more than 1680, were lodged at large, with room enough for their Baggage.

The *Principes* being equal in number, had the same allowance.

The *Triarij* had but half as much, because they were one half fewer.

For the Cavalry 100 foot square was allowed to 30 Horse, and for the hundred *Turmae*, or Troops, 100 foot in breadth, and 1000 in length.

The Foot belonging to the Allies had as much ground as the *Roman* Legions; but because the Consul took the charge of the fifth part of
the

the Legions of the Allies, a fifth of the ground allowed them elsewhere, was retrenched in that Post.

As for the Cavalry of the Allies, it was always double the number of the *Romans*, but the Consul taking one third of them to lodge about him, there remained not in the ordinary Quarters above a fourth more than that of the *Romans*; and because the ground was more than sufficient, they were allowed no greater share than the *Romans*, viz. 100 foot in breadth, and 1000 in length.

The Camp was divided into five Streets, each 50 foot wide, and cut in the middle by a Street called *Quintana*, of the same length with the others.

At the Head of the Camp there was a great Street of 100 foot wide, next to which were the Quarters of the 12 Tribunes, over against the two *Roman* Legions; and the 12 *Prefects* over against the two Legions of the Allies; each of the Tribunes and
Prefects,

Prefects having 50 foot square for their Quarter— Next to that was the Consuls Quarter, called the *Pretorium*, which contain'd 200 foot square, and was situated in the middle of the Camp: on the right and left of the Consuls Quarter there were two Squares, one for the Market, and the other for the *Questor*— About this whole Quarter were lodged the 400 Horse, and 1630 Foot, which the Consul drew out from the Legions of the Allies; the Volunteers did also lodge here, and there were also Lodgings reserved for such extraordinary Horse or Foot as might happen to come, and altogether made a perfect Square— Round the whole Camp there was left a space of 200 foot, and then the Trenches were cast up, the Ditches surrounding being wider or deeper, and the Ramparts higher or lower, according to the Apprehensions which they had of the Enemy.

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We must observe that the Infantry were always lodged next the Trenches, it being their province to defend them, and cover the Horse which were posted in the middle of the Camp. The following Example will demonstrate the whole.

The Incampment of a *Roman Army* consisting of 16800 Foot, and 1800 Horse, being a Square containing 2016²₃ Feet.

By a Person of Quality.

- A *The Pretorium, or the Generals Apartment.*
- B *The Tribunes Tent.*
- C *The great street between the Tents of the Tribunes, and the Lodgments of the Legions, called Via Principatis.*
- D *Lodgment of the Roman Horse.*
- E *Lodgment of the Tryarians.*
- F *Lodgment of the Principes, which are an Order of their Militia so call'd.*
- G *Lodgment*

- G Lodgment of the Hastarij, or Spear-men.
- H Lodgment of the Confederate Horse.
- I Lodgment of the Confederate Foot.
- L The Street of the Confederate Foot.
- M The Street between the Principes and Triarij.
- N The Street between the Hastarij, and Confederates.
- O The Street, or space between the Lodgments and the Rampier, containing 200 foot.
- P Via Quintana, a street so called:
- Q The Market-place, &c.
- R The Questors Lodgings.
- S Quarters of the Volunteers.
- T The Quarters of the Horse which the Consul draws out of the Allies to be near his person.
- V Quarters of the Foot which the Consul draws out of the Forces of the Allies, to be near his Person.
- X Quarters of the extraordinary Horse that may happen to be taken into the service.

M

Y Quar-

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- Y *Quarters of the extraordinary Foot that may happen to be taken into the service.*
- Z *Quarters of the Prefects of the Allies.*
- & *The Apartment for lodging their Arms.*
- 8 *Lodgments of their Machines or Engines.*
- ✝ *Lodgments of their Victuals.*
- Δ *Lodgment of their Cloaths.*

Note, That the Gates in a Roman Camp were never more than four, unless the two Consuls with their 4 Legions were together; then their Camp was doubled, and their Gates fix.

1. *Porta Prætoria, or extraordinaria.*
2. *Porta Decumana, or Quæstoria.*
- Porta Dextra principalis.*
- Porta Sinistra principalis.*

When both the Consuls were together, then there were two *dextr. Principæ,*

Principa, and two *sinistr. Principa*, namely the first and the second, and no *Porta Prætoria*, but two *Decuman*, the first and the second. And then for the most part the *Prætorium* was in the center of the Camp.

When the Consular Army is composed of above four Legions, they are lodged in the same order, one by another, and in that case the Camp resembles a long Quadrangle; or if the two Consular Armies join in one Camp, it takes up the place of two Squares.

Sometimes the two Camps are near one another, but yet separate. Here *Polybius* hath omitted the number of the Gates of the Camp, their names and places, with what the Camp was inclosed, the Quarters of the Consuls two Lieutenants (there being one for every Legion) of the *Questor* or Treasurer, the *Præfect* of the Camp who administred Justice, the twelve *Præfects* of the Allies, the Provisions, the Arms, the Machines

of War, the Cloaths, and of what the Tents were made; which we shall supply with the assistance of some Authors, and apparent circumstances; and first we find in diverse Histories that the Camp had four Gates, situated and named as in the foregoing Example.

As for the Inclosure of the Camp, we read that the Rampart was made up of Earth, which was dug up out of the Ditch; and to make the Earth hold, they planted two or three Rows of Piles or Stakes, interwoven with Fascines, in fashion of Hurdles about it.

As to the Quarters of the Consuls Lieutenants, it's probable that they were about the *Pretorium*.

And for the *Questor*, who besides the charge of the Money, had also that of the Arms, Machines, Provisions

sions and Cloaths; I reckon that the great and spacious Square assigned him was to lodge all those things.

And as for the Tents, we find that until *Cæsars* time they were composed of Beasts Skins.

CHAP. V.

Their Laws and Guards of the Camp.

BESIDES the Oath required of Soldiers at their Election, they were obliged to take another in the Camp, viz. Not to plunder nor steal any thing in it, and that what they found they should carry to the Tribunes. *Polybius* says, that this Oath was administered by the Tribunes; and *Cicero*, that it was administered by the Consuls, at the Election of the Soldiers.

This being done, they divided the Bands of *Principes* and *Hastarii* as follows, viz. two to keep the great Street betwixt the Tribunes, and the rest of the Soldiers clean, and to water it in the Summer to prevent the Dust, because a great part of the
Army

Army staid there in the day time; the eighteen remaining, were appointed to serve the Tribunes, *viz.* three for every Tribune; who had eight Souldiers *per* day, to guard his Tent. The Bands of the *Triarij* were Guards to the Horse, and one *Cohort* kept guard every day at the Consuls Quarter.

The Ditches and Ramparts were made one half by the *Romans*, and the other by their Allies. The Centurions kept the Souldiers at work; and two Tribunes were appointed to see it well done.

The Authority of the Tribunes in the Camp was very great, and they did exercise the same over their Legion by two at a time, for two months successively.

For the *Word*, one Souldier of the last Band of Foot, and another from the last Troop of Horse, came to the Tribunes Tent, and took it on a Writing-Table, where his own Name and Lodging were also inserted, and he

delivered it in presence of Witnesses to his Captain, who gave it to the next, and so it went from hand to hand to the first Cohort by the Tribunes Tent, to whom it was carried back before night; so that by that means he was assured that all the Army had the Word; and if the Writing-table should happen to be wanting, it was easie to find where it stopt. We must take notice that here is only one Tribune mentioned, which inclines me to believe, that the two Tribunes who were in authority at the same time, commanded day and day about.

As for the Guard that was kept day and night, the 24 hours being divided into 8 Guards.

First the Consul was guarded by his ordinary Cohort, then each body had a Guard at their own quarter, and there were three Guards more, *viz.* one for the *Questor*, and the two other for the Consuls *Leiutenants*.

The

The *Tergiductores*, or Commanders of the Rere, conducted the Guards, who cast Lots which of 'em should begin, the first whose Lot it fell to marcht to the Tribune, who was in Authority, and he gave orders to the Guard with a little Writing-table, and a mark besides, and all the Guards were set in the same manner.

The Cavalry went the Rounds, and their Leader commanded four by day and four by night. The first went to receive the Tribunes orders, which he gave them in writing, appointing what Guards they were to view.

The Guards were viewed and changed eight times in 24 hours with sound of Trumpet; and the first Centurion of the *Triarij* had the charge of seeing them march, when it was their due.

When the Trumpet gave notice, the four men mentioned cast Lots, and he on whom it fell to begin, took some of his Friends with him, and if
in

in going his Round he found the Guards in good condition, he only withdrew the mark which the Tribune had given, and restored it to him in the morning; but if he found the Guard abandoned, any Centinels asleep, or any other disorder, he reported it to the Tribune, with the names of his Witnesses, and forthwith a Council was called to take cognizance of the fault, and punish the guilty according to their demerit.

The *Velites* kept guard about the Trenches both without and within, and the Allies observed the same order.

Authors give no account of the number of their *Corps de Guard*, how they posted their Centinels about the Camp, nor how many days respite they had from mounting the Guards.

C H A P. VI.

Of Punishments and Rewards.

One but the Consul had power of adjudging to death ; and this Authority he exercised over the greatest Captains of the Army , as well as over the meanest Centinels.

The Tribunes had the power of Military Justice, which was put in execution with great Rigour. The manner of the ordinary punishment was thus.

After the Tribune had touch'd the party condemned with a battoon or rod, every Souldier hit him with a stick or a stone, so that oftentimes he was killed before he could get out of the Camp ; and if he happened to
escape,

escape, he was no more received into his own Country, nor durst any of his friends entertain him. He who commanded in the orders for the Guard or Rounds, or any other thing which concerned the safety of the Army, and did not perform his duty, he that did falsely arrogate to himself some signal Action, abandon'd his Post, lost his Arms in Battel, gave false Evidence, or ran from his Colours, was punished in this manner, as were also those who fell thrice into the same fault, tho not so great.

If it happened that several Legions, one Legion, or any considerable body had fled, they were punished in two manners; the most severe was to make them all cast Lots, and punish every tenth man more or less, as the case requir'd; so that all were put in fear, and but a few punished. The gentlest punishment was to make them lie without the Camp, and give them Barley instead of Wheat, as a mark of Ignominy,
which

which many times they would efface by some generous and remarkable Action.

As for the acknowledgments of honour, their design was to excite the Souldiers to emulation. by praising those before their fellows, who had distinguished themselves by their Bravery and Valour. And over and above they presented him with a *Dart*, who had wounded his Enemy in a Skirmish or Rencontre, or of his own accord did go to the Attack. If a Footman had killed or stript his Enemy, he was rewarded with a *Buckler*; and if a Trooper did the like, he had a *Horses Furniture*: He who first mounted the Wall at the Assault of a Town, had a *Mural Crown*; and he who had saved a *Roman Citizen*, had a *Garland of Oak*, which he, whom he saved, did put upon his head, and honoured and respected him thenceforth as his Father.

The

The Captains had also their share of Honors, by the several Triumphs which were assigned them, according to the greatness of their Actions, and the Cheapness of their Victories.

CHAP.

C H A P. VII.

Of their Pay.

AS for *Pay*, it was not in use till 340 years after the building of *Rome*. Before which time every Souldier armed and maintained himself at his own charge; which was easie for them to do at that time, when the Seat of the War was near unto *Rome*; but when once they began to march out of *Italy*, it was necessary that they should have *Pay*, which at first was very small, but afterward advanced as the Empire encreased. I shall not trouble my self to compute the value in our Money, because it is not worth the while, but shall only say, that the Souldiers *Pay* must be so proportioned, that
he

he may be able to live upon it. We may here observe, that the *Romans* furnished Bread, Cloaths, Arms and Tents, as also Corn for the Troopers Horse, deducting the same from the Souldies Pay, which I look upon to be a good method, and altogether needful to make an Army subsist; for besides that the greatest part of Souldiers are always ill Husbands, and if it were not prevented, would still be ill provided of Victuals and Cloaths, it's impossible for them to find always Bread for Money, or that they can carry all that they need.

C H A P.

C H A P. VIII.

Their Order of Battle.


THere are different Opinions about the *Roman* Order of Battle, some will have it, that when the *Hastarii* could not sustain the shock of their Enemies but by retiring, that then they enter'd by Files into the Ranks of the *Principes*, and both together into those of the *Triarii*, renewing the Fight three times after this manner; but others are of Opinion, that they retired by Troops, which I judge much more probable, looking upon the first not only as impossible to be practis'd, but also very hazardous and obnoxious to loss; whereas the other is very feasible and profitable: For to enter so by Files one among another, it is necessary that the *Hastarii* should fight at such a distance from one another, that betwixt the two Files there might be room for two more, which discovers the weakness of the first

Order : For being thus drawn up in Battle Array, they could neither overthrow, nor sustain the shock of a Battalion ; and the Files being likewise at such a distance from one another, they could neither keep straight during the Fight, nor observe their distance. But in the other Order there are many Conveniencies. First, Divers Bodies consisting of 100 Men each, or thereabouts, attacking a Battalion, might easily defeat it, and in all cases they might retire without losing their Rank or distance, and the second Rank, which is posted behind the first in Battle, over against the Distances, might easily fill them up, and the third Body might do the like as to the Distances which were left for them in case of need, renewing the Fight three times. And that which confirms me the more in this Opinion is, First, That it seems agreeable to reason ; and next the Description of the Battle of *Zama*, which *Scipio* fought against *Hannibal*, where it is said, that *Scipio* to prevent his being overthrown by *Hannibal's* Elephants, posted the Bands of the *Principes*, which were over against the Distances of the *Hastarii*, just behind them,

so that there might be Lanes for the Elephants to pass; which demonstrates clearly, That the Order of Battle was by Cohorts, or Bands, and not by Files.


In this Order of Battle I make no mention of the *Velites*, nor other Soldiers lightly arm'd, because they fought at a distance with Darts and Slings; and when the Armies drew near one another, they retired behind those who carried heavy Arms.

To form this Order, the File was always Ten Men deep, the *Cohort* or *Manipulus* of a Legion of 4200 Men consisted always of 120, and by consequence made up Ten Rank; and Twelve Files, which at six Foot Square for each Soldier, took up 72 Foot in length, and 60 in depth, and at three Foot *per* Soldier one half less.

The First Figure of a Cohort.



In each of these Three Orders, though the Legions were stronger or weaker, there were always 10 *Cohorts* or *Manipuls*; but the *Cohorts* were increased or diminished, according to the proportion of the Legions.

The Second Figure of Ten Cohorts.



The first Two Orders are of an Equal Number, and the last one half Less. By the Example of a Legion we may see how all the Troops entred amongst one another.

The Third Figure of a Legion.




I believe that there was a much greater distance betwixt the Legions than betwixt the Cohorts, the better to avoid confusion amongst them, which I look upon to be so necessary, that it is altogether impossible to preserve good Order without it.

As for the Cavalry, seeing it was divided into as many Troops as the Infantry, we must believe that they fought in the same Order, but one half was upon the Right, and the other half upon the Left Wing; so that the Army was compos'd of six great Bodies, *viz.* four of Infantry and two of Cavalry, and each Body divided into small Troops, as in the following Figure.

A Complete Army in Order of Battle.

The Fourth Figure.



C H A P. IX.

Of Sieges.

N O Roman Captain did ever undertake more Famous Sieges, nor describe them better than *Cæsar*, who hath furnish'd us with Examples of Attacking all sorts of places, however situated, and to maintain a Siege against all manner of Succours : He forced *Pompey* to abandon *Brundisium* though it stands upon the Sea, by blocking up the Haven by which he receiv'd Supplies : He obliged *Cadenac*, though impregnable by situation, to surrender, by depriving it of Water : He fortified himself in such sort before *Alexia*, which had 80000 Men in Garrison, and expected twice as many more, that he starv'd them notwithstanding of all the Efforts of those from within and without. He took *Bourges* by Assault, and constrain'd *Marseilles* to Surrender just as it was upon the point of being Stormed. I shall not particularize the Machines which he made

use of to reduce them, because the Invention of Cannon hath put them down ; but shall only take notice that they made their Approaches towards the Wall gradually, covering themselves the best they could, and then endeavoured to overthrow it by Machines, or Mines, in order to take the place by Storm, or at least to lodge themselves upon the Breach, which I mention to show that tho' the manner of Fortifications be chang'd to make them the more defensible against the thundering Engines now in use ; yet the Ancient Maxims as to the attacking places, were the same with those now in use ; for as to the Siege of *Alexia*, it was the Model which the Prince of *Parma*, Prince of *Orange*, and Marquis of *Spinola* follow'd in theirs. And all those great Works and Circumvallations which we admire, and by means whereof, many great Towns have been taken in the view of greater Armies than theirs, are nothing in comparison to those which *Cesar* made at the Siege of *Alexia*. In fine those who come nearest the ancient *Roman* way of making War, both in Sieges and in the Field, become the most excellent Captains.

C H A P. X.

*Remarks upon some Battles of the
Ancients.*

HAVING shew'd you the Ancient Military Discipline of the *Greeks* and the *Romans*, by which they acquired so many famous Victories, I shall now take notice of two principal things which their greatest Generals did successfully observe, in order to overcome in Battle, *viz.* they endeavoured to inclose their Enemy, and never fought with all their Army at one time. *Cyrus* to prevent his being enclosed in the Battle which he fought against *Cresus*, doubled the Front of his Army in breadth, by reducing the Files of his Foot from 24 to 12 Men, and the better to enclose his Enemies, placed his best Men on the Wings, who having defeated the Wings of the opposite Army, attack'd the Main Body on the Flank and on the Reer. At the Battle of *Cannæ*, *Hannibal* posted

posted all his best Soldiers on the Wings, and the worst in the middle, on purpose that the *Romans* finding small resistance, might insensibly break through, by which means they were inclos'd on both sides. At the Battle of *Pharsalia*, *Cæsar* covered one of the Flanks of his Army with a small River, and fortified his Cavalry on the other Flank with a Body of Infantry, to make Head against *Pompey's* Horse, which were by far more numerous than his, and having by this means defeated it, he attackt the Army on the Flank, and obtain'd an easie Victory. At the Battle of *Zama*, *Hannibal* drew up all his old *Italian* Troops into one Body, and separated them from the rest of his Army with a design that when all the rest were weary with Fighting, this fresh Body might come on and carry the Victory. In such sort that *Scipio* after having routed all those whom he found before him, was astonish'd when he saw another Army marching to charge him afresh.

Against this it is objected, that Armies may be sometimes so unequal in number, as to render all those Maxims of no use. To which I answer, That when an Army exceeds

exceeds 40000 or 50000 Men, the Overplus is good for nothing but to make them all Starve, and it is easie to avoid Battle by entrenching themselves. And when they have a mind to Fight, there is no Plain so large but some way may be found to cover one of the Flanks of the Army, either with a River, Wood, Mountain, or Ditch, and the other with Waggon; nor is there any thing that can hinder them from having a Body in reserve which does not fight at first Onset; or to place the Troops which they confide most in upon the Wings; all which being observed exactly as they ought, may very much contribute towards obtaining the Victory.

C H A P. XI.

A Comparison of the Arms, and Military Discipline of the Greeks and Romans.

THE Arms made use of by the *Greeks*, were the Buckler, Pike, and Sword.

Their Order of Battle was great Battalions of Sixteen Men deep, with heavy Arms, reinforced by Eight Men deep lightly Arm'd ; so that their Battalions were 24 Men deep, and fought all at a time, being all in Front.

The *Roman* Arms were the Target and Sword ; and their Battle was compos'd of small Bodies of 150 or 200 at most, not exceeding 10 Men in a File, and they made up three Orders or Lines of Battle, that so they might fight three times successively one after another.

As to the Arms of the *Greeks*, it would seem that their long Pikes had a great advantage over the *Roman* Targets, because
they

they reach'd far : Nor do we yet find any Weapon equal to a Pike against the Efforts of Cavalry. And as for the Order of the *Grecians*, there was nothing able to stand before so great a Body.

On the other hand, the great *Roman* Targets covered them so well, that the Pikes could do them no damage, and if once they came to Blows they made a terrible Slaughter with their short broad Swords, the Pike being then of no use. And by their small Bodies they had this advantage, that they fought with more Men at a time ; and as to the drawing up of the three Lines behind one another, so as to assist one another, and to be able to renew the Battle three times, they had this advantage from it, That all were not wearied nor left their Ranks at one time. Infomuch that they have often carried the Victory after their two first Lines have been defeated, because the third being fresh, and having rallied the rest, made a great Effort against a weary and disordered Army, and so many times gain'd the Battle. There are moreover two Inconveniencies in these
great

great Bodies ; to wit, That they must always have a very intire Field of Battle, otherwise they cannot keep Order ; nor can they act to the Right and Left, but always on Front ; but the small Bodies can move to any side, and keep their Ranks every where. It's true that the *Romans* did sometimes joyn altogether, drawing up their Army into one round Body, but this was only to save themselves in a Retreat, and not to attack ; for as those great Bodies are in a manner unmoveable, and of small use in Attacks, so when their business is only to defend themselves, it is hard to break them. But the *Romans* did not use this Method except when they were pestered with the Arrows of a great Cavalry, as those of the *Parthians*, for not finding it possible to come to Blows with them, they were forced to have recourse to this Order, and to cover themselves with their Targets. So that upon the whole I conclude that the Arms and Discipline of the *Romans* was better than that of the *Greeks*, because the small Bodies were better accommodated to all Grounds than the Great ; and that

that Fighting at divers times renders a Battle more Obstinate, than when all fight at once; and that it is much more easie to form great Bodies from small ones readily, and without Disorder, than to reduce a great Body into many little ones.

A
TREATISE
OF
W A R.

I do not undertake here to Treat of all the Functions of War in particular, because so many have Writ on that Subject, that it would be superfluous; I shall content my self with some General Remarks upon all things which depend on it, and may be now put in practice, being resolv'd to touch upon nothing but what I have learn'd by Experience, and above all, to endeavour brevity, that I may not be too tedious to my Reader.

C H A P.

C H A P. I.

Of the Chusing of Soldiers.

THE way of Electing Soldiers, was different among the Ancients, as it is at this day among the Moderns. The *Greeks* and *Romans* did not content themselves, only to Lift such Soldiers as went of their own accord to the War, but chose from amongst the People, such as they judged fit for Arms. The *Carthaginians* did for the most part, entertain Strangers, and therefore never had worse Soldiers than those of their own Country. The *Turks* Chuse and Train their Soldiers. The *Swiss* make use of their own Men. The *Venetians* and *Dutch* entertain Auxiliaries, as did the *Carthaginians*, the *French* and *Germans* abound with brave Men, and seldom make use of Auxiliaries, yet they don't chuse their Soldiers, but are satisfied with such as Lift themselves willingly. *Great Britain* alone, of all the Nations at present

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sent, has the privilege of chusing such as they please for Soldiers. Wherefore we must consider the constitution of Governments, upon what Maxims they are founded, and the best course which each can take to have good Soldiers. Most Countries at this day are rather founded on Policy than Arms, and endeavour rather to preserve than augment their Dominions. Whence it comes to pass, that we see Learning flourish, and the Study of Arms degenerate; So that those Governments which are founded upon Maxims of War, swallow up others.

The Example of the *Turks* to the shame of *Christendom*, and that of the King of *Spain*, to the no small prejudice of *Germany* and *Italy*, are two convincing proofs of it. The occasion of this Mischief, is, that those who have addicted themselves to Learning, are almost every where possessed of the Government, and because they hate Soldiers, occasion them many times to be ill treated; and also advise rather to make use of Auxiliaries than their own Subjects, which is a very pernicious Maxim. But this not being
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the place to Treat of it, we shall only speak of the Election of Soldiers.

Great Brittain, which has a Liberty by Law to chuse their Soldiers, may observe the *Roman* way of Election, which is very good. Other Kingdoms which have not that priviledge, ought to excite Men of Honour and Ambition to Lift themselves, both by giving them hopes of being advanced to other Honours in so doing, and excluding all other ways of attaining Honour; as not to bestow an Office in the Government, or King's Household, nor a Command in the Army upon any, but such as have serv'd some years as Soldiers, not to advance any to be *Camp-Masters*, but such as have been *Captains*, nor any to be a *Captain* of Horse who hath not been a *Subaltern* in the Cavalry; nor any to be a *Mareschal de Camp*, but those who have behaved themselves Honourably in *Inferior Commands*; Nor any to be *General* of an Army, but such as have acquitted themselves with Honour, as *Mareschal de Camp*. In fine, That none may be advanced to any Office, who hath not taken his Degrees in War; and as the hopes of Advancement

is a strong motive to encourage every Man to exercise himself in the Art of War, so the apprehension of becoming Poor or Lame, after having carried Arms a long time, is a great discouragement to enter upon it. Wherefore, that ought to be provided against, by establishing a Fund for those People, that they may live out the rest of their days with Convenience and Honour.

Such States, who because of the Form of their Government, are afraid to Arm their Subjects, as *Venice*, or whose Subsistance depends on Traffick, as the *Netherlands*, and for those Reasons are constrain'd to make use of Auxiliaries in their War, ought in the first place to be careful to chuse good Generals, and in the next place to have such a Body of Soldiers, well Disciplin'd, as may be sufficient both to prevent a surprize, and to give them time to raise more Forces. For an Army which hath been a long time Form'd and Disciplin'd, is much more capable, either to defend themselves or attack another, than those Armies which rely only upon their number. All Great Conquests are generally made by
Armies

Armies of a midling sort, as Great Empires are always overturn'd by their too numerous Armies. Because those who have had such overgrown Forces to deal with, did always oppose them with exact Order and Discipline, which the others neglected, because they relied on their numbers, and so falling into confusion, were routed with the more Disgrace. I conclude then, that the best way to have good Soldiers, is to chuse such who are most proper for the War, and in the next place, to provoke those of Honour and Virtue, to List themselves willingly, by shutting up all other ways to advancement; and in the last place, That to keep up a Body of an Army, there be care taken to hold an exact Discipline, without any Relaxation, as well in Peace as in War. For all sorts of Governments may make use of one or another of those Methods.

C H A P. II.

Of Arms.

THE Defensive Arms most in use now for Infantry, are a Head-piece, Back and Breast, and Tasslets for defence of the lower parts. The Offensive Arms are the Sword, Pike and Musquet, which are rather the Arms of the *Greeks*, than the *Romans*; and here I must observe, That our Muskets are instead of those Weapons which the Ancients us'd to hurle and sling; we set the Pikes in the Body of the Battle, being very proper to withstand Horse, because many of them joyn'd together, make a very solid Body and hard to be broke in Front, because of their length, their being four or five Ranks of them together with their Points to the Enemies Face, keeping the Horse still at a distance of 12 or 15 Foot. *Maurice* Prince of *Orange* had a great mind to make use of Targets, and having made several proofs
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of them, found that they were not only able to resist the Pikes, but also that half the number of Targets could enter and break through twice as many Pikes: But however being only General to the Army of a Commonwealth, and not a Sovereign Absolute Prince, he durst not venture upon so great a Change, being either afraid of the Cavalry, which now adays is always well Arm'd, or of being reproached with ill success, knowing well enough that People judge of Actions by the Event, and not by Reason. But for my part I would use that sort of Weapon in our present Discipline, making up the chief Body of my Foot always with Pikes allowing to each Battalion a separate Body of 100 or 26 Targets to Charge on the Flank, which would be of wonderful use in the Day of Battle, and the proper Post for Voluntiers and the brave Gentry, who are oftimes a hindrance in an Army, as things are now ordered, As for the Offensive Arms of the Cavalry they are of five sorts, *viz.* The Lance, Pistol, Sword, Carabine and Harquebush with Match: The two first are given to the Horse-men in heavy Armour, who ought to have

Head-piece, Back and Breast, Vambraces for the Arms, Taillets for the Thighs, and Pully-pieces for the Knees ; and it is not long since the Horses were also armed with Harness. Of the two other sorts, those who wear Carabines, have Head-piece, Back and Breast, and because they fight on Horse back they ought to be well mounted, but those who carry Harquebushes with Match, have no Defensive Arms : Of those five sorts of Offensive Arms there are only three now much in use, *viz.* The Pistol, the Sword, and the Carabine. The *Spaniards* alone do still make use of some Companies of Lances, which they retain more for Gravity's sake than any other reason, for the Lance works no effect but by the violence of the Horses Course ; and besides there is but one Rank which can make use of them ; so that they must fight by Files, which are not able to resist Squadrons, and if they fought in Squadrons they would be more troublesome than serviceable ; and for the Firelock, or Harquebush with Match, it's also in a manner quite laid aside, because in the Civil War it ruin'd the Infantry, for every one would have his Nag to carry off
Plunder.

Plunder. Nevertheless some well Disciplin'd Troops of that sort in an Army are very serviceable either for Military Executions, gaining of bad Passes, guarding the Horsemens Quarters, or to serve as a Forlorn in Day of Battle, and fight on Foot before the Horse. Then we proportion the Horse to the Foot according to the situation of the Country, or the Enemy against whom we fight; for if we be in a plain Country full of Forage, and have a strong Cavalry to deal with, like that of the *Turks*, we must in that case strengthen our selves with a greater number of Cavalry. But if the War be in a Country full of Mountains, Forrests, Marshes, Hedges and Ditches, and that abounds with strong places, the Infantry must be strengthened, because the War consists rather in Sieges than Field Battles, but those two are so necessary to one another, that an Army cannot be reckoned good nor subsist, except they be equally well entertain'd: But for my own part, I would proportion my Army according to this Method, if some extraordinary Reason did not oblige me to the contrary. In an open Country I would join one fourth of
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Horse to three fourths of Foot: As for Example, 8000 Horse to 24000 Foot; and in a close Country I would have 5 times as many Infantry as Cavalry; and so to 20000 Foot, would have 4000 Horse; it only remains, that we give to those two Bodies the Arms which we have mentioned, in a due proportion. The *Suisse* have abundance more Pikes than Muskets, and for that reason are very formidable in the Field; for on the Day of Battle when they come to a close Fight, the number of Pikes hath a great advantage over the Muskets: Other Nations have an equal Number of Pikes and Muskets, and because War now consists more in Sieges than Battles, the number of Musqueteers exceeds that of Pikemen; but as to my own part, seeing I would add Targets, I am of Opinion that a Regiment ought to consist of 1440 Men, *viz.* 600 Pikes, 600 Muskets, and 240 Targets, and as for the Cavalry, I would proportion it in this manner; the Regiments should consist of 500 Horse, 400 of which, I would mount like *Gens d'Arms*, 50 with Carabines, and 50 with Harquebushes on Horseback. But its not enough that your
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Soldiers be well Arm'd, if you don't oblige them to carry their Armour, it being altogether insufferable to see the Delicacy of these of the present Age, and how they despise this practice. To hide this fault they give out, that it betokens want of Courage to go Armed, and that they will expose themselves to the greatest of dangers in their Doublet, as well as those who go in Armor; but it is not sufficient to march to a place to be Kill'd, they ought to go thither to Conquer, and not to be Beat. There is also this Inconvenience which results from it, that if they do not accustom themselves to carry their Arms when they take them on occasion, they become so very uneasie, that they cannot fight; whereas if they use themselves to it, they find no inconvenience, but are at as much ease, as if they were only in their Doublet: But the greatest mischief arising from this neglect, is that it's attended by the ruine of Military Discipline, which a good Captain ought to observe exactly in all parts of his Command; for if he remit it in one thing, or in favour of some certain Persons, the Consequences thereof are such

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as will corrupt the whole, and then he is neither obeyed nor respected, and never fails of being hated by those whom he hath spared too much; it being a certain truth that it is easier to prevent than cure a Disease.

C H A P. III.

Of Military Discipline.

BESIDES what hath been said to oblige every Man to betake himself rather to the Art of War than any other. I shall make some Observations, by which it may be rendred worthy of Mens so doing, which consist in three things, *viz.* in the Recompence of Good Actions, Punishment of those that are evil, and the exact and continual Exercise of Military Discipline: For of all Arts of the World, that of Warfare hath most need of those Aids, wherein for a small Pay (on which a Man can hardly live, and wherewith the meanest Tradesman would not be content)

tent) the Soldier exposes himself to all manner of fatigues and dangers. Now no Man is inclined to be a Soldier, if it be not either by a desire of Honour, or to Live Licentiously; and as the first design is Vertuous, those who engage on that Head, do good Service; but there is nothing but Disgrace to be had by the other sort: For instead of a good and obedient Army, they prove a Troop of Robbers, who abandon you without order, because they know not how to obey, either after they have got good store of spoil, or else in some eminent danger. And therefore it is that the chusing of Soldiers is a better way of forming an Army, than meerly by Voluntiers, amongst whom all Vagabonds, Lewd Fellows, and such as know not how to Live any other way but by Robbery, enrol themselves. And hence it appears that for the Incouragement of the Vertuous to do well, and to deter the Vicious from doing of Evil, Rewards and Punishments, are absolutely necessary. The *Romans* practis'd both with great Success, and if we don't follow their Example, we shall never have good nor well Disciplin'd Soldiers; not that I judge it necessary for
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us to make use of the very same Punishments and Rewards: It's sufficient for us to practise an Equivalent, which may as well answer the end; for there is a difference of Times and Customs. But we must chiefly observe this, That the Reward be sufficient to animate Brave Men to Generous Actions, and that the Rigor of the Punishment be great enough to prevent the most fearful turning Cowards or base. The *Roman* way of decimating the Soldiers, is reckoned Cruel; but there sometimes happens such Infamous Actions, that we are constrain'd to make use of great Severity, to strike Terrour into the rest; and I judge it expedient to Terrifie those who have run, by making them cast Lots, and putting some few to Death: For by this means Soldiers will perceive that they cannot avoid Death by flying, but only exchange one sort that might have been Glorious in Fighting for their Country, for another that's Infamous. After having possess'd the Soldier with the Honour which he reaps by passing for Valiant, and the certain Infamy which attends a Coward, he must in like manner be taught, that it's equally Honourable for every Man,

Man, even from a single Soldier, to the Lieutenant-General, to know how to obey his Superiour: For on such an Obedience do all the performances of an Army depend, and without it nothing can be done regularly, or to the purpose. This must be recommended to the Soldiers, as one of their principal Vertues. In effect it's this which gives Birth to Order; it's this which entertains Military Exercise; it's by this that all brave Designs are put in execution, and without this, all goes to Confusion and Ruine. I shall not trouble my self to speak of the Military Exercises which the Soldiers are to perform, because Books are full of them; and that Custom makes some alteration every Day in that point. I shall only say, That there is nothing so profitable as to Train up every Soldier well in carrying and handling his Arms, keeping his Rank, and observing all the Changes of Posture which are Commanded him. So much for the Soldiery. And for the Recompence of the Generals, I shall say the same which I said for the Soldiers, *viz.* That according to the Times, or the Constitution of Kingdoms and Commonwealths, there ought
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to be care taken that the Honour of those who have done great Actions, or rendred considerable Services, be not diminish'd or neglected. Because the most Generous Souls who will easily excuse all other Defects in the reward of their Service, will never suffer themselves to be deprived of the Honour which is due to their Gallant Actions, but will sooner resent such a denial of Honour, than any thing else whatsoever, which hath often been the occasion of very great Mischiefs.

C H A P. IV.

Of the Obedience of Soldiers.

AS the General would receive from his Soldiers that Obedience which is his due, he must take care to give them no lawful cause to withdraw it ; and for this end must keep them always employed, because Idleness produces the Corruption of Discipline and Manners, whence flow Luxury, Negligence in Exercise and
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keeping Guards, and Disobedience to their Superiors. It was during their Repose at *Capua*, that *Hannibal's* Army was ruin'd; and in the Delights of *Babylon*, that *Alexander* himself was corrupted, and he was forc'd to March his Army thence to prevent their being utterly spoil'd, there being no Method so efficacious to keep them in their Duty, and avert Seditions, as to imploy them in the War: So that it is a Maxim which must be exactly observed, never to leave the Soldiers idle in any place, especially when the Army is together; for if you don't take care to imploy them in something that's good, they will be sure to imploy themselves in something that is evil: In full Peace, as well as in the heat of the War, they ought to be particularly exercis'd in handling their Arms, and keeping good Order. And though there be no need of it, they should be imploy'd to cast up Intrenchments for a Camp, and make Huts for themselves, that they may be so accustomed to remove the Earth, as when Necessity requires it they may do it without trouble. They should also be imploy'd in making Fortifications and

other Works of that Nature, because Exercise keeps them in Health, that thereby they gain something over and above their Pay, by which they may the better Maintain themselves, and render those things familiar which in time of War are as profitable as to fight well, there being nothing impossible to 20 or 30000 Men who have a Mind to work in the Ground, for in 8 Days they may make Impregnable Fortresses, *Cesar* rendred himself as redoubtable and admirable by the Great Works which he made his Soldiers cast up, as by his Great Battles. The General ought moreover to take care that they be well Cloathed and Fed, especially that he cause Cloaths and Shoes to be furnish'd to them out of their Pay, otherwise an Army will quickly be ruin'd and consum'd by Sicknes. Great care must also be taken of the Sick and Wounded, and nothing spar'd in that case; so that the Soldiers may not have that excuse to avoid going to places of danger, or suffer Fatigue, that they are abandoned and not look'd after when Sick and Wounded. The General must also have a particular care to incourage them, and not to oblige them

them but in cases of extreme need to undergo any extraordinary Drudgery; and when necessity calls for it, he ought to be the first who puts hand to the Work, for the Example of the Commander makes all things easie to the Soldier. The Examples not only of the Greatest Generals of Antiquity, but even of the Greatest of Monarchs and Emperours, should make our Effeminate Modern Captains ashamed, who are afraid to spoil their fine Complexion in the Sun, and their Finery in the Rain, and look upon themselves as disgraced to March on Foot at the Head of their Company; but those Great Men did not disdain to March on Foot at the Head of their Armies; and being pressed with an extraordinary Thirst, would not satisfy it because there was not Water enough to satisfy all the Soldiers; and so by making themselves Companions in all the Perils and Labours of their Meanest Soldiers, they became Masters of the Greatest part of the World, and acquir'd Immortal Glory:

C H A P. V.

Of Marching.

Divers Considerations are to be had upon the March of an Army, which may be attackt in the Day time, when they Dislodge, or else in the Night when they are Lodged, if it be not incamped, but only Quartered in the Villages; They must for this cause March in a Body, have their Rendezvous appointed on the way that they are to March, which if the Enemy understand, early enough to be there first, or that by chance they meet them there, the Army runs a great risk, which comes to the Rendezvous at different times, and by several ways; the best method to prevent such an accident, is to keep the place of Rendezvous very secret, to have good Spies amongst the Enemies, and abundance of Couriers abroad for News. When they are incampd, there is no such Danger on that account, because the Army

my is always together. For the March you must consider the Country where you are, and the number of Soldiers which you have ; If it be through Great Plains, you may march always in Battle array, or at least, have all the Battillions and Squadrons form'd, then it is easie to put your self readily in a Fighting posture, because your File is not too long. But when you March through a strait Country, where but a few can go in Front, then you must consider the Incommodity of the Way, the time which you have allowed for your March, and the number of Soldiers which composes your Army ; for 10000 Foot Marching by 10. and 10. and 1000 Horse Filing off by 5. and 5. with the least Baggage which they can have, and Ten Cannon with 100 Charges, for each take up about 28000 Foot in length. Then we may judge from this, how many Files 30000 Foot, and 6000 Horse will make. So that when Great Armies are in such cumbersome Ways, they must of necessity make up divers Bodies, which follow one another, and Lodge apart ; or else they must March by several Ways, and

at some Leagues distance from one another, or in all cases, make themselves a Way through the Fields, and leave the ordinary Paths for the Cannon and Baggage. If there be a River to pass over, which they can lay no more than one Bridge, or some Pass of a Mountain, Morass or Forest, where several Ways cannot be made, then they must March one after another, and in different Days; I shall not trouble my self to say how those difficult Passes are to be March'd through, in the view of an Enemy, because abundance of Authors have writ on that Subject, and when it comes to be put in execution, there are few who will attempt it, if they be briskly attackt; but I shall only say, that the best way is to lay down your Measures so well, as to avoid such Rencontres. But during the time of a March, I hold it almost impossible that two Armies should Rencontre, if either of the Generals have a mind to shun it, especially in a close Country. But in all cases, the best way is, that the Baggage be separated from the Soldiers, leaving only some few Troops on the Rear, to prevent its being

ing lost ; for if in an Allarm each Body have their Baggage behind them, it occasions a great Confusion, and hinders the Soldiers both from Rallying and Succouring one another. The time of lodging is also dangerous in case of an Attack, because then the Army is harass'd and every one having a desire to Lodge himself, advances towards his Quarters in Disorder, which is scarcely to be avoided ; if the Army be not drawn up in Battle Array before they enter into their Lodging place, and if they be not obliged to enter the same by Troops, and no Man permitted to go to his Quarters, but by Command, taking care in the mean time to make Discoveries on all sides.

There still remains the attacking of a Quarter, which is very often attempted, especially when the Army is not Encamped, because being Lodged in divers Quarters, some of them may be Attackt without running the hazard of a General Battle : Against which I don't find that the Ordinary Guard alone, how exact soever it be kept, is a sufficient Remedy, because it cannot give the Allarm till the Enemy be too near ; so that many times they have

not leisure enough to draw themselves up in Order of Battie. Therefore it is necessary to send some small Troops scouring every Night, who if they do their Duty, will not suffer you to be Surpriz'd. For an Army, or a great Body, capable of carrying off a Quarter of another, cannot march so secretly as not to be perceiv'd; and when you have to do with a Watchful Enemy, and are afraid of Attacks by Night, there is nothing so fit to prevent it, as to give them Allarms every Night, so that they may have enough ado to keep themselves upon their own Guard, and not have time to Attack you. If it be in an Intrencht Camp where all the Army is in a Body, it's a very bold Enterprize to Attack it, and this Chapter alone demonstrates the safety of an Intrench'd Camp, and I shall finish it with this Conclusion, that nothing which I have said about securing the place of Lodging ought to be omitted, although you think your self at a sufficient distance from the Enemy; for besides the Profit which you will reap thence, by accustoming your Army to their Duty; it may so fall out, as not only to be the preservation
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of them, but also of your own Life and Honour.

C H A P. VI.

Of Encamping.

I Shall not describe the Form, but only the Utility of Intrenched Camps, wondering very much that this has been neglected by other Authors. Their was no People who observ'd them so exactly as the *Romans*; and *Maurice* Prince of *Orange* renew'd the use of them in our time, or at least brought them to a great perfection. The Intrenching of a Camp assures an Army forasmuch as it is not then dispers'd into Villages, where some quarter of it is always in danger to be carried off, but Lodges altogether in a Body in such sort that being Attacked, they may fight with great advantage. The Intrenchments ease them of a great deal of Fatigue, and considerably diminishes the Number of their Guards, being also less toilsome,

toilsome, especially to the Horsemen, who when they are Quartered in an open Village, are obliged to be on Horse-back most part of the Night. The Trenches contain your Army like a Compact City, whence you may March secretly with what Troops you please, to put all manner of brave Designs in Execution, and leave your Baggage in Safety. The Intrenchment secures you from being obliged to Fight by the Enemy, except you have a mind to it. Intrenchments put you out of all danger, though under the Nose of the most redoubtable Army. Intrenchments enable you to take strong Cities in the view of an Enemy that's stronger than your self. In fine, you are less subject to Infection in Intrenchments, than in Villages, because then you chuse a healthful Situation, but in Villages you must take it as they are, and because it is also more Airy, the Lodgings better divided, and those things more easily remov'd, which occasion a bad Air, and that in effect an Army Encamp't and Entrencht, will subsist better in Health for Three Months in a Camp, than 15 Days in the best Villages. Whence I conclude, That one of
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the most necessary things in War, is to know well how to Encamp and Intrench an Army.

C H A P. VII.

Of Battles.

OF all the most Glorious and Important Actions in War, to give Battle is the Chief, the Gaining of one or two, Establishes or Overturns whole Empires; anciently all Wars were decided by Battles, whence it came to pass that Conquests were so Rapid. But the present Management has more of the Fox than the Lion; and War is now founded more upon Sieges than Battles. Nevertheless there are still some Nations who decide their Wars by Battle, as the *Turks* and *Persians*, and even amongst *Christians* we have seen of late, that several Battles have been fought in *Germany*, whereof one alone did in a manner enthrall all the *Protestant* Princes. An Army well Disciplin'd,
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and which is not affraid of giving Battle, hath a Marvellous Advantage in all their Designs against another which is afraid; and this is also the reason why in the present Method of making War it is not so usual to hazard Battles as at other times, we must not however neglect the Knowledge of it, for the General of an Army cannot be call'd a Good Captain if he do not understand all the Advantages which are to be taken in a Day of Battle, and all the Disadvantages which are to be shun'd, so that he may free himself from them: I shall not mention the Dust, nor the Sun, nor the Rain, whereof some remark that many Captains have improved them to good advantage, by taking the Wind of their Enemies, because these are Casual things which may change in a Moment, and so happen rather by Chance than Design; but I shall Treat of more solid things.

He then who would give Battle, ought to have regard to seven principal things.

The First is, That he never suffer himself to be forced to Fight against his Will.

The Second is to chuse a place of Battle fit for the Quality and Number of his Soldiers ; for if he be affraid of being inclosed by a Greater Number, he ought to cover his Flanks, or at least one of them according as the Nature of the place will allow, either with a River, Forrest, or something equivalent, and if he be weak in Horse, he ought to avoid Plains in the same manner as he does narrow places if he be strong in Horse.

The Third is so to draw up his Army in Battle Array, that according to the Quality of his Soldiers, he may be so advantageously Encampt as to cover his Horse with his Foot if his Horse be weakest ; and if otherwise, to cover his Foot with his Horse, and to draw up his Men in so good order that they may Fight divers times before they be entirely Defeated ; for if we take care to prevent that the small Troops of Soldiers do not Fight all at a time, and if we believe that 100 Horse separated in two Troops ought to Fight 200 which make but one ; and if we have observed in our Days that many Battles have been won by having one Troop in reserve which did not Charge till

till after all the rest had fought; how much greater will the impression be of a second Line of Battle; which comes to Charge after all the Enemies Army have fought against the first Line, and more may still be done by a third Line according to the practice of the *Romans*, if the two first be Defeated. It is a certain Maxim that a Troop, how great soever it be, is in such disorder after having fought, that the least Troop which shall Attack them is capable of giving them an entire Defeat; so that the General, who is able to keep a Reserve of Troops last without Fighting, will carry the Victory with those Troops, it being a long and difficult Work to bring an Army which hath already fought in sufficient Order to make a second Charge, some being taken up with the Plunder, others unwilling to charge again, and altogether in such a hurry that they neither can hear, nor will hear any Command. On the contrary, those who have not as yet fought, are still in order and ready to do what their Leader Commands. Wherefore it is plain that the Skill of a General does not so much consist in rallying his disordered and broken Troops, (which

(which is properly nothing but an Act of Courage) as to Order his Troops to fight as they should, one after another, and not all at a time. For he ought to consider that he cannot be well obeyed by his Soldiers but just as he is sending them to Fight; for afterwards all the Harangues of the World won't make them stop when they flie, whatever their Effects may be when they are in good order.

The Fourth is to have several good General Officers, for it's impossible for one General to be every where. After he hath made a Good Choice of a Field of Battle, and put his Army in good order, he cannot when they come to fight, give Orders on any other Quarter, but where he is himself; so that if he be not well assisted throughout in his Cavalry, as well as his Infantry, and though he do Wonders in his own Quarter, he cannot answer for the Ignorance of those who Command in other parts of his Army. There must be at least five principal Commanders to make an Army fight well, *viz.* Three for the three Bodies of Foot, distinguished by the Advanced Guard, the Main Battle,

tle, and the Arrear Guard, and two for the Horse which are upon the Wings.

The Fifth thing to be observed, is that due Distance be kept, so as if the First Troops be broke, they may not fall in upon those who are to sustain them, nor the Second fall in upon the Third.

The Sixth is to place the Stoutest Soldiers on the Wings of the Army, and to begin the Battle on that side where you are strongest ; for if once you break one of the Enemies Wings, you take them both on the Flank and the Rear, so that it is impossible for them to resist.

The Seventh and last is not to suffer your Men to Pursue nor Plunder till the Enemy be broken on all sides, and tho' it be good to pursue Vigorously, yet you must always have Troops in order, who do not scatter, to prevent all Inconveniences. I shall not speak of the Advantages which may happen in the Field of Battle, of which a good General does many times make great Advantage, because there is no certain Rule to be given on that Head, the diversity of the situation being such, that there are not two to be found alike.

C H A P. VIII.

Of Fortresses.

BECAUSE the loss of Battles is of so great Consequence that it is often followed with that of whole Kingdoms : Fortresses are made use of to put a stop to the first Shock of the Conquerors Fury, and to ruine their Armys, but since the Invention of Cannon, the Manner of Fortification hath been chang'd ; and since the Invention of Petards, Men are obliged to secure the Gates of the City by Portcullis's, Pallisado's, Draw-Bridges, and other Engines, because there was no place how strong soever, which was not in hazard of being taken by this Invention. The best Forts against Cannon, are such as are made of Earth, because when they are thick enough to resist, they don't Endamage the Besieged, as do the Fortifications of Stone-work , when the broken Stones fly about and make havock

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amongst

the Defendants. But if the Prince be able to bear the Charge of facing it with Stone as far as the Parapet, which must be rendred Cannon proof, the Work will be more durable.

Four principal things are to be observed in Fortresses, That the Line of Defence be within Musquet Shot, That the Angled Flank be not opened above 90 Degrees, nor shut up above 60; That the Entrance into the Bastion be not too strait, and that the Flank be as large as may be; and those four General Maxims ought to be so proportioned amongst themselves, that to make one good the other ought not to be destroyed. In the principal Body of the Fortification, *Tenails* ought to be avoided if the Ground be not so strait as that you cannot have room for good Flanks for the Dead Angle, or that which enters the Body of the Fortification, as in all Starworks, being rais'd as it ought, cannot be defended by any Flank, and Men may post themselves at the Foot of it without hazard of being reacht by any other Weapons but Stones; and therefore it is that Men don't use Logements but upon the Counterscarps. The Ditches

are ordinarily proportioned according to the Ground which is necessary for the Fortifications ; those which are full of Water are best against a Surprize, but the dry ones defend themselves best against an Attack ; their breadth ought to be proportionable ; for when it is over broad it divides the Outworks too far from the principal Fortification, but the depth never hurts a Ditch. The *false Brays*, or out-walls are annex'd to the Body of the Fortification, being a new and Excellent Invention to prevent the approaching of the Bastions with Galleries, the Counter-scarp, Half-Moons, Ravelins and Horn-works are beyond the Great Ditch. All the Outworks, if possible, ought to be Commanded by the Body of the Fortification. And thus you have in General, what is needful to be observed concerning Fortifications in a Plain or other places, easie to be approached. The rest depends upon the Judgment of the Engineer, who ought to make a profitable use of the situation of the place which he fortifies either by taking in that which may be advantageous, or avoiding what may be hurtful to him. I shall further add, That there are

Situations so favourable, that Nature it self defends them and renders them more Impregnable than all the Art of the World could do as an Unaccessible Rock, Morasse, or Lake; But every thing is attended with its Inconveniency. It is rare to find such Situations on Frontier places, or any Important Pass, or capable of such a Garrison as to strike Terrour into an Enemy who wou'd invade the Country, or else they are so easie to be Blockt up, that 500 Men without, may Besiege 500 within. Those who have a mind to know the particulars of Fortifications, may find them describ'd in abundance of Books, but still better in the Exercise of War, where something is added by Experience every Day.

C H A P. IX.

Of Defence against Surprizes.

AFTER having spoken of Fortresses, we must now come to the manner of defending them, and the way how to prevent their being Surpriz'd. It is certain that Men will attempt them always rather by Surprise than main force, because thereby both Time and Expence are saved; but Surprizes being occasioned either by Defects in the place, or in their Guard, I will begin to treat of what must be observed to defend our selves against such Surprizes.

The Captain who hath the Charge of a place ought to take care of six principal things, on which all the rest depend, *viz.* To put the Walls out of all danger of being Scal'd, and the Gates of being broke open by a Petard; To make the Rounds easie to be perform'd, place his Sentinels well, keep exact Guard, and

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prevent

prevent Intelligence and Treachery. For the five first the Path is beaten, Books are full of Instructions concerning them, and there are so many Ordinances of Princes, both in Writing and Practice; that it must be a very great Negligence not to be sufficiently provided on this Head. But for the last, Rules cannot be so well ascertain'd, Treasonable Correspondence being carried on either by the Inhabitants or the Soldiers, a good way to prevent it is to have a mixture of both, either on the Guards, Patrouls, or going the Rounds, to make them perform all the Functions of the Guard by Lott, to have a strong Guard without the place, and Spies amongst the Enemies. Guards should be doubled in time of Fairs, Markets and Harvest, but especially during the Vintage, because that time is generally chosen for putting such Designs in Execution. The Soldiers must always be in Arms at opening and shutting of the Gates, and there ought to be no Relaxation of the Guards, though even in the most profound Peace. There is another way to avoid Treasonable Correspondence, *viz.* by forming Enterprizes of the like nature
your

your self either in seeming to disoblige an Officer, single Soldier, or Inhabitant who may go over to the Enemy and perswade them to undertake some design which there is a probability to accomplish, for besides the advantage of bringing the Stoutest of your Adversaries into the Snare by this means, you will also prevent your Enemy from undertaking any other design while they are in hopes of succeeding in this, because Men do always attempt that which they reckon themselves sure to accomplish. Hence we may see how doubtful those Enterprizes are, which Men undertake by Intelligence, either because there may be deceit at bottom, or that the Traytor loses Courage when it comes to the push, and in that case makes a discovery, or else by his Indiscreet Carriage betrays himself in not keeping his Design secret enough. And therefore in all Enterprizes which are undertaken by Intelligence, both the Assailant and Defendant ought to be very Jealous and Diligent in observing the Words, Actions and Gestures of those who promise to serve you by betraying their own Party, and therefore no Precaution ought

to be omitted for securing their Persons, that so they may not deceive you not being sufficient (as *Montluc* observes in his Design upon *Barges*) to have their Wives and Children as Hostages, because there are some Traytors so resolute that they will risk all to accomplish their Designs, and hope to recover their Pledges by the Prisoners which they take.

It remains that I should say one word of Allarms, in which case Soldiers may do either of these two, *viz.* The first and most usual way is for them to betake themselves to such place of Rendezvouz as ought to be the Governor's Post, and from thence to March as need shall require; or for each Company to draw up under their own Colours, and then March to find out their Squadron which is upon the Guard, If the Garrison be weak, the place easie to be Scal'd, and of large extent, the last Course is the best, because the Soldiers March soonest to the defence of the Walls, but then you ought to be sure of the Loyalty of the Inhabitants.

CHAP. X.

Of Attacks by way of Surprize.

THere are divers ways of Surprizing Places, either by Petards, Scalade, digging holes in the Walls, * Saucidges or such other Inventions as are found out every day, according as Defences are provided against those already invented.

* An Engine in Form of a Saucidge, but much bigger, which is wreathed at one end, and being put in betwixt the Joins of a Wall, and fired, throws it down, tho' never so strong.

But to be successful in such Attacks, Three things must be carefully adverted unto.

First, to view the Place well which you design to surprize.

Secondly, To use good Conduct in it.

And *Thirdly*, To put it well in execution, for one or another of those things failing, we find that all Enterprizes miscarry, either because they are prevented by the Day.

Day-light, being too early discovered, by want of Petards and Scaling Ladders, or by reason of some disorder which happens in the execution. As to what concerns the viewing of the place, Those employed therein must inform themselves exactly, of the Form of the Garison, Number of its Inhabitants, and how they are affected; They must also observe the Gates, and whether in the way to them there be not a Dormant-Bridge, whether it be of Stone or Wood, and if of Wood, whether they do not remove the Planks by Night, and whether or not it have any Rails; They must also observe whether the Ditch be deep or large, and if by descending commodiously into the Ditch, one can shun the Draw-Bridge, which is ordinarily made upon the Dormant-Bridge, or if by the help of the Ditch, one can Petard the Gate, Draw-Bridge, or Rowing-Bridge. It must also be carefully observed, what stops there are in the Way before the Dormant-Bridge, whether Gates, Barriers, Palli-sado's, or other things, there being ordinarily a Ravelin before it. They must also take notice, whether there be any . Guard

Guard kept by Night, upon or without the Dormant-Bridge; How many Gates, Bridges, Barriers, Palisades,* Trebuchets, Grates, * An Engine for throwing Stones downward with great violence. Portcullis's, Chains, or other Stops betwixt the

Town and the Fields, how they are all hut or Lockt; How many Paces distant one of them is from another, with their Length, Breadth and Thickness, as near as may be, and how they are situated; whether there be any * Machecoulis over the Gate or

Holes in the Arch; How many Corps de Guard there be, where, and how placed, whether the * Stones resembling a Grate, through which, offensive things are thrown at the Assailants,

Entry to them be Straight or Winding; the situation of the Flankers must also be observed, whether they be on the sides, before or behind, above or below; if they be mounted with Cannon; how many; and if they be only for Musqueteers; how many may Lodge therein, and at what distance they Flank the Gate. The way which you intend to take from the place where you are, to that which you would Attack, must also be observed, and

and a fit place must be found out within halfe a League of the Town to a Light in, and distribute the Petards and other Instruments. The Places and Streets of the Town which is to be seised, must also be descried, and how many Corps *du* Guard are to be forced, the Condition of the People, and all things necessary to surmount whatever Obstacles may occur, are likewise to be considered; If the design be to take the Place by Scalade, we must diligently view the Avenues, Counterscarp and Ditch, to see if we can approach the same under Covert, enter and return easily from the Ditch; and chiefly in and about that place where we intend to set up our Ladders. For if after having entred into the Ditch, we must go a long time about the place, the Enterprise will become abundantly more dangerous and difficult. We must also know whether the Ditch be Drie or Frozen, if the Water be deep without Mudd, and easie to pass, if the Wall be low or weak, if it can be easily Scal'd or Dug thorow, if there be any Hole, Sink, or other Entries or Common-shores, weak or ill Guarded. We must also consider
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the height of the Ladders, how they must be fixt, if the place designed for the attempt be remote from the Guards and Centinels, if more Ladders can be set up than one, by which many people may enter at a time, and if the place be very strait, we must see if the first who enter, can be accommodated upon the Rampart, and able to subsist till others mount the same. The distance of the Wall from the Town must likewise be thought on, in order to the attacking of the Main Guard.

For the next thing which is the good Conduct of the Enterprize, that may be managed two ways, *viz.* either by piecemeal, or in gross. By piecemeal when the design is upon places of Importance, which are far within the Enemies Country, and the Enterprize upon them reckoned feasible, for they must infallibly put all the Soldiers who March thither in Eminent danger; and therefore great Prudence is requisite in this case, and Persons of Resolution and Secrecy are only to be employed in it because they must either Conquer or Die, which does not fall out in such Enterprizes where care is taken both to have a safe March and Retreat.

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The *Mareschal de Brisac* being in *Piedmont*, undertook such an Enterprize on the Castle of *Milan*, wherein his Conduct was excellent, and deserves to be remarkt here as a Lesson for those who would undertake the like. He pickt out Fourscore and ten *Frenchmen*, and Forty *Italians*, the bravest and most resolute Soldiers in his whole Army, and appointed for Captains, *Salvaïson* to the *French*, and *Peter Marie de Recuperat de Bresignolle* to the *Italians*, the Captains alone being privy to the Design; after this he made them to come by Five and Five to his Secretaries Quarters, where he gave every one of them 25 Crowns, and to the Leader of each Five, he gave a Note of the Place, whither he was to go, and the Journeys which he was to make, so that the Brigades might not Rencounter; The First Rendezvous was at a Farm on the confines of *Milan*, where *Lewis Birague* had arrived very secretly some days before in a disguise, to give necessary Orders for the conduct of the Design. The way of their Rendezvous at the Farm was thus, at the passage out of the Valley of *Camonica* or *Bergamasco*, the First Brigade, and so all
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the rest, one after another, found a Peasant with a Straw Hat and two Feathers of a Pheasant in it, each Commander had Orders to ask this Man in *Italian*, *Good Fellow will you sell your Hat?* And he was to Answer, *No Sir, there's no need of that.* This being the Watch-word, the Leader, without saying a word more, followed the Peasant, who conducted him with his Brigade to the Farm where *Lewis Birague* was, and in this manner the *Mareschal de Brisac's* 120 Soldiers arrived at the place with great Secrefie. From this Farm they were to gain the House of a certain Native of *Sienna* near *Milan*, who was the Author of the Design; and for this end they March'd as before, by Five and Five, and having pass'd the River *Adde*, at the Gate of *Vaure*, they had adjusted the time of their arrival towards the Evening at the Bridge of *Navillo* in *Milan*, near the Monastery of *Angels*, and being arrived on the said Bridge the Commander of the Brigade rung a small tingling Bell, which was answered by such another, and forthwith the *Siannois*, the Author of the Design, came from under the Bridge, and conducted them to his House

House, continuing to do thus for several Nights, till the whole Troop passed, which is a very Remarkable thing to have Marcht 120 Soldiers from *Piedmont* to the Gates of *Milan*, without being discovered, or any Bodies knowing where they were, or what they were about till the very nick of time, except the two Captains abovenamed.

As for Conduct in General, which is the most ordinary, the length of the way to the place on which you have the design must be measured, as also the time which must be taken up to the very Minute appointed for Execution, wherein Men are often deceiv'd, because ordinarily there happens unforeseen Accidents which prolong the time in such sort, that take what measures you will, without a great Experience in such Journeys, you will ordinarily find the time too short, especially if you have a large Troop to Conduct; for to File off 2000 Men by Night, you will be obliged to lose very much time in making them halt often, because of the bad ways and Interruptions of Rivers; insomuch that if you be not very diligent to make them March, and that you have not
viewed

viewed the way, and provided for all those things, you will find that you have not half enough of time. I shall not say any thing of the Great Rains and Frosts, which are sometimes so very severe and extraordinary; that what Precautions soever you have taken against the rest, it will be impossible to surmount them. After having adjusted your time to your way, you must provide good Guides and as many of them as you can. Then you must form your Order before they March as it ought to be put in Execution, and give every Commander his part in Writing, and keep a Register of it; for if you remit it to the place of Rendezvous, or where the Equipage is accommodated (which is ordinarily within half a League of the place) the Night time which is inconvenient for that sort of Affairs, the place which perhaps is neither Spacious nor Commodious enough for adjusting the Order, the Contentions which may happen among the Officers in point of Honour, and several other unforeseen Accidents are capable to make the design miscarry; to have these things all resolv'd on before the March, and the Orders so fixt as nothing may be

E e altered,

altered, is certainly the best way to avoid Obstacles. If it be from a City that you March, you must keep the Gates shut a long time before, and March out the Troops by Day, so as you may see that no Body goes forth but those who are of the Expedition. And it will be best in fine, to cause the Troops to halt without the Gate, or at some place where they may be under Covert. As for the Order, some Cavalry must be Detacht first, and let their Avant Couriers have it in charge to Advance far enough, and stop all sorts of Persons from what places soever bound, to prevent the giving of any Advice to the Town which you design to Attack. Above all, if there be any Bridge or Pass which you cannot avoid Marching through, you must of necessity gain it. After this 50 Musqueteers ought to March, then the Train, Petards and Ladders, and the Men who are chosen to carry them, which ought to consist of three Companies that they may relieve one another, and fill up the places of those who may be Wounded or Kill'd. They ought to be Men fit to do Execution, and of the most bold and daring of the whole Troop, for on those
first

first Men the good or bad Success of the Enterprize does ordinarily depend. There must also be a great number of Petards, because every one of 'em works not the desired effect, and oftentimes for want of a Petard many fine Enterprizes miscarry. There must also be store of Ladders, because they are oftentimes either broken by the Enemy, or by the too great weight of your own Men; nor must a Troop consist of more than 50, whether they be Pikes or Muskets; for we must consider, that the first Rencounters are in narrow Streets, and in the Night time; so that great Troops do nothing but occasion disorder; but if you find the Street larger than the Rank which you have form'd, you must joyn two Troops together to take up the whole breadth of the Street. Every Troop must have Officers on the Front and on the Rear, besides Serjeants on the Flanks to keep them in Rank, and prevent their stragling or running off to Plunder. This must also be observed concerning the Order at parting from their Quarters, that if there be divers Attacks made, the Commanders, Soldiers and Equipage must be distinguished in as many

Troops as you design Attacks, and March in the same Order as they are to Attack. In all Enterprises, but chiefly in those which are dangerous and long, you must rely more upon the Goodness than the Number of your Men, for a small Company can March from a greater distance more secretly, and retire with less Peril and Confusion than a greater can do. Moreover a small Body, with many Officers, is more obedient in the Execution, and occasions less disorder than a great one; and it may be added, That in an Enterprize by Night, a small Troop will terrifie as great a number of Enemies as a greater; for it is a certain Maxim, That those who are Surpriz'd and Attackt fight in fear, this being always presupposed, that they must be Charg'd with a Force sufficient: And, in fine, If you Conquer with a small Number, you have more Glory than if you do it with a greater, which does oftentimes Encumber you both in the Fight, March, and Retreat, and if you be Defeated, you have less Disgrace.

As for the Third thing which is to take care, that the Enterprize be well put in execution, the whole Method and Order of it ought to be set down in writing, so that none of those who have any Command, may have occasion of pretending that they did not understand it. If a Scalade be design'd, there must be Two Men to carry each part of the Ladder, and because it is in a manner impossible to scale a place which takes more than Five pieces of Ladder in height; it is sufficient to have Ten Men for the Ladders, and one to Command them. Those design'd to each Ladder ought to be mark'd in a Roll by their Names and Surnames, and to what Company they belong. They ought to be Commanded on pain of death, to bring back their Ladders, if they cannot take the place, because knowing the danger and trouble that there is in bringing them back, they will rather do their utmost to enter the place, Then Ten other Men must be Commanded to enter after the Ten first, who are to have an Officer on the Front and another on the Rear, to take care that they Mount without Loss

of time, or making too much haste, for otherwise, they will overcharge the Ladders so, as to break them. In the next place, there must be other Tens separated and commanded, as the former, and every Ten ought to know on what Ladder they are to Mount, and in what Rank, that they may avoid Confusion. The First Ten who follow their Ladder, ought to carry another with them, altho' they have no Order to erect it; that in case any piece of the First break, they may have another to supply it. If the Design be by Petard, the Petardier ought to call him, who is to carry the Planks, and then the Three Men who belong to the Petard, Two to carry it, and the Third to assist them, in case of need, and if the Planks be fastened to the Petard, the Four Men may carry it Two and Two by Turns, and the Two who don't carry the Petard, should each of them have a Smith's great Hammer. Next to these Four, the Petardier must call Two more each of them carrying a great Axe, then one who carries a Leaver, another who carries a Dark-Lanthorn, and a Third who carries three or four lighted Matches,

Matches, and besides these there ought to be one who Commands them, and he is to carry a Piercer, Nails, and a Wedge, so that to serve a Petard well, there are 10 Men required; and the File of 10 for the first Petard ought to be Conducted by some brave Serjeant, who is to have the Names of each Man of his File in Writing, and should know what every Man carries. The Men ought to know the Mule which carries their Equipage, and as soon as they come to the place where he is to be Unloaded, they must all come about him, that every Man may receive what he is to carry. If the second Petard is to be us'd against a Gate or Barriere, those who carry it ought to be in the same Order as they that carried the first, but if it be for a Draw-Bridge, the Flying-Bridge ought to March first with Seven or Eight Men who are to carry and lay it over the place of the Draw-bridge. Then the Petard with its Planks is to be carried in the same Order as the first.

After which the File is to follow in close Order with those who carry the Ladders design'd to be laid upon the Breach which the Petard shall make on the Draw-bridge,

then follow those who carry the Hammers, Axes, Pincers, and other Instruments to pull off the Bolts, and cut the Chains; after them are to March some with Dark-Lanterns, Grenado's, and other Fireworks. The Officer who Commands, must take care that no Man lose his Rank, he must likewise divide them in Files, and see that such parts of the Equipage as were carried by those which are Killed or Wounded, be taken up by others, without suffering those who belong to the Petard to concern themselves with the Kill'd or Wounded, but make them only to be carried out of the way. The Men must be disposed in the same Order at all the Gates and Bridges, but when they go to the Grates or Portcullis's, those who carry the Chevalets or Scaffolds for a covering, must March first, after them the Planks and Petard, and then the Axes, Hammers, Leavers and other Instruments which are judg'd needful, neither must Fireballs, Grenado's, nor Pikes be omitted, if they be judged serviceable, every Man must carry an Axe at his Girdle, and its better to have too many Instruments than to want one. Having thus
put

put all things in Order, and Officers on the Wings and Front of each File, there must be Petards, Planks, and other Instruments in reserve which are to March in the same Order with the former, for it's always necessary to have a double Equipage, and when you come near the place design'd for the Execution, let every Man's part be distributed to him; the Serjeant is to put them in File, and Command every one to follow his Leader. Then he must cause them to March before to make way for the second Petard, and so of all the rest, the first File being to have a Guide to show them the way. And that there may be no Incumbrance, sometimes it is needful to make Ten Men in Armour March before them on Foot to discover if the Enemy be not upon the Avenues, and after them Three Men are to follow, carrying good Targets to cover the Petardier. Next to them are to March those who carry the Petard, and other Materials in the Order above-mentioned; and they ought to be followed by a Captain and 50 Musqueteers to fire with great Hail-shot in their defence if it be needful, and
care

must be taken that none halt by the way as they March. When the Enemy asks, Who is there? You must quicken your March: The Petardier is to take the first Petard along with him, and the rest must follow up very close, that the second may be ready to put into his Hand as soon as the first plays. The 10 Horsemen who hitherto had Marcht before the whole Equipage, must only advance within Pistol Shot of the first Barrier, and then retire with the Captain who led on the 50 Musqueteers. The first Petard being plaid, the Officer must make his Men stand off to the Right and Left, to make way for the second; and that being done, the like for the third; then for the Flying-Bridge, and after that for the Petards and other Instruments in order; and those who have discharged their part, are to assist the others without any noise: If the Petardier ask any thing, he who carries it must be ready to give it him, and none are to quit their Ranks on pain of Death, except it be to serve the Petardier, or fill up the place of such as are Kill'd, or Wounded. The Officers must take care that the Petardier be serv'd on his Demand, and that every

every thing be done without confusion or noise. The Breach being made, those who are Commanded on the first Brunt, must be ready to enter and force their way through such as oppose them, those who follow them must do the like, and so must all they who are Commanded on the Exploit. When you are got in, those who entered first, must not be suffer'd to advance too far within the Town, neither in pursuit nor search of the Enemy, until such time as they be sufficiently backt; for two Bodies must be drawn up, one to Act and the other ready in Battalia to sustain them; and this being done, they must March in good Order, the one to force some Post, and the rest in Battle-Array to the Streets and Places which they resolv'd to seize upon, when the whole Attack was design'd on viewing the plan of the Town; for though sometimes it has been successful to pursue the Enemy boldly with the few Men who get in first, yet it is not the surest way, because they may be repulsed by a small number, which hath oftentimes Defeated brave Enterprizes. There must also be a third Body to stay without, in Order of
Battle,

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Battle, during the Execution, that if those who have entred the Town be repulsed, they may sustain them, or at least prevent such Accidents as might happen by some of the Enemies Troops. which may perchance arrive at that place. If your Men be intirely repulsed, the Body without will make good the Retreat, and remain firm in Order of Battle, until such time as the Troops which are repulsed may be rallied and brought into Order again. But if those who have entred make themselves Masters of the place. The Battalion without will separate and March to Guard the Avenues, which being accomplished, you must Disarm the Inhabitants before you lay down your own Arms. Then when you have assured all the *Corps de Guards*, and Commodious Places, you must divide the Town into so many Quarters, that every one may have a share of the Booty; they must not be suffered to Plunder in any other manner, and those who begin to pillage, are to be severely punished. By this means the best Quarter may be assigned to those who have best deserved it, and the rest divided by Lot, and

and then no Man can have reason to blame any thing but his own Misfortune. In those Places which are Attackt by Scalade, some Troops of Musqueteers may be Posted to Fire continually upon the Flanks if it be needful, and Fireworks are also to be used in this Case if possible, but those who Discharge just over the Ladder, are to forbear when their own Men begin to Mount.

I have been more particular in this Chapter than in any other, because so many Enterprizes miscarry for want of observing the least of those things; so that I rather chuse to be a little too long, than to omit any thing on this Head.

C H A P. XI.

Of Attacking by Siege.

IN the Two Chapters of Surprizes, I began to Treat of the Ways of Defence, because Men do never undertake a Surprize, if some defects be not found in the place, so that he who neither knows where, nor in what manner it ought to be Attackt, must prepare himself against all Accidents. In the next Two Chapters, I shall begin to Treat of attacking Place by Siege, because you must know where, and in what manner you are attackt, in order to make a good Defence.

Sieges are carried on, either by Blockade to Starve the Place, or else by main Force; But either for the one or the other, you must be the strongest in the Field, and have two Armies, one to prevent the attempts of your Enemy, and the other to carry on your Siege, or at least you must be first in the Field that you may Fortifie your self in such manner before the Town, as to be able to maintain your Post against all the Efforts of your Enemies. That you may
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the more easily become Master of any Town which you Besiege, you must labour to surprize it, when but ill provided of Soldiers, and for this end you must use all manner of Artifices to prevent the knowledge of your Design, and then block it up all of a sudden. But, if notwithstanding of all your stratagems, you cannot surprize it unprovided, or apprehend that it will cost you too dear, it's best to undertake some other Siege of less Importance; for a Place obstinately defended is the ruine of an Army, and if it be not taken, does often diminish the Reputation of him who attacks it: Wherefore it is needful to consider well of it before you undertake it, and to be well provided of all things necessary. When you form a Siege you must be sure to encamp in a place as healthful as possibly you can, and you must take special care to have your Quarters spacious and clean, lest raging Distempers ruine your Army. You must sit down as near the Town as may be, so as not to be incommoded by their Artillery. If the Situation be plain, and that they can see all round about them, you must pitch your Camp without reach of their

Cannon. You must have as many Quarters as you design Attacks, or at least as the bigness of the Town, and its situation requires. And the Generals Quarter ought to be capable of receiving the whole Army, in case of need. If your Army be small, and the Garison strong, you must fortifie your Quarters one after another, with the whole Body of your Army, and in that case, make fewer Attacks; But if you find that you are strong enough, it will much shorten the Work to make them all at a time. Besides this, you must make a Circumvallation with Forts and Redoubts, without reach of the Enemies Cannon. This joins all the Quarters together, and behind it, your Army may appear in Battle; It ought to be carried on in such sort, as to possess all the Commanding Grounds, but if the Garison of the Town be so strong, as that you fear being attackt on both sides, you must cast up another Line of Circumvallation as near the Town as you can, that so it may need the less number to Guard it, for being made to oppose the City, you need not fear to cast it up, being without the reach of their Cannon.

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As for the opening of the Trenches, there is more or less precaution used, according as the Garison is weak or strong; If it be strong, you must begin with a good Fort, and raise strong Redoubts along the Trenches. Leaving none but Sentinels in the Latter. For its an old Error to think of defending the Trenches. If the Garison be weak, there's no need of so much precaution, so that you may gain time. The Batteries ought to be defended by good Ditches, and Flankt with strong Corps *du* Guard, to secure them against the Enemies Sallies. If there be any Outworks belonging to the Garison, which are not as yet in a State of Defence, and may probably be carried by Force, they must be attempted, or otherwise you must take them gradually as you can, for in them lies the greatest defence of the Garison, because they render their Sallies easie. When the Outworks are carried, your Cannon Lodged on the Counterscarp, your Descents made into the Ditch, and that you prepare to lay your Galleries for attacking the Bastions, then you must make Lodgements of Musqueteers along the Counterscarp, that under the protection of them, and

your Cannon; your Men may pass the Galleries, if the Ditch be drie they will dispute it with you, but the strongest will carry it at last. If they be full of standing Water, it does not prevent your filling them up, so as you may fix your Gallerie, but if they be fill'd with running Water, you must use floating Bridges to carry over your Miners. When you attack the Bastions, you make use of great or little Mines, to gain Ground by degrees; and the Intrenchments which may be cast up behind them. I shall not trouble my self to tell you here, how the Quarters, the Forts, the Circumvallations, and the Trenches ought to be made, so as they may not be incumbred; nor how the Batteries are to be rendred sure; how the Descents are to be made into the Ditch, wherewith the Out-walls are to be attackt, of what the Galleries are fram'd, nor how the Mines are dugg, and Lodgements made after they have play'd, because all that can be said on that Head is writ already, and Experience must teach the rest, there being some Additions or Alterations every day.

C H A P. XII.

*How to Defend Places against
a Siege.*

TO hold out well against a Siege, it's necessary that the place be strongly Fortified, that the Garrison be sufficient to defend it, and that they have enough of Provisions, Arms and Ammunition. Those four things are so necessary, that the want of any one of them makes all the rest to signifie nothing; for of what use is a Fortrefs, though very strong, if there be not Soldiers enough to defend it; and what signifie Soldiers without Arms and Ammunition; and what Service can you do with Arms and Ammunition without Provisions; to which I may add, That you must be supplied with Instruments to cast up Earth, without which you can make no Vigorous Defence. Nor is it enough to have all things necessary for resistance, but they

must be well Husbanded, otherwise they will be consum'd by those who have a mind to rid themselves quickly of the danger, and find some handsome pretence for a Surrender, and the Number of such is always greater than the Number of those who are for an Obstinate Defence, the Labour and Rest must be equally divided betwixt the Soldiers and the Inhabitants, that those who are willing may not be overcharg'd, nor others inur'd to Idleness; the Pioneers, Miners, Carpenters, Smiths, and all the Artisans which are necessary for a Siege, must be formed into Companies, with a Captain to each. There must also be an Inventory made of all the Iron, Wood, Cloth, Instruments for casting up Earth, Materials for making Fireworks, and all other things in the Town which are necessary for a Siege, and of all those things there must be continually some quantity in the Magazines to serve in case of present necessity: And to avoid Disorders which may happen in the distribution of them; there must be a Council to superintend and take care to have them deliver'd out and brought in again, according to the Order of the Governor

vernor and a Council of War. Matters being thus ordered, you must begin next to think of Defence, which consists chiefly in two things, *viz.* Either in holding the Enemy at a distance by Intrenchments, or Incommoding them when they draw near by Sallies.

As to the first it is approved and practis'd by all, and they who cast up Trenches best, and begin to dispute their Ground furthest off, make the longest resistance, for the least Intrenchment without being Accommodated with Pallisado's are hard to force, but if the Intrenchments be Mined, and another cast up behind them, it is dangerous to approach them, and the Enemies are constrain'd to advance Gradually, and with the same Precautions which they approach the Bastions and the Great Ditch; so that by divers Intrenchments the Enemy is long kept off before he can approach the Counterscarp, and he cannot ruine those Outworks but by Mines, which require much time. The Ditch, if dry, is also defended by Loopholes in the Wall, or Coffers, as some call them, which are surrounded with Pallisado's, or small Ditches

to hinder the approach, and such Ditches and Pallisado's are made in many places of the Grand Ditch, to cover the Defendants from the Enemies Cannon. The Bastions are defended by Intrenchments cast up, either at the point, in the middle, or at the entry of them, according as they are capable, and as the Enemies Mines advance within the Bastions, and when all those things are forc'd, the last Defence is an Intrenchment of the whole Town, and betaking your selves only to defend one part.

The Second manner of Defence is, by numerous Sallies, but this is disapproved by most, who content themselves with false Sallies, to divert those who work on the approaches, and make only one for good and all, in case of great necessity, alledging, that the Besieged lose always abundance of their best Men in Sallies, whom they ought to preserve for a Great Effort, and that many times those who seek for an Honourable Pretence to Surrender, cause their Soldiers to be Lam'd by frequent Sallies, to shew that they are obliged thereunto by necessity. But for my own part, I approve of frequent

quent Sallies, as having observed, that the Works of the Besiegers are obstructed more that way in an hour, than by other sorts of Defences in 8 Days. I own that those Reasons have apparent weight, when Places are attackt by Assault, in which case it is best to preserve your Men to sustain the shock; But now, that it is the Method to gain Ground foot by foot, if you do nothing else but defend your self by Intrenchments, you must in fine, lose it, and your number of Soldiers are of no use to you, so that the care which you took to preserve them, does not prevent the Towns being taken, one day longer; But if by your gallant Sallies you ruine their Batteries, fill their Trenches, force the Redoubts which defend them, and burn their Galleries when they are in the Ditch, they have all their Works to begin again, as often as you ruine them, so that the Besiegers finding themselves received thus, they make their approaches with much more precaution, and their Soldiers will at last grow weary. So that for my own part, I approve much of frequent Sallies, but care must be taken that they be at different hours, the better to surprize the Enemy, and with a

small number, but resolute Men, that you may the more easily avoid the disorder of a Retreat, and do nothing else but what is Commanded, for thō you find no resistance at first, as is usual, yet if you prolong your time needlessly, you run a risk of having your Retreat cut off, or at least, of being sharply handled as you retire. The other particulars belonging to a Defence, depend upon those of the Attack, which teaches the Besiegers, of necessity, what they must do, wherein they can only be directed by Practice and Experience.

C H A P. XIII.

Of Artillery.

IT is Natural to speak of Artillery after Sieges, because places are chiefly taken by means of it, and since it came in use, there is no Place impregnable, but that which is inaccessible, so that it hath occasion'd a change in the form and man-

ner of Fortifications, for instead of Towers, and the ancient Walls which were not able to resist it, they now make Bastions and other Works of Earth. We may also say, that it hath in some sort changed the Method of making War. In ancient times they began their approaches to Cities, where now they must finish them, for the first day they Lodged upon the Bank of the Ditch, and now they must make a great progress before they come that length. Then they cast up their Circumvallations only without the reach of Arrows, but now they must do it without the reach of Cannon. It did not signifie much then, whether the Fortrefs or the Camp had the most advantageous Ground, provided, that they had their other Conveniences ; but now, the advantage of the Ground must be chiefly considered. In those days Armies were peaceably marcht within 2 or 300 Paces of one another, and would stand whole days without a possibility of being dislodged, any other ways, than by the hazard of a general battle, but now one cannot stand before another, except they be without reach of the Cannon ;
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Otherwise, they who have most, or have them best planted, chase the other without fighting. In those days, the General of an Army could take a view of his Enemies Order near at hand, draw up his Men accordingly, and take his advantage of the others defects, without any hazard. But now those things cannot be observed but at such a distance, that it is safer to rely on our own good Order, than on the defects of that of our Enemies. At that time, one Army could attack another without breaking its Order, because they had but 2 or 300 Paces to march. But now it's impossible to maintain your Order in view of an Enemy for halfe a League together, or to find a Plain which is so united, as to have no Lett or Stop. To which may be added, that without a very great Inurement of marching in order of Battle. It's impossible to go one Mile without losing all the distances of Bataillions and Squadrons, and by consequence without being in confusion. Then, since Cannon is of so great use in War, and contributes so much to the Victory, it's necessary to know how we may serve our selves with it to advantage.

vantage. It's a Machine which cannot well be made use of by all, because it occasions a vast Expence. It's only for great and powerful States to use them at all times, for they must have a great Train, and 100 Artillery Horses at least to draw a Battering Piece through the Country, which may not perhaps be discharged 100 times, and by this you may judge according to the Number which you would make use of, how long a File they will make. To serve a Battering Piece well, there must be 18 Men, and besides that how many Forgemen, Waggoners, Smiths and other Workmen must there be to mend the Carriages, how many Carpenters to make Bridges, and how many Pioneers to mend the Ways. In fine, an Army which has a Train of Artillery, cannot March but very slowly, and that which has none, can do no great Feats. And therefore at present Artillery is an Essential thing to an Army. But if the General suffer it to approach too near his Enemy without Intrenching himself, it is impossible for him to come off without Fighting or losing his Cannon, which cannot fall out without a great blemish on
his

his Reputation, and for this Reason he ought to be particularly well instructed in every thing which depends upon the Artillery, and that he may not be deceived, he ought to know the least thing which belongs to the Management of it, *viz.* the Alloy us'd by the Founder in Casting it, it's Proportion, Weight, Bore, and Carriages, and of what sort of Wood they ought to be, wherewith it ought to be drawn according to the difference of Ways, whether Muddy or Mountainous, how it is to be Marcht over Rivers; with what the Batteries ought to be Fortified, both against the Enemies Cannon and Sallies; what space it must have for its Recoil; how far distant they ought to be from one another; of what the Platform ought to be made; at what distance the Batteries ought to stand, so as to be effectual; and many other things which I do not specify here, because others have Writ of them elsewhere, It suffices that I have shew'd you the use of Artillery, its Charge, Trouble, and to what it obliges you, so as I may perswade Generals not to rely upon another for the Management of it, and to understand both
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Convenience and Inconvenience of it so far that they may make use of the one with advantage, and avoid the other by foresight.

C H A P. XIV.

Of Baggage and Pioneers.

HAVING got through the Incumbrances of the Artillery, I shall now speak one word of the Baggage. It is a great disgrace to lose it, and a great trouble to preserve it when it is Excessive, there being nothing which occasions so much Disorder in an Army, and therefore it is of great Importance to reduce it to the smallest pittance that may be, and review it each Month, for it increases visibly. We are now become so delicate, that instead of carrying Eight Days Provisions about us, we are very unwilling to carry our Arms; and so long as such an Abuse is suffered in an Army it will never do any thing of Note; for as in a Battle,

Battle, he who can keep his Reserve last without Fighting, carries the Victory ; so he who keeps his Army longest in health, compleat and inur'd to Fatigues, does the like, which he cannot do if the Soldiers be so delicate that they will not carry their own Baggage ; and besides that, Sicknefs and Famine is many times bred in an Army by the Rabble of Soldiers, Boys and Strumpets ; and this, tho' it seem next to nothing, is of such importance that it is very often the ruine of the most flourishing ; and, if I may say so, Victorious Armies. It's principally in time of Prosperity that Men indulge themselves in Ease and Luxury, which is the time that of all others is the least proper for it, If we would not by imitating the Jollities of *Capua*, where *Hannibal's* Army Debauch'd it self, do the like by ours : And now that I am upon the Retrenching of things which are unnecessary for an Army, I shall speak one word of Pioneers There are Generals now a days who would have an excessive Number of such, and say that it is better to Retrench the Regiments of Soldiers, and Convert them into Pioneers, which are so necessary to
cast

cast up the Inclosures of a Camp, the Trenches of a Siege, and to repair the Ways; and in short, to save the Soldiers from Working in the Ground, because they will not, according to the Practice of the Ancient *Romans* subject themselves to that Labour now, alledging moreover that the Soldiers are harrassed enough when they come to their Quarters, without being imploy'd afresh to cast up Earth; an Opinion at which I cannot wonder enough, and which confirms me mightily in my own, that we spoil our Soldiers by sparing them too much. There must be care taken of their Vi-ctuals, Cloaths, Distempers and Wounds, but we must inure them to hardships, and their General and other Leaders ought to show them Example; for if you would bring them to be content with a little, while you surfeit your selves with too much, and to work while you Glory in being Idle; I confess they will Murmur. But to return to the Pioncers, It is necessary to have such for mending of the Ways, and chiefly for the Artillery, but 500 of 'em may serve for a great Train. As for the Inclosing of the Camp, the Sol-
diers

diers are oblig'd to do that because thereby they have the opportunity of enjoying their Repose and Sleep with safety. To which I add, That it is a thing which ought to be perform'd in three or four hours, and for that end let the whole Army fall to work, or at least one half of them when the Enemy is near; so that if it were to be done by Pioneers, they must equal the Army in Number, which were enough to furnish a whole Country, and to augment the Incumbrance which we would diminish. As for casting up Trenches, I never found Pioneers successful, and when the danger encreases, the stoutest Soldiers are not too good for the Work. They should also be encourag'd to it by Gain, which will make them the more Courageous in time of hazard, and enable them to spare something for Cloaths, which is the best way that Money can be spent in an Army.

C H A P. XV.

Of Spies and Guides.

THere are moreover, two sorts of Men to be chosen from amongst the sturdiest of the Pioneers, of which, an Army cannot have too many, *viz. Spies and Guides*; the first acquaints you with the Enemies Motions, and according to their Report, you either undertake something against your Adversaries, or Guard your selves against their Designs.

The Second give you an account of the Country, of the Roads that you must take, or by which your Enemies can march towards you. Both the one and the other must be faithful, otherwise they may bring you in great danger, either by giving you false Advice, or malicious Information. You must have store of Guids, because if you march in the Night time, every Troop has need of one, or at least every Body, and they

ought to be agreed on the Way which they are to take before they part. There ought to be a Captain of the Guides, who should be a witty and vigilant Man, and recover his Guides from their several Posts. As for *Spies*, there is something more to be observed, and you must always be diffident of them; for as it is a dangerous Imployment to him who follows it, it is no less dangerous to those who make use of them. And for this reason, no Man ought to know them, but he that imployes them, and they must not be suffered to know one another, lest they should agree to give false Advice, and so by examining them apart, you may judge, whether or not they are honest, by the uniformity or difference of their Intelligence, and when you observe which of them speaks true, and which of them false, you will easily discover who it is that betrays you, and who it is that serves you faithfully, and when you have made a discovery of the Traitors, you may still make use of them to your advantage, by seeming to rely on their Fidelity, and giving them such Commissions, as may make the Enemy believe, that

that you have Designs in hand, quite contrary to those which you resolve to put in execution, so that while he prepares to defend himself on one side, you may attack him on another. But 'tis not enough to be on your Guard, as to your own *Spies*, you must also do the same as to those of your Enemies, for you are always to suppose that he has *Spies* in your Camp, as well as you have *Spies* in his; so that besides a profound Secrecy, which you are to observe in all Enterprizes. It is also good to pretend a change of Measures, by whispering about that you have quite another sort of Design, than in reality you have, that the *Spies* may inform their Masters accordingly; But the surest way of being well served by that sort of Men, is to be liberal to them, for they are faithfull-est to those who give most.

C H A P. XVI.

Of Provisions.

BEcause it signifies nothing to have an Army composed of good Officers, Valiant, Obedient, and well Disciplin'd Soldiers, tho' provided with Artillery, and Ammunition sufficient, if they have not Victuals to eat. I will divide this Chapter into 5 Points; The First, is to buy good Corn. The Second, to provide for the Carriage. The Third, to take care of the Convoy. The Fourth, to make good Bread. And the Fifth, to distribute it. For this end the Commissary-General of the Provisions, ought to be a Man of Authority, Faithful, Vigilant and Active, and this Office should not be despis'd as at present, nor bestow'd upon Men of small Note, for it is of such importance, that according as it is ill or well perform'd, the ruine or subsistence of an Army depends upon it, so that the

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Romans always put some eminent Person in this Charge. To come to particulars, The Corn should be bought in good time, it ought to be sufficient, good of the kind, and in a place fit for Transportation; for you must not rely upon finding it in the Country, nor places whether you march, because the Enemy may either seize or burn it, and then if you relied upon it, your whole Designs are crush'd. Next, you must erect Magazines in different places, that you may not lose all at once, and they ought to be in the Towns and Castles which are nearest, and most commodious for your Army, and according to the situation of the Country, you must provide Waggon, or Mules to carry it into your Camp, Where you should always have a Magazine for 15 days, which ought not to be toucht but in case of extremity. In the Third place, there must always be a sufficient Guard with the Carriages, and the Day ought never to be prefixt, lest the Enemy should know of it, and surprize it by the way. In the Fourth place, you must prevent the abuses which are ordinarily, nay, I may say, always committed,

committed, as to the Provisions, if good care be not taken to prevent it, for to gain thereby, they often mix bad Corn, Earth, and other unwholsome things with it, whence for the most part come Diseases in an Army, so that this is a piece of Villany that cannot be punish'd too severely, In the last place, there must be care taken that it be duly distributed, and not wasted, for if you trust to the Sergeants, they will always take for double the number of Soldiers that they have in their Companies, and therefore it is necessary that every eight days, the Commissary-General of the Provisions have exact Rolls of all the Soldiers in the Army, Signed by the General, that he may distribute his Bread accordingly: And further, they who rob Sutlers, or others, who bring Provisions to the Camp, must be condignly punish'd, and the price of all things regulated, that the Soldiers be not exacted upon. When you are at a Siege, and well entrench'd, and the only hopes of making you raise it, consists in cutting off your Provisions, you must have the Foresight to cause so much to be brought into your Camp, as you
judge

judge necessary for the time that you shall spend in taking the place as *Cæsar* did before *Alexia*. There are abundance of Regulations necessary in this matter, to prevent such Abuses as may happen, which I omit because of their length, they being moreover of such sort as change according to place and occasion, and all of them having a Tendency to make Provisions abound, and to prevent Dearth in an Army.

C H A P. XVII.

*Of the General Officers in an Army,
and their Functions.*

THERE is nothing more necessary in an Army, than to have the Officers well regulated, that every one may know whom he is to Command, and whom he ought to Obey : But not finding that any Man hath made an Absolute Decision on that Head, I have here exhibited a Project how that Affair ought to be established,

The *Captain-General* ought to have an Absolute Power, which is not to be shar'd with any Person whatever. For in War more than any thing else, the Command ought to be entire, and it is a very ill Method to have *Generals* by the Day, by the Week, or by the Month. Whenever the *Romans* practis'd this they found it unsuccessful.

Next to him there must be a *Lieutenant-General*, or *Field Marshal General*, who ought to take care to see the *General's* Commands put in Execution, in as absolute a Manner as himself, so that he may relieve him; it's hard for the *General* to do all, especially on a March, because of necessity there must be a Person of great Authority at the Head of the Army, whom all the other Officers will obey without any Dispute. Sometimes there is both a *Lieutenant-General*, and *Field Marshal General*, but when those Offices are possessed by two, it many times breeds Confusion in an Army, and occasions that which we ought to avoid, for they never agree in their Function. The *Field-Marshal* in performing his Office is to distribute the *General's* Commands to all the other Officers,
March

March on the Vant-Guard, and take care of Quarters and Encampments, so that I don't see what the *Lieutenant-General* shall have to do, if he don't either Intrench upon the other, or serve as an Instrument to convey the *General's* Mind to him, and therefore I conclude, that one only of those Officers is needful.

This being finish'd, I divide all the Functions of the Army into four principal parts, *viz.* The *Cavalry*, *Infantry*, *Artillery* and *Provisions*, and Treat of them one after another.

The *Cavalry* is a Body which many times Quarters apart from the Army, and requires a Commander in Chief, whom all the rest ought to obey, and therefore he should be of Eminent Quality, or of so great Vertue and Experience that the other General Officers may Obey him without scruple; for it is the *Cavalry* where most of those who are Rich and best Born, and consequently the hardest to Command do Engage themselves, and therefore his Authority ought not to be shar'd, and because on a March the Horse are usually on the Van and the Rear, that we are often constrain'd to divide them
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in two Bodies, for the Conveniency of Quarters; and that on the Day of Battle they are upon both Wings, it is necessary that there be also a *Lieutenant-General*, who is likewise to be a Man of great Authority. There must also be a third Great Officer, who for the most part is called a *Commissary-General*, and he is to distribute the Orders, keep a List of the Guards, Convoys, and other Functions, carry the *Field Marshal's* Orders to the General of the Horse, and then to the Quarter-Masters of Companies, who come from all Quarters to receive them.

All the *Cavalry* ought to be divided in Companies, whereof Regiments are formed not according to the Manner of the *Infantry* under the Charge of a *Camp-Master*, but only to maintain the Order of the Quarters and Battle. In forming Regiments, four or five Companies, with one of Carabines, are joyn'd together, and the Eldest Captain Commands this Body; and so all the *Cavalry* are divided, which makes it evident, That a General of the Carabines is altogether a needless Officer; for the Carabines cannot form a Body, because their way of Fighting does not admit

mit of it, neither were they Instituted for any other end but to serve the Horse either in their Quartering, Discovering the Enemy, Skirmishing with them, falling on their Flank in time of Battle, Harassing those who pursue in a Retreat, or to prevent their own Mens being so serv'd when they pursue. In effect good Carabines mixt with Horse are of excellent use, but all alone they are good for nothing.

If there be more Quarters than General Officers, the Eldest Captain Commands in that Quarter, and has the Eldest Quarter-Master with him; so that the General of the Horse giving his Orders to the Commissary-General and Quarter-Master-General, and they to the Quarter-Masters who come for them from other Quarters (where the like Order is observ'd) the Commands are carried without Confusion, pass through the hands of few Persons, and when any Defect happens, it is easie to find out how it came.

The *Infantry* is the most solid Body of an Army, and the Artillery and Provisions do always Lodge with them. There is no difference among the Companies as
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in the Cavalry, but they are all of one fort, *viz.* half Musquetcers, and half Pike-men; several Companies make a Regiment, which hath its Collonel, and several Regiments make a Body, commonly call'd a Brigade. The Army is usually divided into three Bodies, *viz.* The Vant-Guard, the Main Battle, and the Reer-Guard: Every Brigade ought to have a Brigadier, Sarjeant-Major, and Quarter-Master. The former is to go and receive his Orders from the Field-Marshal, and deliver them to his Brigadier, and then he is to give the Word to the Sarjeant-Majors of Regiments, the latter is to give Orders to the Quarter-Master of each Regiment where he is to Quarter his Regiment, and how much Ground is necessary to Encamp them, and they impart the Orders to the Harbingers of each Company who afterwards lodge them. If there be a Collonel General of all the Horse, he may take upon him the intire Government of them, but in an Army he is to Command no more than one Brigade, otherwise we cannot establish the Order which is here proposed. And hence there are several Nations who
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don't think a Collonel General of the Infantry necessary, but content themselves with particular Collonels of every Regiment, who are subject to no other Commands but those of the General, or Field-Marshal General.

The *Artillery* ought to have a General, a Lieutenant-General, a Quarter-Master and other Officers; and because all Pioneers, Miners, Engineers, Masters of Work, Forge-Men, Carpenters, Waggoners and other Workmen depend upon him, I think that a Captain ought to be appointed over each sort, either Chosen from amongst the Commissaries of the Artillery, or other Persons; that I may address my self to them when I have occasion for such People. The Quarter-Master ought to go every Evening and receive the Orders of the Field-Marshal.

There should also be a General over the *Provisions*, and he ought to have his Lieutenant, his Quarter-Master, and other Officers. His Quarter-Master ought likewise to go every Evening for the Field-Marshal's Orders.

Then

Then follows the way how Orders ought to be distributed. The Field-Marshal receives them from the General, and then goes to his Quarter, whether the Commissary of the Horse comes to receive them for the Horse, and the Sarjeant of the Battle for the *Infantry*, and he imparts them to the Sarjeant-Majors of Brigades. The Quarter-Master of the Artillery, and the Quarter-Master of the Provisions come also to the Field-Marshal, who by speaking with those four Persons, distributes his Orders throughout the whole Army. But all Orders and Commands ought to be given in Writing.

The Field-Marshal General, the General of the Artillery, the Judge, the Pay-Master General, the General of the Provisions, the Quarter-Master General, the Sarjeant of Battle and Provost General ought always to Lodge in the General's Quarters.

If the Army Encamp altogether, the Quarter-Master General assigns to each Body a convenient piece of Ground which is afterwards subdivided by other Officers design'd for that end.

On the Day of Battle the Field-Marshal General assigns each Body its place, and then the Sarjeant of the Battle draws up the Infantry in Battle Array.

The Field-Marshal ought to have three or four Assistants, call'd *Aides de Camp*, to carry extraordinary Commands, but they must not pretend to Command any Captain, if they have not been formerly either Collonels or Captains of Horse.

The Serjeant of Battle ought to Command the Collonels, but that they may the more readily obey him, he ought to have been taken from amongst themselves, and none should be advanc'd to that Charge, but such as have been Collonels, and so the Sarjeant-Majors of Brigades ought to be chosen from amongst the Sarjeant-Majors of Regiments. Things being thus regulated and establish'd, Commands will become very easie, and no Man will be able to lay his own fault upon another, because it will immediately appear where it lies, so that this obliges every Man to do that which he is commanded exactly.

C H A P. XVIII.

*Of Attacking Countries according to
their Strength and Situation.*

AN Army being formed, must either be employ'd in the Conquest of a New Countrey, or the defence of their own. We shall begin with the first. The Prince who acts offensively ought to be the strongest, or take the advantage of a Country when it is divided, or else be Invited by a Party, otherwise he acts rashly. If the Country which he attacks be large and open. he ought at first to endeavour to bring his Enemy to a General Battle, or some great Conflict that by the Reputation of his Arms he may terrifie his Enemies. If the Country be Mountainous, full of Rivers and Ditches, covered with Woods, or abounding with Fortresses. It will be hard to force the Enemy to a Battle, so that in this case you must fall to Besieging, and render
your

your self Master of the Country by degrees and if you would make progress in this sort of War, you must at least have two Armies, one to make Head against the Enemy, and the other to carry on your Work without interruption, for you will find it very hard to push on a Siege, while a great Army is encamp't near you, which from time to time may cut off your Provisions. If the Entry into the Country be very difficult, and the Passes by which you can invade it, few, you must force one before you go any further, and when you have done that, it must be fortify'd. You must ascertain the method of having Provisions. lest the Enemy should burn or withdraw these of his own Country. If you be invited by any Faction, it will be of singular advantage, for by their means you may be inform'd of the Situation of the Country, and the defects of their Fortifications. They will also be sure to furnish you with Spies, and give you punctual notice of what passes amongst the Enemies. You must take special care to treat that Faction well, and to engage them by degrees in such Actions as will make them irresconcilable

to their Prince ; but if you perceive that they have still a respect to him, and only make War against him by halves ; you are oblig'd to be jealous of them, and to keep the Reins in your own hands, for whether it be the fear of unavoidable Ruine, or the hopes of a favourable Reconciliation that prevents their running to the last Extreme, the one and the other are equally dangerous ; and you ought to take special care , that an accommodation be not made up to your disadvantage. And therefore if they decline at the first to engage in such things as may render them unpardonable , it is not for your Interest to joyn with them, except they give you very good Hostages. You must also Treat those who submit with the height of Humanity , Clemency and Bounty, and such as stand out with the greatest severity, for your Munificence to the one, and Austerity to the other, are the properest methods to acquire their Obedience ; One Town taken and roughly Treated, and another which Surrenders willingly, being kindly handled, will open the way to a Dozen more : Whereas on the contrary, if one be taken by force,

force, and yet spar'd, and another which Surrenders willingly, be hardly used, it must prevent the taking of many others. whence I conclude, that the Conqueror ought to value himself upon his *Word* and *Promise*, let it be in Clemency or in Severity.

C H A P. XIX.

Of the Defence of States and Countries, according to their Strength and Situation.

FOR the better handling of this matter, we must distinguish them into Three sorts, Little, Midling, and Powerful States. The Little ones subsists only by the jea'ousie which their Neighbours have of one another, because if one should attack a little State, another would defend it. Yet this is but a trembling and dubious condition; for if the one shall find themselves in a condition to attack them, the others wont be able

to defend them. The Counsels of Princes and States are not always so equally managed, but that oftentimes one prevails against another; and besides that Inconvenience, there is this further, that sometimes they agree to divide the Prey, so that Little States which are not strong enough to defend themselves, are always in great hazard, and they must be very complaisant if they give their Neighbors no pretext to Quarrel with them. The only way left them, is to have a Place or two very well fortified with Arms, and Money enough to defend them; so as they who would prevent the growth of those who have a mind to attack them, may have time enough to come to their Relief; for if there be no means to resist the Country will be taken before they can have help; and besides that, the probability of Conquering you easily, gives the Enemy an inclination to attack you, you will find abundance of people readier to succor you, than to Re-conquer your Country, because the First is easie with an equal Force, but the other very hard, without a numerous Army. To which may be added, That you are oftentimes in as great hazard from him that Recon-

quers your Country as a Friend, lest he retain it, as you are from him who seiz'd it, as your Enemy, or if he restore it again, its for the most part on such hard Terms, that you have nothing left but the shadow of Sovereignty. Happy are they who meet with Princes so good and generous, as to restore them to their Lost Country, with that same Authority and Liberty, that they had before, for such Examples are very rare.

For middling States, I suppose a Prince or a Republick, which for their Defence can entertain an Army of 20000 Foot and 3000 Horse, with all the necessary Equipage. If their Country be of difficult Access, and that it cannot be entred but by certain Passes and Mountains, which are Guarded and Fortify'd, they have a very great advantage, but those who have trusted too much to those things, grown secure and neglected other Defences, have found themselves cheated and undone on that side, where they thought themselves most secure. If you be encompass'd with the Sea, it is a fine Ditch, nevertheless, a potent Enemy will find a way to make a Descent upon your Island; if you be surrounded with Marsh-

es and Rivers, he will still find means to pass'em, chiefly now when there is Artillery to favour his passage, so that the surest way is to found your security upon your own strength, viz. A good Army, and strong Fortresses. I mention both together, because an Army without Fortresses, being weak, and not daring to hazard Battle, leaves the Country exposed to the Enemy, who maintain themselves at your Expence, and will in fine ruine you; and Fortresses without an Army cannot preserve you any longer, than while your Magazines of Provisions Last. But both of them being proportioned with Judgment, may make a great Resistance. But herein you must not be Governed by the Humour of the People, who, without considering the situation of their Towns, or the publick Good, when they see their Neighbors fortifying themselves, would imitate them. It being equally dangerous to have more Fortresses than you can Garison, as to have none at all, and indeed I should love the last better than the first, for by hazarding a Battle, your Enemy has at least halfe the Fear, but by the other way, you must certainly per-
rish,

rish, without being able to hope for any thing, more than to prolong your Ruine; for the desire which you have to preserve all your Fortresses, by putting Great Garisons in them, renders you unable to keep an Army in the Field, and then the spoiling of two or three Harvests forces you to surrender on your Enemies Terms, I know that there are some who build upon this Foundation, that when all the principal Places in a Country are fortify'd, the Provisions are carried into the Fortresses, so that if an Enemy stay there he must starve; and if they only pass through the Country, they do no great hurt, so that things being thus ordered, it's in a manner impossible for them to make a long Siege. To which I answer, That Fortresses were principally design'd for defence of the Weak, that so a few people might resist a greater number, and if you have a great number of Fortresses, and Garisons, such as are requir'd in great Fortify'd Towns, you must have a greater number of Soldiers, than they that come to attack you, otherwise you will not be able to provide all of them with Garisons sufficient to sustain a Siege. And

if you be strongest without any Garison, you may preserve your Country by keeping the Field. There is' also this inconvenience in fortifying great Towns, that you thereby render them so proud, that they will not acknowledge their Sovereigns, but upon their own Terms, and when they receive the least damage by War, the inhabitants are rather willing to change their Masters, than see their Wealth ruin'd. So that I conclude, that your Fortresses must not be so many as to prevent your keeping the Field, and those you have, must be so well fortified and provided, that they may be able to make a great Resistance, and so well placed, that they may curb the great Towns, and secure your Frontiers, so as an Enemy may not be willing to leave a Place behind him, which may intercept his Provisions, if he cannot, by Correspondence, or otherwise possess himself of some principal Town, which may serve as a Seat for carrying on the War in the Country. Those things being thus disposed, you must consider what sort of Enemy it is who attacks you, if they be Confederates, it is easier to dis-unite them,
than

than if the War were carried on by one
frank action. And in this case it is an
easy way to create a mistrust amongst
them in feigning to have intelligence
with some one of them, and by shewing
more respect and less Animosity against
that one, than the rest: It will give oc-
casion of Jealousie. It is also a good way
to give diversion to one or other of their
Countries. It being very difficult for ma-
ny Sovereign Powers, united together to
remain so any long time without Disgusts,
Misunderstandings, Envies, yea, and al-
so Enmities, because of their different
Humours and Interests, so that an Ene-
my depending upon one only Head, is
much more redoubtable. And because
you may be attackt with more or less vi-
gor, I shall speak one word of that. If
it be by a force, not very much superior
to your own, you may preserve your
Country without deserting it, and with
your Army and Fortresses, consume your
Enemy, by incommoding him in his Pro-
visions, and intrenching always so near
him, as to prevent his undertaking any
Siege of importance; for if an Assailant
does not gain, he loses, and it is impossi-
ble

ble for him to subsist in a Country which he would Conquer, if he don't take firm footing at first, and strengthen himself by taking some considerable Place. But if you be attackt with a Force very much above your own, in that case you must quit the Field, and burn all the Provisions which you cannot carry into your Fortresses, and all the Towns and Villages which you cannot keep, for it's better to preserve your self in a ruined Country, than to save it for your Enemy. And it is in this case, that a Prince, to procure to himself the Name of Merciful (as he thinks) to his People, who on all such occasions desert him, becomes cruel to himself; But it is rather Irresolution, and want of Courage, which prevails with us to do this, than any true Compassion of anothers Misery, like that of the Emperor *Otho*, who when the first Disgrace befell him, durst not hazard a Battle again, tho his Forces were intire, and he who had no pity upon the Emperor *Galba* in his decrepid old Age, tho he had design'd him as his Successor in the Empire, to obtain which, he left no manner of Villany unpractis'd, would persuade

swade Posterity. that the aversion which he had to the shedding of *Roman* Blood, prevail'd with him to spare it, by killing himself; and thus we many times endeavour to cover our Vices, by that Virtue which resembles them most. But it being a certain Truth, that there can be no publick Good, without some prejudice to particular Persons; so a Prince can never dis-intangle himself from a perillous Enterprize. if he would please all, and the greatest and most ordinary Faults which are committed in matters of State and War, proceed from our being carried away by this complaisance, of which we repent when we cannot help it. But to prevent such a Storm, we must lay it down as a fundamental Maxim of our own preservation, not to suffer our powerfullest Neighbour to increase in strength, for it is better to offend him, to prevent his putting himself in a condition to ruine you, than to let him grow, for fear of offending him. It being an undoubted Truth, that we cannot preserve our Liberty against a Conqueror by Complements, but by meer strength.

It remains, that I speak of potent States, who have strength enough of their own, without depending upon others, and Money, and every thing sufficient for entertaining the War. But there are few such, and they have nothing to do but to be ware of danger from themselves. Because one single Enemy is not strong enough to attack them, and it will be difficult for divers Princes to League together in any such design, nor to subsist long together, if they do. However. I shall speak one word of it. Great States do either lie altogether, or scattered in different places, Those who have all their Force united, may either attack or defend themselves more powerfully than those who are scattered, because they can carry their whole Force where need requires, with more diligence and ease, and less expence. The others do alarm, and give occasion of jealousy to more People, because they border upon more distinct States, but if either the one or the other be attacked, they must make use of the Defences before-mentioned; I shall only add, that they ought to have none but a few Fortresses upon the Frontiers, and those ve-
ry

ry good, but none in the heart of the Country, as having more reason to fear Civil than Foreign Wars. Except it be in the time of Civil Wars; Great States are not in hazard of being Attackt, but this is the best method to pluck up the root of them, and deprive them of that by which they subsist.

But further, you must never perpetuate Governments, neither in Families, nor to any Man during Life; But the principal and best Remedy against a Civil War, is to entertain one abroad, which banishes idleness, keeps all People employ'd, and particularly satisfies restless and ambitious Spirits; it prevents Luxury, renders your People Warlike, and keeps up your Reputation so much amongst your Neighbors, that it makes you the Arbitrator of all their differences. It's true, that this Maxim is only to be practis'd by this last sort of States, for tho' it be necessary for them, it is hurtful to lesser States, who ought to avoid all sorts of War, for not being strong enough to make advantage of it, they run a hazard of becoming a prey to the more powerful.

C H A P. XX.

*Of the Methods of assuring a
Conquest.*

A Sovereign Prince is more capable of making Great and speedy Conquests, than a Republick, because being secret in his Councils, daring in his Resolutions, speedy in his Execution, and in no hazard of being contradicted by any body; he will make more Conquests in Ten years, than a Republick which does not keep their Secrets so well, are long a coming to a Resolution; restrain the Authority of their Generals, and always contradict his Orders can do in a Hundred; and on the other hand, a Republick which Governs always according to their Maxims, is not subject to the Faults of a single Person, and their Government suffers no alteration by the death of any of its Members, but preserves longer and better that which they conquer,

quer, than a Prince does, who many times has a Successor, as remarkable for Vice, as he himself was for Virtue. However, I shall here lay down the true Maxims, how both the one and the other may assure their Conquests, which consist in two things, *viz.* to take away both the Inclination and Power from those whom you have Conquered to Revolt. As to the first, if you Conquer a Free People, it is certain that you shall not be able to take away their desire of recovering their Liberty, at least so long as those who have liv'd at freedom are alive; If they be Subjects of a Prince or State, and do nothing but change Masters, they'll love to live under him who Treats them best, and therefore you must always begin by gentle Methods, and Grant the strongest assurance that can be to those whom you have Conquered, both for Life and Fortunes; for if your own natural Subjects don't find themselves assur'd as to both those things, you have reason to fear that they will Revolt, and much more those whom you have newly Conquer'd. It being the Law of Nature impressed upon all living Creatures, even
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the very least of Animals, to endeavour their own preservation ; To which, Man who is endued with Reason, ought to add the preservation of his Honour and Fortune, which many times he prefers to Life it self. A Prince then ought to Reign with exact Justice, maintain the oppressed in his Right, abstain himself from all manner of Violence, either as to Women or Estates; for without doing so, it's impossible to keep a Conquer'd People in Obedience, You must also maintain them as much as is possible in the Form of their Government, and exclude none of them from arriving at Offices, Dignities and Honours, which they should be suffered to possess, without prejudice to their own Safety ; and if he be a Prince who makes this Conquest, the best way to assure himself of it is, to reside among 'em as often as he can, because his Presence prevents abundance of Disorders; the Splendor of his Court, imprints a kind of Veneration upon the Spirits of the People, and he gains the Citizens and Tradesmen where he Lives.

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If it be a Republick which cannot change the Seat of their Government, they must nevertheless, take care that the Governours whom they send thither should live in Splendor, for the People are often more taken with the appearance of things, than the reality. These are the Methods which do insensibly bring new Conquered People to Obedience. But because this is not sufficient, and that oftentimes a Facility to Revolt, without punishment, puts them in mind to do it; It is necessary to Guard your self beforehand with all manner of necessary Security, which consists in having Arms and Fortresses in your Possession, I don't mean that you should disarm the People altogether, for if possible, that must be avoided, but you ought to assure your self of the great Towns by good Fortresses, to have Arsenals in different places, and not all in one, and to leave no Town or Castle, except your Garison'd Fortresses, in a capacity of resisting 100 Cannon shot. There is this last Method of all, that the Ancients did often put in practice to good purpose, and which I approve mightily, but it is not now in use, *viz.* To establish

Colonies, and transport the People of one Country into another; for besides, its being a great Curb, to keep a Conquer'd Country in Obedience, you hereby Compensate abundance of Soldiers, who have done you good Service. I don't think their Reason valid, who condemn this Method as cruel, and against the Rules of Charity. On the contrary, I think that the ways commonly made use of, *viz.* keeping the People so low, that they have nothing left but their Lives, and excluding them from all hopes of arriving to any Honour in their own Country, is far more cruel. For my own part, I speak ingenuously, I had rather be chas'd from my own Country to another, where I, or mine might have reasonable hopes of bettering our Conditions, than to stay in my own when depriv'd of that hope; there being nothing so hard in the World, as to deprive a Man of his Hopes; it being that which in this World, obliges him to undertake every thing, that he may enjoy the Goods of this Life, and the Hopes of what he shall enjoy in the Life to come, furnishes him with Constancy, to suffer every thing here. So that there

is nothing which does so much distinguish a Man from a Beast, nor the Regenerate Man from one that is Sensual, as *Hope*. Whence I conclude, that you must never deprive a Man of hopes of obtaining a better Condition, than that which he enjoys, lest you throw him into despair.

C H A P. XXI.

*How we must proceed to succour our
Friends and Allies.*

ONE of the most Honourable Actions which a Prince can do, and by which he acquires the greatest Reputation, is to succour his Allies in their necessities, but it is a thing which is oftentimes very difficult. When we make War our selves, we chuse our advantages, and take our Times and Measures according to our own Pleasure and Ability; but it is not the same in succouring an Allie, whom you must assist with all the difficulties,

and Inconveniencies that occur, If his Country joyn to yours, and that there is nothing to prevent your assisting of him with your whole Force, you can have no pretence to decline it, if it be not that you are afraid of his Enemy, and are not willing to offend him, which is both a cowardly and an injudicious excuse; for by this means you shall not avoid the danger which the ruine of your Neighbour will bring upon you; it being much better to resist together, than suffer your selves to be defeated one after another; But if it be an Ally who is separated from you by other *Princes and States* which often happens) and that you must encounter many difficulties to enter his Country, you ought then to consider well, in what manner you are to succor him, for if the States betwixt you refuse you passage, and that you must fight them before you can succor your Allie; it is to be feared that you will not be able to assist him in time; and if your Neighbour, either for fear of you, or of him who attacks your Allie, offer you free passage, you cannot accept of it safely, except he put such places into your hands as are necessary to secure your Return; and if
this

this be refused, you ought not to go any further. But if your Allies Enemy have Dominions near unto you, which you can easily attack, you must do it briskly, and this assistance which is given by Diversi-
on, is in my Opinion the surest, and that which prospers best, because you do it with all your strength and conveniency; and ordinarily he whom you attack is unprovided, and he who attacks another Country, does usually carry with him his best Officers and Soldiers. But if all those Methods fail you, there is nothing left but Money, wherewith you can assist your Allie, which many times is not sufficient to Save him.

C H A P. XXII.

*Whether it be best for a Great Prince
to manage the War in Person, or
by a Deputy.*

IT's convenient in this place, to Discourse, Whether a Prince ought to manage his Wars in Person, or by a Deputy, because there being difference of Practice, as to this Matter, every Man brings his Reasons for his Opinion. Those who are against his managing the War in Person, alledge, that by leaving his Country, he opens the Door to Com-motions, and deprives himself of the means to prevent it; that it is more necessary for him to preserve Peace at home, than to make War abroad, and that nothing can so much contribute thereunto, as his Presence, which puts a Curb upon the Mutinous; That keeping Peace at home,

he may the better give Orders as to the Affairs abroad, that Greater and more Incurable Dangers arise when the Prince is Engaged in Person to be out of his own Country than when he is in it. If he receive any Check in Person when he is far from home, those who are Mutinous will be the more bold to make Innovations, and every one will be ready to shake off their Obedience. If he be Kill'd, his Subjects are Confounded, his Enemies Emboldened, and make great Advantages of it. If he be Taken, it is still worse, for none being able to declare himself Prince, and the Grandees making their own advantage of his Calamity, put all things in such confusion, that nothing can be done with Authority in the State, because those who have seiz'd the Government, Tyrannize over others who may also have Pretensions to it, and will oftentimes rather call in the Common Enemy, than Obey their Companions. To all this they add, That a Prince, if Taken, cannot recover his Liberty, without giving great Advantages to his Enemy, which may turn to the remediless.

prejudice of himself, and his Dominions so that all things being weighed, they conclude that the Inconveniences of the Prince's Hazarding himself in War, are greater than those of Managing the same by his Lieutenants. This Opinion is chiefly maintain'd by those of the Long Robe, who are Naturally Enemies to Men of War, and because they maintain their own Authority best in time of Peace, they not only dissuade the Prince from making War in Person, but also advise him rather to suffer any sort of Ignominy, than to engage in it otherwise. And with them joyn Flatterers, Pimps, and such others as are the Plague of Princes, and in time of Peace entertain them with such things as incline them to all manner of Luxury, and make them believe that their People were created only for them, and not they for the People; that to Debauch a Woman is more Honourable than to Conquer a Province, that there is more Industry and Glory in Marshalling a Feast than a Battle; that Labour is only fit for Porters; that Great Kings ought to do all things without

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stirring themselves, which is the ordinary Road to the Ruine of Empires and Kingdoms.

Those who advise the Prince to make War in Person, alledge that the Command of an Army is such a Relishing Bit, that it ought not to be committed to any other, but in cases of great necessity, because if one would acquit himself well in such a Charge, he must be very absolute, and oftentimes Generals dont contain themselves within the bounds of their Duty, especially when the Prince does not do his, who in this case is Naturally Envious of another Man's Glory, and can't endure to hear of the brave Actions of his Generals, although they succeed to his Advantage; and in this Humour those who Govern Affairs will Entertain him, because they are affraid of being Supplanted themselves by the Eminent Vertue of others, and hence proceeds the bad Success of many brave Designs, though well undertaken, which are made to miscarry for want of Money or Victuals, by restraining the General's Authority, or setting those over him

him who oppose and rather setter than assist him. And then if things don't succeed according to expectation, the blame is thrown upon the Innocent and the Culpable Triumph. And thus Great Princes who make War by their Lieutenants, will be serv'd. The Reputation of a Prince who is a good General himself, is quite another thing than that of a Prince who hath good Generals; the first is formidable in himself, but the last only by another; the first cannot betray himself, but the last may have his Generals Corrupted; the first knows how to make choice of those who are fit for War, but the last has good Soldiers only by Chance, the Authority of the Prince is neither subject to Envy nor Controll, seeing he is Master himself, and accountable to no other, but he who is General for another, is liable to a perpetual Jealousie, and happy if he escape free. And to prevent Civil Wars, the best way is to imploy those who are Stoutest and most Turbulent in Forreign Service, where they will find opportunity to glut their Ambition. You must also

also be continually in a Warlike Posture, and that will cool the Courage of the hottest, and the Prince must always be at the Head of his Army, so that none may be able to incline it against him. They a ledge further, that never any Prince did found a large Empire but such as made War themselves in Person, nor did any ever lose one but by managing the War by Lieutenants. So that Princes are at Liberty to make their own Choice of either of the two, if he be a Poltron who contents himself to be admir'd by his Servants, delights only in sensuality, and lays aside the Office of a King for that of a Scoundrel, he'll never take the Advice of Commanding his Armies in Person; but if he be a Wise Prince who Loves his Repose that he may Govern his People in Justice, he will not omit to instruct himself in the Mystery of War, and to be prepared for it, that if there be occasion he needs not Entrust the Command of his Army to another. But if he be a Generous Prince who is Ambitious of Glory, and would imitate those Great Men who are still alive though 2000 Years after their
their

their Death, and whose Venerable Names do honour those that are call'd by them, he will doubtless chuse the Myſtery of War for his Principal Study, that he may be expert therein, and have no need to depend upon another for the Conduct of his Armys, which will be his own Delight, that being the only true pleasure which contents the Soul, is particular to Man, and common to Great Men, for Bodily Pleasure has more of the Beast than Man, so that he who addicts himself altogether thereunto is worse than the brute Beast.

C H A P. XXIII.

Of Reputation.

IT cannot be imagin'd of what Service the Reputation of a General may be, and how hard it is to preserve it, for if after having acquir'd the Esteem of being a Wise General, and a Man of Great Conduct, you would preserve it by Prudence, they will say that you are become a Coward, and if by hazarding a Battle, you receive a Check, they will call you Rash, so that there is no Function in the World more liable to blame, than that of a General; and happy is that Captain who keeps up his Reputation to the last; which so long as it continues has Marvellous Effects. For having once acquir'd the Reputation of being Fortunate in War, the Soldiers believe that he cannot be beat, and March with as much Confidence to Battle on his Word,
as

as if there were no danger, being perswaded that he never Commands them to Fight, but when he is assur'd of the Victory, which encourages them so much, that they Fight with abundance of more Resolution. And further, the Enemy when they are Engag'd with such a Man, Fight always in fear, as being perswaded that they shall be beat. There are a Thousand Ancient and Modern Exemples of this Truth. When *Alcibiades* his Army was Defeated (though he was absent) the *Athenians* did verily believe that it was by his own Consent.

The very Fame of *Alexander*, or *Cesar's* Arrival, though but with a small Force, hath several times made Provinces render, and Armies fly. The very Reputation of King *Henry IV.* who was known in the Battle of *Fountain Francoise*, where he Arriv'd but the Day before, and in a manner by Post made the *Spaniards* quit *Burgundy*. I have my self perceived that the *Dauphinois* had that Opinion, that the *Constable d'Esdiquieres* could not be Beat. And as this Reputation is of great use to a General when he hath acquir'd it, so that of being unsuccessful in War, is his
Great

Great Misfortune, for its impossible that ever he can be sure of his Soldjers if they have that Opinion of him, and therefore the Commander of an Army ought to make it his principal Aim to have a good beginning, and then to omit nothing which may tend to the Preservation of his Honour, when it is acquir'd, but resolve rather to Die Gloriously in some Great Action, than to lead a dishonourable Life after the Commission of an Act of Cowardice; for as the Art of War is that which of all others brings most Honour to the Man who acquits himself well, so it brings the greatest Disgrace upon those who behave themselves ill.

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Covent-Garden, 1694.

Then follows the way how Orders ought to be distributed. The Field-Marshal receives them from the General, and then goes to his Quarter, whether the Commissary of the Horse comes to receive them for the Horse, and the Sarjeant of the Battle for the *Infantry*, and he imparts them to the Sarjeant-Majors of Brigades. The Quarter-Master of the Artillery, and the Quarter-Master of the Provisions come also to the Field-Marshal, who by speaking with those four Persons, distributes his Orders throughout the whole Army. But all Orders and Commands ought to be given in Writing.

The Field-Marshal General, the General of the Artillery, the Judge, the Pay-Master General, the General of the Provisions, the Quarter-Master General, the Sarjeant of Battle and Provost General ought always to Lodge in the General's Quarters.

If the Army Encamp altogether, the Quarter-Master General assigns to each Body a convenient piece of Ground which is afterwards subdivided by other Officers design'd for that end.

On the Day of Battle the Field-Marshal General assigns each Body its place, and then the Sarjeant of the Battle draws up the Infantry in Battle Array.

The Field-Marshal ought to have three or four Assistants, call'd *Aides de Camp*, to carry extraordinary Commands, but they must not pretend to Command any Captain, if they have not been formerly either Collonels or Captains of Horse.

The Serjeant of Battle ought to Command the Collonels, but that they may the more readily obey him, he ought to have been taken from amongst themselves, and none should be advanc'd to that Charge, but such as have been Collonels, and so the Sarjeant-Majors of Brigades ought to be chosen from amongst the Sarjeant-Majors of Regiments. Things being thus regulated and establish'd, Commands will become very easie, and no Man will be able to lay his own fault upon another, because it will immediately appear where it lies, so that this obliges every Man to do that which he is commanded exactly.

C H A P. XVIII.

*Of Attacking Countries according to
their Strength and Situation.*

AN Army being formed, must either be imploy'd in the Conquest of a New Countrey, or the defence of their own. We shall begin with the first. The Prince who acts offensively ought to be the strongest, or take the advantage of a Country when it is divided, or else be Invited by a Party, otherwise he acts rashly. If the Country which he attacks be large and open, he ought at first to endeavour to bring his Enemy to a General Battle, or some great Conflict that by the Reputation of his Arms he may terrifie his Enemies. If the Country be Mountainous, full of Rivers and Ditches, covered with Woods, or abounding with Fortresses. It will be hard to force the Enemy to a Battle, so that in this case you must fall to Besieging, and render
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your self Master of the Country by degrees and if you would make progress in this sort of War, you must at least have two Armies, one to make Head against the Enemy, and the other to carry on your Work without interruption, for you will find it very hard to push on a Siege, while a great Army is encampt near you, which from time to time may cut off your Provisions. If the Entry into the Country be very difficult, and the Passes by which you can invade it, few, you must force one before you go any further, and when you have done that, it must be fortify'd. You must ascertain the method of having Provisions. lest the Enemy should burn or withdraw those of his own Country. If you be invited by any Faction, it will be of singular advantage, for by their means you may be inform'd of the Situation of the Country, and the defects of their Fortifications. They will also be sure to furnish you with Spies, and give you punctual notice of what passes amongst the Enemies. You must take special care to treat that Faction well, and to engage them by degrees in such Actions as will make them irreconcilable

to their Prince ; but if you perceive that they have still a respect to him, and only make War against him by halves ; you are oblig'd to be jealous of them, and to keep the Reins in your own hands, for whether it be the fear of unavoidable Ruine, or the hopes of a favourable Reconciliation that prevents their running to the last Extreme, the one and the other are equally dangerous ; and you ought to take special care , that an accommodation be not made up to your disadvantage. And therefore if they decline at the first to engage in such things as may render them unpardonable , it is not for your Interest to joyn with them, except they give you very good Hostages. You must also Treat those who submit with the height of Humanity, Clemency and Bounty, and such as stand out with the greatest severity, for your Munificence to the one, and Austerity to the other, are the properest methods to acquire their Obedience ; One Town taken and roughly Treated, and another which Surrenders willingly, being kindly handled, will open the way to a Dozen more : Whereas on the contrary, if one be taken by force,

force, and yet spar'd, and another which Surrenders willingly, be hardly used, it must prevent the taking of many others. whence I conclude, that the Conqueror ought to value himself upon his *Word* and *Promise*, let it be in Clemency or in Severity.

C H A P. XIX.

Of the Defence of States and Countries, according to their Strength and Situation.

FOR the better handling of this matter, we must distinguish them into Three sorts, Little, Midling, and Powerful States. The Little ones subsists only by the jea'ousie which their Neighbours have of one another, because if one should attack a little State, another would defend it. Yet this is but a trembling and dubious condition; for if the one shall find themselves in a condition to attack them, the others wont be able

to defend them. The Counsels of Princes and States are not always so equally managed, but that oftentimes one prevails against another; and besides that Inconvenience, there is this further, that sometimes they agree to divide the Prey, so that Little States which are not strong enough to defend themselves, are always in great hazard, and they must be very complaisant if they give their Neighbors no pretext to Quarrel with them. The only way left them, is to have a Place or two very well fortified with Arms, and Money enough to defend them; so as they who would prevent the growth of those who have a mind to attack them, may have time enough to come to their Relief; for if there be no means to resist, the Country will be taken before they can have help; and besides that, the probability of Conquering you easily, gives the Enemy an inclination to attack you, you will find abundance of people readier to succor you, than to Re-conquer your Country, because the First is easie with an equal Force, but the other very hard, without a numerous Army. To which may be added, That you are oftentimes in as great hazard from him that Recon-

quers your Country as a Friend, lest he retain it, as you are from him who seiz'd it, as your Enemy, or if he restore it again, its for the most part on such hard Terms, that you have nothing left but the shadow of Sovereignty. Happy are they who meet with Princes so good and generous, as to restore them to their Lost Country, with that same Authority and Liberty, that they had before, for such Examples are very rare.

For midling States, I suppose a Prince or a Republick, which for their Defence can entertain an Army of 20000 Foot and 3000 Horse, with all the necessary Equipage. If their Country be of difficult Access, and that it cannot be entred but by certain Passes and Mountains, which are Guarded and Fortify'd, they have a very great advantage, but those who have trusted too much to those things, grown secure and neglected other Defences, have found themselves cheated and undone on that side, where they thought themselves most secure. If you be encompass'd with the Sea, it is a fine Ditch, nevertheless, a potent Enemy will find a way to make a Descent upon your Island; if you be surrounded with Marit-

es and Rivers, he will still find means to pass'em, chiefly now when there is Artillery to favour his passage, so that the surest way is to found your security upon your own strength, viz. A good Army, and strong Fortresses. I mention both together, because an Army without Fortresses, being weak, and not daring to hazard Battle, leaves the Country exposed to the Enemy, who maintain themselves at your Expence, and will in fine ruine you; and Fortresses without an Army cannot preserve you any longer, than while your Magazines of Provisions Last. But both of them being proportioned with Judgment, may make a great Resistance. But herein you must not be Governed by the Humour of the People, who, without considering the situation of their Towns, or the publick Good, when they see their Neighbors fortifying themselves, would imitate them. It being equally dangerous to have more Fortresses than you can Garrison, as to have none at all, and indeed I should love the last better than the first, for by hazarding a Battle, your Enemy has at least halfe the Fear, but by the other way, you must certainly perish,

rish, without being able to hope for any thing, more than to prolong your Ruine; for the desire which you have to preserve all your Fortresses, by putting Great Garisons in them, renders you unable to keep an Army in the Field, and then the spoiling of two or three Harvests forces you to surrender on your Enemies Terms, I know that there are some who build upon this Foundation, that when all the principal Places in a Country are fortify'd, the Provisions are carried into the Fortresses, so that if an Enemy stay there he must starve; and if they only pass through the Country, they do no great hurt, so that things being thus ordered, it's in a manner impossible for them to make a long Siege. To which I answer, That Fortresses were principally design'd for defence of the Weak, that so a few people might resist a greater number, and if you have a great number of Fortresses, and Garisons, such as are requir'd in great Fortify'd Towns, you must have a greater number of Soldiers, than they that come to attack you, otherwise you will not be able to provide all of them with Garisons sufficient to sustain a Siege. And

if you be strongest without any Garison, you may preserve your Country by keeping the Field. There is also this inconvenience in fortifying great Towns, that you thereby render them so proud, that they will not acknowledge their Sovereigns, but upon their own Terms, and when they receive the least damage by War, the Inhabitants are rather willing to change their Masters, than see their Wealth ruin'd. So that I conclude, that your Fortresses must not be so many as to prevent your keeping the Field, and those you have, must be so well fortified and provided, that they may be able to make a great Resistance, and so well placed, that they may curb the great Towns, and secure your Frontiers, so as an Enemy may not be willing to leave a Place behind him, which may intercept his Provisions, if he cannot, by Correspondence, or otherwise possess himself of some principal Town, which may serve as a Seat for carrying on the War in the Country. Those things being thus disposed, you must consider what sort of Enemy it is who attacks you, if they be Confederates, it is easier to dis-unite them, than

than if the War were carried on by one single Action. And in this case it is an excellent way to create a mistrust amongst them in feigning to have intelligence with some one of them, and by shewing more respect and less Animosity against that one, than the rest; It will give occasion of Jealousie. It is also a good way to give diversion to one or other of their Countries. It being very difficult for many Sovereign Powers, united together to remain so any long time without Disgusts, Misunderstandings, Envies, yea, and also Enmities, because of their different Humours and Interests, so that an Enemy depending upon one only Head, is much more redoubtable. And because you may be attackt with more or less vigor, I shall speak one word of that. If it be by a force, not very much superior to your own, you may preserve your Country without deserting it, and with your Army and Fortresses, consume your Enemy, by incommoding him in his Provisions, and intrenching always so near him, as to prevent his undertaking any Siege of importance; for if an Assailant does not gain, he loses, and it is impossible

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ble for him to subsist in a Country which he would Conquer, if he don't take firm footing at first, and strengthen himself by taking some considerable Place. But if you be attackt with a Force very much above your own, in that case you must quit the Field, and burn all the Provisions which you cannot carry into your Fortresses, and all the Towns and Villages which you cannot keep, for it's better to preserve your self in a ruined Country, than to save it for your Enemy. And it is in this case, that a Prince, to procure to himself the Name of Merciful (as he thinks) to his People, who on all such occasions desert him, becomes cruel to himself; But it is rather Irresolution, and want of Courage, which prevails with us to do this, than any true Compassion of anothers Misery, like that of the Emperor *Otho*, who when the first Disgrace befell him, durst not hazard a Battle again, tho his Forces were intire, and he who had no pity upon the Emperor *Galba* in his decrepid old Age, tho he had design'd him as his Successor in the Empire, to obtain which, he left no manner of Villany unpractis'd, would persuade

swade Posterity. that the aversion which he had to the shedding of *Roman* Blood, prevail'd with him to spare it, by killing himself; and thus we many times endeavour to cover our Vices, by that Virtue which resembles them most. But it being a certain Truth, that there can be no publick Good, without some prejudice to particular Persons; so a Prince can never dis-intangle himself from a perillous Enterprize, if he would please all, and the greatest and most ordinary Faults which are committed in matters of State and War, proceed from our being carried away by this complaisance, of which we repent when we cannot help it. But to prevent such a Storm, we must lay it down as a fundamental Maxim of our own preservation, not to suffer our powerfulllest Neighbour to increase in strength, for it is better to offend him, to prevent his putting himself in a condition to ruine you, than to let him grow, for fear of offending him. It being an undoubted Truth, that we cannot preserve our Liberty against a Conqueror by Complements, but by meer strength.

It remains, that I speak of potent States, who have strength enough of their own, without depending upon others, and Money, and every thing sufficient for entertaining the War. But there are few such, and they have nothing to do but to beware of danger from themselves, because one single Enemy is not strong enough to attack them, and it will be difficult for divers Princes to League together on any such design, nor to subsist long together, if they do. However. I shall speak one word of it. Great States do either lie altogether, or scattered in different places. Those who have all their Force united, may either attack or defend themselves more powerfully than those who are scattered, because they can carry their whole Force where need requires, with more diligence and ease, and less expence. The others do alarm, and give occasion of jealousy to more People, because they border upon more distinct States, but if either the one or the other be attacked, they must make use of the Defences before-mentioned; I shall only add, that they ought to have none but a few Fortresses upon the Frontiers, and those ve-

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ry good, but none in the heart of the Country, as having more reason to fear Civil than Foreign Wars. Except it be in the time of Civil Wars; Great States are not in hazard of being Attackt, but this is the best method to pluck up the root of them, and deprive them of that by which they subsist.

But further, you must never perpetuate Governments, neither in Families, nor to any Man during Life; But the principal and best Remedy against a Civil War, is to entertain one abroad, which banishes idleness, keeps all People employ'd, and particularly satisfies restless and ambitious Spirits; it prevents Luxury, renders your People Warlike, and keeps up your Reputation so much amongst your Neighbors, that it makes you the Arbitrator of all their differences. It's true, that this Maxim is only to be practis'd by this last sort of States, for tho' it be necessary for them, it is hurtful to lesser States, who ought to avoid all sorts of War, for not being strong enough to make advantage of it, they run a hazard of becoming a prey to the more powerful.

C H A P. XX.

*Of the Methods of assuring a
Conquest.*

A Sovereign Prince is more capable of making Great and speedy Conquests, than a Republick, because being secret in his Councils, daring in his Resolutions, speedy in his Execution, and in no hazard of being contradicted by any body; he will make more Conquests in Ten years, than a Republick which does not keep their Secrets so well, are long a coming to a Resolution; restrain the Authority of their Generals, and always contradict his Orders can do in a Hundred; and on the other hand, a Republick which Governs always according to their Maxims, is not subject to the Faults of a single Person, and their Government suffers no alteration by the death of any of its Members, but preserves longer and better that which they conquer,

quer, than a Prince does, who many times has a Successor, as remarkable for Vice, as he himself was for Virtue. However, I shall here lay down the true Maxims, how both the one and the other may assure their Conquests, which consist in two things, *viz.* to take away both the Inclination and Power from those whom you have Conquered to Revolt. As to the first, if you Conquer a Free People, it is certain that you shall not be able to take away their desire of recovering their Liberty, at least so long as those who have liv'd at freedom are alive; If they be Subjects of a Prince or State, and do nothing but change Masters, they'll love to live under him who Treats them best, and therefore you must always begin by gentle Methods, and Grant the strongest assurance that can be to those whom you have Conquered, both for Life and Fortunes; for if your own natural Subjects don't find themselves assur'd as to both those things, you have reason to fear that they will Revolt, and much more those whom you have newly Conquer'd. It being the Law of Nature impress'd upon all living Creatures, even
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the very least of Animals, to endeavour their own preservation ; To which, Man who is endued with Reason, ought to add the preservation of his Honour and Fortune, which many times he prefers to Life it self. A Prince then ought to Reign with exact Justice, maintain the oppressed in his Right, abstain himself from all manner of Violence, either as to Women or Estates, for without doing so, it's impossible to keep a Conquer'd People in Obedience, You must also maintain them as much as is possible in the Form of their Government, and exclude none of them from arriving at Offices, Dignities and Honours, which they should be suffered to possess, without prejudice to their own Safety ; and if he be a Prince who makes this Conquest, the best way to assure himself of it is, to reside among 'em as often as he can, because his Presence prevents abundance of Disorders; the Splendor of his Court, imprints a kind of Veneration upon the Spirits of the People, and he gains the Citizens and Tradesmen where he Lives.

If it be a Republick which cannot change the Seat of their Government, they must nevertheless, take care that the Governours whom they send thither should live in Splendor, for the People are often more taken with the appearance of things, than the reality. These are the Methods which do intensibly bring new Conquered People to Obedience. But because this is not sufficient, and that oftentimes a Facility to Revolt, without punishment, puts them in mind to do it; It is necessary to Guard your self beforehand with all manner of necessary Security, which consists in having Arms and Fortresses in your Possession, I don't mean that you should disarm the People altogether, for if possible, that must be avoided, but you ought to assure your self of the great Towns by good Fortresses, to have Arsenals in different places, and not all in one, and to leave no Town or Castle, except your Garison'd Fortresses, in a capacity of resisting 100 Cannon shot. There is this last Method of all, that the Ancients did often put in practice to good purpose, and which I approve mightily, but it is not now in use, *viz.* To establish

Colonies, and transport the People of one Country into another; for besides, its being a great Curb, to keep a Conquer'd Country in Obedience, you hereby Compensate abundance of Soldiers, who have done you good Service. I don't think their Reason valid, who condemn this Method as cruel, and against the Rules of Charity. On the contrary, I think that the ways commonly made use of, *viz.* keeping the People so low, that they have nothing left but their Lives, and excluding them from all hopes of arriving to any Honour in their own Country, is far more cruel. For my own part, I speak ingenuously, I had rather be chas'd from my own Country to another, where I, or mine might have reasonable hopes of bettering our Conditions, than to stay in my own when depriv'd of that hope; there being nothing so hard in the World, as to deprive a Man of his Hopes; it being that which in this World, obliges him to undertake every thing, that he may enjoy the Goods of this Life, and the Hopes of what he shall enjoy in the Life to come, furnishes him with Constancy, to suffer every thing here. So that there

is nothing which does so much distinguish a Man from a Beast, nor the Regenerate Man from one that is Sensual, as *Hope*. Whence I conclude, that you must never deprive a Man of hopes of obtaining a better Condition; than that which he enjoys, lest you throw him into despair.

C H A P. XXI.

How we must proceed to succour our Friends and Allies.

ONE of the most Honourable Actions which a Prince can do, and by which he acquires the greatest Reputation, is to succour his Allies in their necessities, but it is a thing which is oftentimes very difficult. When we make War our selves, we chuse our advantages, and take our Times and Measures according to our own Pleasure and Ability; but it is not the same in succouring an Allie, whom you must assist with all the difficulties,

and Inconveniencies that occur, If his Country joyn to yours, and that there is nothing to prevent your assisting of him with your whole Force, you can have no pretence to decline it, if it be not that you are afraid of his Enemy, and are not willing to offend him, which is both a cowardly and an injudicious excuse; for by this means you shall not avoid the danger which the ruine of your Neighbour will bring upon you; it being much better to resist together, than suffer your selves to be defeated one after another; But if it be an Ally who is separated from you by other *Princes* and *States* which often happens) and that you must encounter many difficulties to enter his Country, you ought then to consider well, in what manner you are to succor him, for if the States betwixt you refuse you passage, and that you must fight them before you can succor your Allie; it is to be feared that you will not be able to assist him in time; and if your Neighbour, either for fear of you, or of him who attacks your Allie, offer you free passage, you cannot accept of it safely, except he put such places into your hands as are necessary to secure your Return; and if
this

this be refused, you ought not to go any further. But if your Allies Enemy have Dominions near unto you, which you can easily attack, you must do it briskly, and this assistance which is given by Diversi-
on, is in my Opinion the surest, and that which prospers best, because you do it with all your strength and conveniency; and ordinarily he whom you attack is unprovided, and he who attacks another Country, does usually carry with him his best Officers and Soldiers. But if all those Methods fail you, there is nothing left but Money, wherewith you can assist your Allie, which many times is not sufficient to Save him.

C H A P. XXII.

*Whether it be best for a Great Prince
to manage the War in Person, or
by a Deputy.*

IT's convenient in this place, to Discourse, Whether a Prince ought to manage his Wars in Person, or by a Deputy, because there being difference of Practice, as to this Matter, every Man brings his Reasons for his Opinion. Those who are against his managing the War in Person, alledge, that by leaving his Country, he opens the Door to Com-motions, and deprives himself of the means to prevent it; that it is more necessary for him to preserve Peace at home, than to make War abroad, and that nothing can so much contribute thereunto, as his Presence, which puts a Curb upon the Mutinous; That keeping Peace at
home,

he may the better give Orders as to the Affairs abroad, that Greater and more Incurable Dangers arise when the Prince is Engaged in Person to be out of his own Country than when he is in it. If he receive any Check in Person when he is far from home, those who are Mutinous will be the more bold to make Innovations, and every one will be ready to shake off their Obedience. If he be Kill'd, his Subjects are Confounded, his Enemies Emboldened, and make great Advantages of it. If he be Taken, it is still worse, for none being able to declare himself Prince, and the Grandees making their own advantage of his Calamity, put all things in such confusion, that nothing can be done with Authority in the State, because those who have seiz'd the Government, Tyrannize over others who may also have Pretensions to it, and will oftentimes rather call in the Common Enemy, than Obey their Companions. To all this they add, That a Prince, if Taken, cannot recover his Liberty, without giving great Advantages to his Enemy, which may turn to the remediless

prejudice of himself, and his Dominions so that all things being weighed, they conclude that the Inconveniences of the Prince's Hazarding himself in War, are greater than those of Managing the same by his Lieutenants. This Opinion is chiefly maintain'd by those of the Long Robe, who are Naturally Enemys to Men of War, and because they maintain their own Authority best in time of Peace; they not only dissuade the Prince from making War in Person, but also advise him rather to suffer any sort of Ignominy, than to engage in it otherwise. And with them joyn Flatterers, Pimps, and such others as are the Plague of Princes, and in time of Peace entertain them with such things as incline them to all manner of Luxury, and make them believe that their People were created only for them, and not they for the People; that to Debauch a Woman is more Honourable than to Conquer a Province, that there is more Industry and Glory in Marshalling a Feast than a Battle; that Labour is only fit for Porters; that Great Kings ought to do all things without
stir.

stirring themselves, which is the ordinary Road to the Ruine of Empires and Kingdoms.

Those who advise the Prince to make War in Person, alledge that the Command of an Army is such a Re ishing Bit, that it ought not to be committed to any other, but in cases of great necessity, because if one would acquit himself well in such a Charge, he must be very absolute, and oftentimes Generals dont contain themselves within the bounds of their Duty, especially when the Prince does not do his, who in this case is Naturally Envious of another Man's Glory, and can t endure to hear of the brave Actions of his Generals, although they succeed to his Advantage; and in this Humour those who Govern Affairs will Entertain him, because they are affraid of being Supplanted themselves by the Eminent Vertue of others, and hence proceeds the bad Success of many brave Designs, though well undertaken, which are made to miscarry for want of Money or Victuals, by restraining the General's Authority, or setting those over him

him who oppose and rather setter than assist him. And then if things don't succeed according to expectation, the blame is thrown upon the Innocent and the Culpable Triumph. And thus Great Princes who make War by their Lieutenants, will be serv'd. The Reputation of a Prince who is a good General himself, is quite another thing than that of a Prince who hath good Generals; the first is formidable in himself, but the last only by another; the first cannot betray himself, but the last may have his Generals Corrupted; the first knows how to make choice of those who are fit for War, but the last has good Soldiers only by Chance, the Authority of the Prince is neither subject to Envy nor Controll, seeing he is Master himself, and accountable to no other, but he who is General for another, is liable to a perpetual Jealousie, and happy if he escape free. And to prevent Civil Wars, the best way is to imploy those who are Stoutest and most Turbulent in Forreign Service, where they will find opportunity to glut their Ambition. You must
also

also be continually in a Warlike Posture, and that will cool the Courage of the hottest, and the Prince must always be at the Head of his Army, so that none may be able to incline it against him. They a ledge further, that never any Prince did found a large Empire but such as made War themselves in Person, nor did any ever lose one but by managing the War by Lieutenants. So that Princes are at Liberty to make their own Choice of either of the two, if he be a Poltron who contents himself to be admir'd by his Servants, delights only in sensuality, and lays aside the Office of a King for that of a Scoundrel, he'll never take the Advice of Commanding his Armies in Person; but if he be a Wise Prince who Loves his Repose that he may Govern his People in Justice, he will not omit to instruct himself in the Mystery of War, and to be prepared for it, that if there be occasion he needs not Entrust the Command of his Army to another. But if he be a Generous Prince who is Ambitious of Glory, and would imitate those Great Men who are still alive though 2000 Years after their
their